Octavio Pérez, Senior Fellow MSI² for FinGurú
Much has been written since CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) published and conducted war simulations in 2023 concerning a possible invasion attempt of Taiwan in 2026-2027. For the last three years, China has been conducting war simulations and live-fire exercises around Taiwan.
In particular, the two previous exercises of 2024 (Joint Sword 2024-1 and Joint Sword 2024-2) and the one conducted in early 2025 (Strait Thunder 2025-1). As we approach the estimated date, we observe an increase in activity and ongoing rehearsals, just like in many other previous military operations.
This article examines several studies conducted following the CSIS war simulation in 2023 and provides insight into the magnitude of this attempt and the variables that could be critical in the event of an attack. Finally, based on the indicators and warnings that have been studied and even considered key events, we can lean towards various scenarios, whether a large-scale invasion, a blockade, or a quarantine as an initial or final objective.
Saddam Hussein's special forces and key personnel secretly rehearsed the invasion of Kuwait in 1989. Operation Thunderbolt (also known as Operation Yonatan) in 1976 was also rehearsed before the final attack on Entebbe airport on July 3, 1976. In less than six days, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli special forces built a model of the airport and diligently rehearsed their mission. Here are two examples of military raids: one planned a year in advance and the other in six days. At the same time, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been rehearsing with live-fire exercises for years, with increasing intensity over the last three.
Is all this a deception operation? Intimidation? Invading the "Gray Zones" of Taiwan, i.e., its territorial waters and airspace, with a significant increase in naval and air resources over the years, and providing substantial intelligence on targets for counter-battery fire also prepares both sides for conflict.
Therefore, if we observe a continuous pattern that seems to lead to an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, we must determine what indicators and warnings are associated with a possible invasion and avoid falling into a deception both strategically and operationally.
We must also put into perspective what China needs to achieve and the challenges it must overcome to achieve this goal. A large-scale endeavor that will involve risk, deception, and speed, with coordination and maneuverability.
A brief recap of the challenges China must overcome to succeed in this endeavor. Despite the apparent proximity to the mainland, D-Day in Normandy in 1944, Incheon in Korea in 1950, and Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991 involved an element of deception that proved to be a combat multiplier, saving lives, operational costs, and time.
A feint in war, a fundamental surprise. A deception to gain an advantage, as the 1st Cavalry Division did during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 in Wadi al-Batin, on the border between Iraq and Kuwait. For 11 days (from February 13 to 24, 1991), the 1st Cavalry entered Iraq every night, advancing several kilometers inside each day on search and destroy missions. All this, coupled with artillery preparation that lasted over an hour, and the support of all the artillery units of the 7th Corps as they positioned themselves for the final attack. This created the perception that the main advance would come through the Wadi (dry riverbed), and the enemy shifted most of its artillery in that direction, as well as a couple of Republican Guard divisions in their secondary defense. A strategic trick we pulled off without the press knowing until after the invasion. And the rest of the 7th Corps actually came in with the "Hail Mary" pass option, where units entered through the western sector and surrounded their forces.
Remember that all this posture by China could also be part of a feint, a ruse, a deception simulating an amphibious landing operation. When in reality, it could be a deceptive maneuver, and an airborne or airmobile operation might be the real invasion force. A blockade or quarantine is imposed while they continue destroying governmental and military facilities until the Taiwanese forces surrender.
Citing Ian Easton's article "Why a Taiwan Invasion Wouldn't Look Anything Like D-Day," Ian's analysis clearly identifies the enormous differences between the two: "...Unlike Normandy, the coastal terrain here is a defender's dream. Taiwan only has 14 small invasion beaches, all surrounded by cliffs and urban jungles...".
Thus, in his analysis, he makes it very clear that the terrain, composed of granite hills (filled with tunnels and bunker systems) and the multitude of peripheral islands, separated from the mainland and heavily protected with missiles, rockets, and artillery, offers a very different scenario for an invading force than that of D-Day in Normandy.
He continues to explain how the rugged terrain of the main island, with 258 peaks over 3,000 meters high, poses another challenge for ongoing defense and insurgencies after the initial attack. He reiterates that the coastal terrain here is a defender's dream come true. Furthermore, he reviews some unique constructions built for protection against earthquakes and typhoons, which ultimately serve as part of the defenses.
Ian's article, published in May 2021, remains relevant. It addresses the military strength of Taiwan in peacetime, of nearly 190,000 personnel, and a large reserve force primarily composed of recent recruits that could quickly muster up to 450,000. It is estimated that, in the worst-case scenario, 260,000 reservists could be mobilized to quickly increase active-duty personnel.
