Jesús Daniel Romero from the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI2) for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
Introduction
On May 27, 2025, the United States allowed the license granted to Chevron to operate in Venezuela to expire. This decision marks a turning point in Washington's policy towards Caracas, following weeks of internal tensions within the Trump administration. The end of the license eliminates one of the last legal links between the oil industries of both countries and reaffirms a firm stance of pressure on the Maduro regime (Reuters, 2025a).
The License and Internal Division
Initially granted by the Biden administration in 2022 as a humanitarian gesture, the license allowed Chevron to produce and export oil in partnership with PDVSA. It has been a controversial measure since its inception, although some defended it as a pragmatic tool to maintain a U.S. presence in the Venezuelan energy sector while assessing the regime's willingness to negotiate in good faith (Wall Street Journal, 2022).
With the arrival of the Trump administration, pressures to completely cut off that avenue increased. Secretary of State Marco Rubio led the “maximum pressure” position. On the other hand, special envoy Richard Grenell advocated for a 60-day extension linked to the recent release of U.S. citizens (Washington Post, 2025). This disagreement exposed a critical flaw: the lack of internal coherence in U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela.
Strategic Implications
1. Economic Blow to the Maduro Regime
Chevron's operations accounted for nearly 24% of Venezuelan oil production (Argus Media, 2024). Its immediate cessation seriously limits the regime's revenues and exposes PDVSA to new operational difficulties.
2. Victory for the Coherence of Sanctions
The end of the license restores the credibility of sanctions as a pressure tool. It sends a clear message: the United States will not trade democratic principles for oil (Department of State, 2024).
3. Opportunity for Adversaries — And the Case for a Strategic Response
With Chevron's exit, space opens for Russia and China to expand their control over the Venezuelan energy sector. Rosneft and CNPC are not just simple investors: they are strategic instruments of adversarial governments, using the oil industry to project power and interfere in the region (Brookings Institution, 2023; CSIS, 2024).
Recommended measures:
● Apply sanctions under the CAATSA Act to Russian and Chinese companies supporting PDVSA.
● Strengthen maritime interdiction and monitoring of phantom fleets.
● Block dual-use technology transfers (refining, platforms, software).
● Pressure regional intermediaries acting as cover-ups.
If not responded to firmly, the United States could lose energy control of the hemisphere to its more aggressive rivals.
4. Internal Coherence: Grenell is a Strategic Risk
The effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy depends on a single voice, a single policy, and a single chain of command. Although the final decision on Chevron was correct, it was weakened by internal contradictions.
Richard Grenell acted out of line, publicly undermining Secretary Rubio and negotiating on his own with the regime. His insistence on extending the license contradicted the official policy and was interpreted as a sign of weakness and lack of coordination (Washington Post, 2025).
Recommendation:
The administration must ensure that only the Secretary of State speaks on behalf of the President's foreign policy. For coherence, authority, and credibility, Richard Grenell must be removed from any role related to Venezuela. His presence undermines institutional integrity and damages the strategic posture of the United States in the region.
5. Impact on Oil Markets
The withdrawal of Chevron may alter crude flows. U.S. refineries could turn to Mexico or Brazil, while Venezuelan oil will seek clandestine routes to Asia through Chinese and Russian companies (Bloomberg, 2025; Financial Times, 2025).
Conclusion
The end of Chevron's license is not simply a regulatory decision: it is a strategic reaffirmation. But its impact will depend on the ability of the United States to maintain coherence, apply effective pressure, and speak with one voice. The removal of misaligned actors is the first step towards credible, firm, and effective foreign policy.
References
● Argus Media. (2024, October 15). Chevron output in Venezuela nears 135,000 b/d under U.S. license. https://www.argusmedia.com
● Bloomberg. (2025, May 24). Venezuela’s crude flows shift as Chevron winds down exports. https://www.bloomberg.com
● Brookings Institution. (2023, August). Strategic rivals in Caracas: Russia, China, and Iran’s expanding influence. https://www.brookings.edu
● Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2024, April). China’s Oil Diplomacy in Latin America: Risks and Realities. https://www.csis.org
● Financial Times. (2025, April 10). Ghost fleets and dark ships: How China and Russia help Venezuela defy U.S. oil sanctions. https://www.ft.com
● Reuters. (2025a, May 22). Rubio says oil license in Venezuela will expire May 27. https://www.reuters.com
● U.S. Department of State. (2024, January 18). Venezuela Sanctions and the Path to Democratic Transition. https://www.state.gov
● Wall Street Journal. (2022, November 26). U.S. allows Chevron to resume oil operations in Venezuela under eased sanctions. https://www.wsj.com
● Washington Post. (2025, May 24). Rubio and Grenell, Trump’s dueling diplomats, clash over Venezuela. https://www.washingtonpost.com
World Oil. (2025, May 23). U.S. plans Chevron license for minimum upkeep in Venezuela. https://www.worldoil.com
Jesús Daniel Romero is a retired Commander of U.S. Naval Intelligence. Co-Founder and Senior Fellow at the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute, writer, and columnist for Diario Las Américas in Miami, Florida.
He is also the author of the Amazon best seller "Final Flight: The Queen of Air" and is preparing a new trilogy of books on the actions of drug trafficking cartels in Latin America.
Jesús served in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Panama, the Joint Intelligence Center of the Pacific in Hawaii, and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. He led U.S. government operations to account for missing U.S. personnel, with access to Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam for research and recovery operations.
His diplomatic assignments abroad included Lima, Peru; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Guatemala City as agency head and tactical analyst. His personal awards and recognitions include the Meritorious Civil Service Medal from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Superior Civil Service Medal from the Army, and the Franklin Award from the State Department. He was recognized four times by the Office of National Drug Control Policy of the United States and honored by the governments of Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala for his support to the anti-narcotics mission. He was also recognized by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Texas for his exemplary performance and dedication in the case United States v. Debra Lynn Mercer Aircraft Guaranty Corporation and Wright Brothers Inc., et. al. In 2022, he received one of the highest decorations from the Colombian Air Force, awarded by Colombian President Gustavo Petro.
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