Jesús Romero and William Acosta from Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
Introduction
Ecuador is facing an unprecedented violence crisis, largely driven by its role as a key transit point in the drug trafficking route from Colombia to international markets. The homicide rate has alarmingly increased, while criminal gangs are strengthening their influence in the country. This situation not only affects public safety but also raises doubts about the government's ability to manage the crisis, demanding a coordinated response at the regional level.
A detailed analysis of the current situation, its underlying factors, and the implications of government decisions in Ecuador, Colombia, and other countries involved in the fight against drug trafficking is presented below.
Context of Violence in Ecuador
The violence in Ecuador has reached critical levels. According to the Insight Crime report of 2024, the country has become the most violent in Latin America, with a rate of 38 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In the first 50 days of 2025, 1,300 murders have been recorded, equating to one crime per hour and representing a 40% increase compared to the previous year. The rise in violence, with minors among the victims, highlights the deterioration of social fabric and the state's inability to ensure safety.
One of the main factors behind this crisis is cocaine production in southern Colombia. Ecuador, as a transit country, faces severe criminality issues in its commercial and artisanal ports due to drug trafficking. The situation reflects dynamics similar to regions such as Catatumbo, where the struggle for control of cocaine routes has intensified violence. Without effective policy in Colombia to control coca crops and dismantle armed groups, any assistance requested by President Noboa would merely be palliative.
The international demand for cocaine, mainly in the United States and Europe, fuels this cycle of violence. The presence of Mexican cartels and distribution networks in Ecuador strengthens the criminal structure. Without greater international cooperation to reduce consumption and curb the flow of money to these organizations, the crisis will persist.
Government's Crisis Management in Ecuador
President Daniel Noboa's government has attributed the rise in violence to political factors, suggesting that instability could escalate with the presidential runoff elections. However, its hardline policy has shown limitations. Statements from Defense Minister Giancarlo Loffredo about the possible regrouping of armed groups indicate a lack of control over the situation, which could further exacerbate violence in the short term.
Despite efforts to reinforce security forces, the lack of resources and corruption in acquiring essential equipment, such as bulletproof vests, weaken the effectiveness of police and military operations. Noboa's recent proposal to seek foreign military aid highlights the urgency of finding immediate solutions, although there is no clarity on potential allies and the type of assistance they could provide.
The impact of violence on the daily lives of Ecuadorians is devastating. Murders in public places, massacres in Guayaquil, Durán, and Manta, and attacks on residences have generated an atmosphere of terror. This scenario underscores the government's inability to restore order and protect its citizens.
Criminal gangs in Ecuador have evolved, becoming more armed and organized. Although the government has classified them as enemies of war, military operations have failed to dismantle them, leading to an adaptation and strengthening of their structure.
Expansion of Guerrilla Groups and Drug Trafficking
The presence of Colombian guerrilla groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents of the FARC, has significantly impacted violence in Ecuador. These groups have crossed borders, taking advantage of the power vacuum and institutional weakness to establish themselves in Ecuador and other countries in the region.
The ELN has intensified its activity in the Colombia-Ecuador border, engaging in drug trafficking and territorial violence. FARC dissidents have also expanded their influence, increasing clashes with local gangs for control of trafficking routes and strategic territories.
The geographical proximity of Ecuador to Colombia, one of the world's largest cocaine producers, has facilitated this expansion. A clear example of this dynamic is Catatumbo, a strategic and conflictual area in Colombia. The strength of the Colombian Army has decreased by 26% since 2012, from 242,350 personnel to 177,800 in 2024, while illegal armed groups have grown by 14% in the last year, consolidating their territorial control.
The ELN has increased its ranks from 5,880 in 2022 to 6,300 in 2024, while the Gulf Clan has doubled its strength, from 3,600 members in 2018 to over 7,300 in 2024. Violence in Catatumbo has reached alarming levels, with more than 100 deaths and 11,000 displaced in recent clashes.
President Gustavo Petro has identified the ELN as the main culprit of the violence in the region, but the government's responses have been insufficient. The North Santander governor's office declared a manifest urgency and humanitarian emergency on January 20, 2025, to mobilize resources, but the persistence of the conflict highlights the state's ineffectiveness in containing the crisis.
Regional and International Responsibility
The crisis of violence in Ecuador cannot be addressed without coordinated action among several governments. The responsibility falls on:
• Colombia: The government of Gustavo Petro must strengthen the fight against drug trafficking and control coca cultivation. Its "total peace" policy has weakened pressure on armed groups, allowing their expansion.
• Venezuela: The regime of Nicolás Maduro has served as a refuge for criminal groups and drug traffickers, facilitating drug trafficking in the region.
• Mexico: Mexican cartels finance and supply criminal organizations in Ecuador, reinforcing violence.
• United States and Europe: As long as cocaine demand remains high, the money will continue to flow to the cartels. It is essential for these countries to strengthen their cooperation with Latin America to curb consumption and money laundering.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The crisis of violence in Ecuador and regions like Catatumbo is the result of a structural problem linked to the production and trafficking of cocaine. The lack of control over crops and drug trade has strengthened illegal armed groups, generating an environment of violence and instability.
If governments do not act decisively and coordinate, Ecuador risks becoming a narcostate, with irreversible consequences for the region. Urgent measures are required, such as:
1. Greater regional cooperation to dismantle criminal networks.
2. Reform of security forces to improve their effectiveness and eliminate corruption.
3. Reduction of drug consumption in destination markets through prevention campaigns and financial control.
4. Control of coca cultivation in Colombia to curb the flow of drugs to Ecuador.
Without a comprehensive response, violence will continue to escalate, threatening the stability of all of Latin America.
References
Bloomberg. (2025, January 24). In Catatumbo, Petro sees how his total peace plan fails. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-24/en-catatumbo-petro-ve-como-falla-su-plan-de-paz-total
Associated Press. (2023, March 6). Ecuador's violent crime surge linked to drug trafficking and extortion. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/ecuador-violencia-elecciones-secuestro-narcotrafico-extorsion-drogas-bb22e82712aedd4dca18deac8c06b087
Barron's. (2023, March 6). Clashes between drug gangs leave 22 dead and three injured in Ecuador. Barron's. https://www.barrons.com/news/spanish/choques-entre-bandas-narco-dejan-22-muertos-y-tres-heridos-en-ecuador-5b7407a3
About the Authors
William L. Acosta: Magna Cum Laude graduate from PWU and Universidad de Alianza. Retired New York police officer and founder of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc. Since 1999, he has led investigations into narcotics, homicides, and missing persons, participating in state and federal criminal defense. An international case specialist, he has coordinated operations in North America, Europe, and Latin America.
Jesús D. Romero: Magna Cum Laude graduate from Norfolk State University. Retired intelligence officer from the U.S. Navy and Army Intelligence Operations with 37 years of service. Worked in the defense industry with British Aerospace Systems and Booz Allen Hamilton. Commanded a unit of the Defense Intelligence Agency in Panama and supervised operations in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. Bestselling author on Amazon and commentator on radio, television, and print media. Member and co-founder of the think tank Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute.
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