Once this premise is established, the factors that intervene and exacerbate or complicate a large-scale amphibious assault must be considered.
It is necessary to consider that there are many other factors at play: reaction time and mobilization of reserves, how quickly they can respond to a national call-up, the declaration of a state of emergency, the already installed weapon systems, and the long-range missiles that are part of the defenses and could intercept ships and landing craft.
Technology and cyberspace are also important factors, as both countries are world leaders and have residents on both sides who also serve as potential (Humint operations) with sleeper cells or saboteurs.
Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War
The effectiveness of drones in the Ukraine-Russia war will also be a factor in this confrontation. Many lessons were learned from the integration of drones into combat and the myriad functions they perform. The advent of lasers, sonic weapons, or what are now referred to as directed energy weapons also comes into play.
The use of hypersonic missiles, which are sometimes extremely difficult to block or employ electronic countermeasures before impact, is a novelty on the battlefield, with their use being repeated for the first time during the Ukraine War.
A recently introduced combat multiplier: Harpoon missiles.
In addition to CSIS experts, the war simulation was also attended by John Moolenaar, Chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP; Raja Krishnamoorthi, senior member; and Rob Wittman, Vice Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
In April, Wittman was one of four US representatives who sent a letter urging the House Appropriations Committee to allocate $165 million to expedite the delivery of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.
Lawmakers stated that the missiles should be delivered within the "Davidson window," a term referring to the period 2021-2027, when former USS Indo-Pacific Command chief Admiral Phil Davidson believed a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be most likely.
Last year, Bloomberg reported that Taiwan had purchased 400 land-launch Harpoon missiles from the United States, thus completing a deal that the US Congress approved in 2020.
The Taiwanese newspaper Liberty Times, in Chinese, reported in September that Taiwan had received an unspecified number of Harpoon missiles, part of a total of 128 missiles and 32 launchers to be delivered by the end of 2026.
And the key question remains: when will the United States react? Will it act alone? Will Japan and South Korea also support? Will this mean that Taiwan will have to act alone for a while? How long will allies wait to react?
Overall Combat Experience of Both Sides
The PLA invaded Vietnam in 1979, for 3 weeks and 6 days, when it launched a surprise border attack, controlled some cities, and then withdrew. It was practically a land infantry raid 46 years ago, nothing like an amphibious operation. They also do not usually train in complex combined arms scenarios. Therefore, that integration has not been tested. But they are attempting to put it to the test now with recent exercises. The Taiwanese Armed Forces have been training with the United States since 1980, and with greater intensity since 2023. Japan has also offered to train them. The United States maintained a Taiwan Defense Force from 1954 to April 1979.
Invasion Force
A key doctrinal ratio for offensive combat operations is a minimum ratio of 3:1 between the attacking force and the defending force, which becomes even more critical given Taiwan’s geography, natural defenses, and preparations. Therefore, to maintain the 3:1 ratio, the PLA would need to assemble over 1.3 million troops, against the estimated 450,000 defenders. Another bold challenge in the Taiwan Strait. Again, given the terrain and defense characteristics, this ratio could rise to 4:1 or 5:1.
Regardless of the enormous expansion of its fleet of ships and landing crafts, traffic congestion and the possible use of decoys (ships from other merchant fleets, tankers, tugboats, fishing boats) would also present a coordination issue, given the scale of this operation compared to the massive supporting fleet of D-Day.
No one questions the enormous superiority of Chinese forces or their potential to sustain such an operation, but their ability to execute violently and effectively in a short period is in doubt. While these last three years of war simulations have provided them with experience in maneuvers and positioning forces, they have never been under pressure (taking fire); in the end, experience is experience, and it is learned through continuous rehearsal and execution.
Once again, geography, defense exercises, and Taiwan's preparation will pose a challenge for the large Chinese PLA. To achieve operational control of a beachhead or entry point (airport) for airmobile operations, it must achieve this, along with air superiority to protect the rest of the invading force floating in the Taiwan Strait. Failing to do so would be very costly, and being unable to support the initial airmobile assault could result in failure or a high number of casualties.
Various estimates about the real potential of inserting and deploying amphibious troops in Taiwan range from 8,000 per day when compared to D-Day. The Normandy assault involved over 131,000 soldiers daily, along with an additional 24,000 paratroopers. Taiwan will also have mines, deployed attack submarines, as well as multiple air defenses and coastal artillery across all those islands. Increased support from the United States, Japan, and South Korea could even lead to higher attrition rates for the invading force.
According to the CSIS estimate for a possible assault in 2026, it was calculated that an invasion force would consist of approximately 96 ships and 305 trips in landing crafts. Subsequent amphibious waves are expected to decrease continuously. While aviation can quickly mobilize large amounts of troops, it cannot compete with maritime transport for moving the enormous quantities of equipment and fuel that China would need. Therefore, China must secure its maritime ports or, otherwise, rely on diminishing volumes of additional equipment and supply.
Securing maritime ports, of which there are 14 possible sites, will be a monumental challenge. Taiwan has had ample time to integrate defenses with layers of mines, breakwaters, and explosive traps of all kinds. Depending on their intentions, the time of use of these sites as part of airmobile operations (T+24 or T+48) will also affect the success of a landing force to concentrate sufficient forces to take the beaches and destroy the initial defenses.
Thus, during the first week or so, the balance tilts in favor of the defender, who has had several decades to prepare for such a scenario. Failing to secure adequate ports, beaches, and airports during the first week could be very costly, as it would not be expected that the United States and other allies could respond within this timeframe, trying to exhaust all diplomatic resources to halt the invasion.
Therefore, when CSIS conducted the war simulation, they indicated that if there was no US involvement, the invasion would succeed if Taiwan fought alone.
Citing Mark and Matthew Cancian, along with Eric Heginbotham, who wrote in their study: "The First Battle of the Next War...".
“The invasion always begins in the same way: an initial bombing destroys most of Taiwan's navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Supported by a powerful force of co""Today, the Chinese navy surrounds Taiwan and prevents any attempts to bring ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a combination of military amphibious vessels and civilian roll-on/roll-off cargo ships, while airborne and air-assault troops land behind the beachheads…
The war exercise was carried out 24 times, applying different variables, with or without U.S. and Japanese intervention, with or without a blockade, and considering the speed with which the United States would react. Scenarios were even isolated to determine the efficiency of Taiwan's armed forces and the use of certain equipment: anti-ship missiles, a blockade before an amphibious assault, airborne and air-assault operations in support of the invasion.
According to the conclusions reached after all these war drills, it was essential that Taiwan stands firm. Furthermore, it was necessary for the United States to use its bases in Japan and intervene quickly. On the other hand, China would have to maximize its deception techniques, using RORO (Roll On Roll Off) vessels to land vehicles where there are no beaches or ports. Using a container ship as a platform for helicopters to help concentrate enough forces. In addition, the use of commercial and cargo planes for air drops; instead of the usual helicopters, they use the Harbin Z-20, a replica of our Sikorsky UH 60 Blackhawk, and variants of the IL 76 fixed-wing aircraft capable of transporting more than 240 paratroopers (two brigades), and the remaining five brigades with others of fixed wing (Y20, Y7, and Y9) with between 41 and 51 paratroopers each. With a total of 6 or 7 airborne brigades summing an estimated force of 60,000 paratroopers, any viable platform would have to be used to achieve entry in the early hours.
After evading multiple mines, traps, and defenses, they would also have to intentionally beach at least some ROLLO ferries on the beaches to overcome the initial lack of controlled ports. This ruse would facilitate the landing of supplies and materials. All these deceptive maneuvers are extremely risky and represent significant losses of personnel, material, and equipment. China could stage feints to draw Taiwanese attention toward amphibious landing sites that do not constitute the main effort and could seize the opportunity and turn a feint into a real attack.
But deception begins even in the early stages of planning, sometimes months or weeks prior to the event, and in many cases, it is almost impossible to conceal. A key indicator is the concentration of forces. In this case, live exercises, natural disasters, and inclement weather can be timely for concealing the movement of units, critical supplies, and other preparations.
Now that China will conduct at least two major live-fire exercises each year (the latest guideline in two years), this would serve as a basis for planning. Taiwan has also implemented its own war exercises to coincide with these events.
Thus, when piecing together the puzzle, other critical indicators and warnings can be clearly isolated by identifying the movement of equipment and, in the case of a live-fire exercise, the quantity and types of missiles, and determining the intent and any changes. Again, these would serve as deterrents or as traps.
In short, a Chinese amphibious invasion would be, in modern times, the most complex operation since D-Day, even if it does not achieve the total number of troops and equipment that were used during D-Day. War simulation scenarios predict a very high cost of equipment and personnel for China in most cases. The intervention of the United States and Japan in the conflict also confirms this assertion. Unless China manages to deceive through numerous stratagems the actual invasion, its chances of success in at least securing the southern coast are limited.
CSIS did not include any elements of deception in its war simulations, testing different conditions, nor did it achieve the ultimate goal of control. Therefore, oversight of these biannual exercises becomes crucial to determining whether, and what elements of deception, could be employed in the event of an attack. The Army and Armed Forces generally train for combat and rehearse their battles using battle plans, doctrine, and command post and field exercises (CPX/FTX). Therefore, as knowledge is acquired and possible scenarios can be verified with deception operations, they can be included during the war simulation to test the results.
President Xi has been in power since 2012 for over 13 years, and even reformed the Constitution to remain in lifelong power. But he is 72 years old, regained control of Hong Kong and Macau and will continue pursuing the goal of Taiwan's reunification in the next decade. Some analysts narrow the timeframe down to 2027–2030. In two years, he will be 74, and in 2030, 77. How will his health be? He has stated that this is part of his legacy: establishing one China in Taiwan, and he will not yield.
What will the economy of a country with 1.4 billion inhabitants be like in 2027? And in 2030? How strong is the Social Welfare Fund to support 300 million Chinese aged 50 to 60 who will retire in the next decade, when the fund is expected to be depleted by 2035? If today one in five young people aged 16 to 24 cannot find work, and there is a housing surplus of over 2 billion units, many of which are empty in so-called ghost cities, and the domestic economy does not compensate for the lost exports due to a tariff war, these are dissenting elements in the population that would truly influence any decision.
But, again, let's never forget that even in austere and critical times in Argentina, a military junta invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982. Appealing to nationalism and sovereignty when, in reality, the issues in mainland China were economic, and dealing with discontent and terrorist movements, and the army dealing with the children and families of these terrorists.
Everything can happen despite the internal problems of any country, and leaders will use distraction tactics to contain a popular uprising or a coup d'état.
Another aspect to consider is the U.S. doctrine towards China and the changes since 2021. During the Biden administration, funding for regional deterrence tripled to nearly $15 billion (2021-24). Authorization to co-sponsor, build, and assign Marines to a base in northern Australia, the re-emergence of naval assets in a joint venture with the Philippines at the former Subic Bay base, in addition to other bilateral agreements in the South China Sea, seemed to be the center of attention. In contrast, Xi Jinping has been involved in destabilizing not only the South China Sea but also throughout the north, through the Taiwan Strait, to the coasts of Japan.
Xi has engaged China in joint exercises with the Russian Navy around the Kuril Islands (Russia) and Senkaku (China). Both countries have made claims over them and will continue to probe the terrain. Xi Xioa Ping has taken on the burden of banking transactions with Russia and dual-use electronic components found in drones and missiles assembled in Russia, so he is committed to many other initiatives in the region and around the world.
Thus, Washington's overall deterrence policy should be reevaluated to achieve immediate deterrence. Recent actions and movements by China, by its own admission, clearly indicate that the aircraft carrier Shandong was deployed during the last exercise to coordinate naval and air operations and assess joint operations. A sign of greater integration of all combined operations, a key indicator and an essential task for invading.
The sending of vessels and aircraft to those gray areas has been intentional to test Taiwanese reactions. They believe in a possible scenario where a military exercise could become a surprise attack.
Given that Beijing constantly sends warplanes across the Taiwan Strait, a major international shipping corridor through which more than 20% of the world's maritime trade passes annually (2022 statistic), 44% of the world's container fleet transits through the Strait. Moreover, they accompany any American battleship or other countries crossing it.
Taiwan, in response to these war drills and their findings, has established a central response group to oversee the latest exercises, according to Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo.
China's Taiwan Affairs Office stated that the exercises were directed against Lai Ching-te, the firmly pro-independence president of Taiwan. Polls show that a large majority of residents on the island reject the possibility of Chinese domination and support Taiwan's independence.
Taiwan and China separated amid a civil war 76 years ago, but tensions have increased since 2016, during Barack H. Obama's administration, when China cut off almost all contacts with Taipei, despite the fact that Taiwanese citizens were the original source of investment in 1991, and since then, more than $206 billion in investments have reached a peak of nearly $166 billion in trade in 2023.
Other findings and results from these studies suggest that Taiwan would have to withstand a Chinese blockade and invasion for approximately a month before the United States could successfully transport forces or ammunition by air or sea to support it, according to war simulations organized by a defense industrial base conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
As a final reflection, keep these comments in mind to reach your conclusion:
In a briefing on the exercise, CSIS defense expert Mark Cancian stated: “The mountainous terrain of Taiwan and its two relatively narrow coastal strips make it a difficult island to capture…” Besides its terrain, Taiwan's capital, along with most of its industry and military forces, is located in the north, he stated, adding that this presents China with a difficult decision.
China can invade from the north, "slowing down Taiwanese defenses," but also very close to Taipei, or from the south, where it is much easier to conquer the coast, but “you have to fight your way through the entire island.” If Chinese forces managed to establish themselves in the south, the resulting campaign would resemble that of Italy in World War II, with Chinese and Taiwanese troops fighting river to river, ridge to ridge, he concluded.
In the event of an attack from the south, he stated, China would attempt to land its forces and quickly capture a port or airfield, while the United States and Japan would rush to sink Chinese amphibious ships so they could no longer support their forces in Taiwan.
CSIS also organized another war simulation with the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party in November 2024.
The same analyst reiterated that, "...In most of the [simulations] we win that race, but at a very high price..." Cancian said.
During this session, Cancian highlighted that “...one lesson from the war game was the value of anti-ship missiles…” In the next two years, "I think the most effective thing would be to equip Taiwan with 500 Harpoon missiles," he stated. Such missiles would be stationed in Taiwan, installed on mobile launchers, and could reach Chinese ships within range, without requiring U.S. troops to be deployed on land, he added.
"The other lesson is that once combat starts, it is impossible to send forces or reinforcements to Taiwan," Cancian stated. Given that Chinese forces would surround Taiwan, the United States would not be able to provide an air or sea bridge to the island "at least during the first three or four weeks," he added.
For that reason, "Taiwan would have to fight for at least the first month, and perhaps the first two, with any initial strategy."
In conclusion, China is preparing for an amphibious invasion, based on exercises and the recent movement of resources that continuously explore the gray zones around Taiwan.
If it occurs, deception elements would be crucial and would be planned well in advance, camouflaged in the current series of exercises. Numerous indicators and warnings would alert Taiwan, the United States, and its allies, given the complexity of the operation, the short distances between both countries, the impact on maritime operations that affect global shipping, and many other factors. The start could be a blockade, a quarantine based on an excuse or accusation. Hold Coast Guard vessels, board commercial ships, and accuse Taiwan of sabotage operations. This would quickly escalate into an invasion.
The defender has the advantage at the beginning of hostilities, given the amount of preparation, the defenses, the natural terrain, and the inaccessibility of landing points. Therefore, even if an amphibious assault is combined with airborne operations, it would be a colossal task.
And China does not have the number of airborne transports that were used on D-Day, so the need to activate cargo and commercial planes would also indicate an imminent air assault.
Deception is key, but with the requirements needed to achieve a violent and insurmountable assault that allows control of airfields and beachheads, and continue sending additional troops and equipment, which requires operating artificial ports, seems very difficult.
This is reflected in the brainstorming scenarios of the war games. So, will it ever reach an assault? Or could it be a blockade or a quarantine? Your decision is as valid as mine..."
AP World News. (April 2, 2025). China holds military exercises focused on the Taiwan Strait. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/china-military-drills-taiwan-strait-shipping-5a8897368bdabc7038c17
Center for Strategic and International Studies (n.d.). Defeating Deception: How to Overcome Chinese Deception in an Invasion of Taiwan (Part 1 of the China Power Series). https://chinapower.csis.org/
Easton, I. (May 26, 2021). Why a Taiwan Invasion Would Look Nothing Like D-Day. The Diplomat. Project 2049 Institute. https://project2049.net/2021/05/26/why-a-taiwan-invasion-would-look-nothing-like-d-day/
Focus Taiwan CAN English News (November 21, 2024). Taiwan Must Hold Out a Month if China Invades: U.S. War Maneuver. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202411210008
Independent. (October 14, 2024). China Encircles Taiwan in Latest Round of Military Drills to Warn Separatist Forces. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/china-encircles-taiwan-military-drills-independence-b2628708.html
Straight Arrow News. (February 26, 2025). Taiwan Mobilizes Forces as China Holds Provocative Live-Fire War Games. https://san.com/cc/taiwan-scrambles-forces-as-china-stages-provocative-live-fire-war-games/
The Defense Post. (March 20, 2025). Annual Taiwanese Military Exercises to Simulate a Chinese Attack in 2027. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/03/20/taiwan-china-attack/
Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Pérez is a U.S. Army intelligence officer with extensive experience, having served over two decades in active duty and other assignments in the reserves. He specialized in intelligence and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, commanding operations at Fort Leonard Wood and serving in the Republic of Korea. At the Defense Intelligence Agency, he focused on North Korean military analysis and responded to crises related to the Achille Lauro and TWA 847 incidents. Pérez volunteered for the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Shield/Desert Storm and later served as Chief Intelligence Instructor at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, where he trained Latin American officers in low-intensity conflicts. His career in the reserves culminated at U.S. Southern Command as a strategic intelligence officer (J2 Ops).
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