Jose Adan Gutiérrez, senior member, MSI². Enzo Ibaceta, entrepreneur; for FinGurú

Although it is not perceived as a direct military threat, this project is framed within a broader scenario: the global strategic competition between the United States and China. For Chilean analysts and authorities, U.S. funding to Ushuaia seems, in part, a response to the space base that China maintains in Neuquén, Argentina (Personal communication, August 7, 2025). The proximity of Ushuaia to Antarctica, combined with the 5,000 km of shared border between Chile and Argentina, intensifies Santiago's caution. This article integrates historical background, diplomatic perceptions, geopolitical implications, and direct testimonies to analyze how the Argentina/China/U.S. and Argentina/Chile/U.S. equations interact on the new board of the South Atlantic.

1. Introduction and context

The expansion of the Ushuaia naval center—announced by President Javier Milei along with Southern Command—has an estimated cost of $300 to $360 million and aims to boost Antarctic logistical operations, maritime search and rescue, and scientific support (SOUTHCOM Public Affairs, 2025; Orinoco Tribune, 2025). However, the initiative transcends the technical: it emerges at a time when Washington and Beijing are competing for influence in Latin America, and Argentina and Chile have become a key battleground in this dispute.

The Chinese presence in southern Argentina is tangible: the Neuquén space station, operated by an agency subordinate to the People’s Liberation Army, operates with restricted access even for Argentine authorities (Riotimes Online, 2025). Washington views the modernization of Ushuaia as an opportunity not only to counteract that footprint but also to reinforce its logistical projection in Antarctica, support maritime security operations, and ensure compliance with the Antarctic Treaty (El País, 2025).

For Chile—historically a U.S. ally and immediate neighbor of Argentina—the dilemma is clear: how to balance friendly relations with Buenos Aires and Washington without jeopardizing Chilean sovereignty, its Antarctic projection, and its strategic position in the region?

2. Background of the naval base project in Ushuaia

The Ushuaia base has traditionally been Argentine, but its modernization with U.S. support marks a qualitative change. For specialized media and analysts, the initiative is part of the strategy to counterbalance the growing Chinese footprint, which includes not only Neuquén but also port investments in the South Atlantic (Polar Journal, 2021; Americas Quarterly, 2025).

Construction began in 2022 and is progressing slowly. As of December 31, 2023, physical progress reached 9.13%, with a financial execution close to 2,500 million pesos; earthworks and the platform of one of the two warehouses were completed. In April 2025, Report No. 142 from the Chief of Staff confirmed that physical progress remained at 9.13%, with no substantial additional progress. But the presence of high-ranking U.S. officials such as retired General Laura Richardson and Admiral Alvin Holsey reflects that Washington considers Ushuaia a geopolitical asset (Mercopress, 2025; SOUTHCOM Public Affairs, 2025). The logistical dimension—submarines, SAR operations, scientific research—complements the strategic dimension.

3. Strategic concerns of Chile

3.1 Antarctic logistics and maritime access

Punta Arenas has historically been the gateway to Antarctica and seeks to consolidate itself with the International Antarctic Center (INACH, n.d.). The eventual strengthening of Ushuaia could partially displace that role (El País, 2025). Chilean authorities have warned in parliamentary commissions that losing prominence in Antarctic logistics would equate to reducing the country’s capacity to project its sovereignty on the “white continent” (Agenda Malvinas, 2024).

3.2 Strategic rivalry and military presence

The U.S. entry to strengthen Argentine capabilities generates, in the Chilean reading, a potential imbalance. This is amplified by Buenos Aires' purchase of 24 F-16 jets and the absence of compensatory measures or transparency towards Chile. In Chilean military circles, there is a debate about whether Ushuaia represents a "change in the status quo" that warrants enhanced deterrence (Agenda Malvinas, 2025a).

3.3 Sovereignty issues

The history of tensions over the Beagle Channel and the continental shelf conditions the Chilean perception. Even minor gestures, such as the installation of Argentine solar panels in disputed territory, have prompted diplomatic protests (Agenda Malvinas, 2025a).

4. Historical patterns and new geopolitical equations

4.1 Timeline: Chile–Argentina relations (1978–2025)

1977–1978: Beagle Conflict (brings both countries to the brink of war).

1979–1984: Papal mediation and definitive peace.

1990–2010: Opening and rapprochement.

2009:

• Argentina presents to the CLPC (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the UN) its request for extension of the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles, including an area over the “crescent” in the Southern Zone sea south of point F.

• Chile makes a preliminary presentation to the CLPC regarding its extended continental shelf in the area near the Taitao Peninsula.

2016–2017: The CLPC officially approves the Argentine presentation originating in 2009, except for disputed zones with the United Kingdom or subject to the Antarctic Treaty.

2020–2021: Chile updates the Nautical Chart No. 8 and incorporates into its maritime maps a projection of the continental shelf (not extended) from the Diego Ramírez Islands, which partially overlaps with the Argentine claim; Argentina formally protests.

2021–2023: New boundary and diplomatic frictions.

2021: Argentina issues a decree that generates controversy over shared matters in the Strait of Magellan; Chile questions it.

December 2023: With Milei in power, there are diplomatic tensions towards Chile from Argentine officials, creating a bilateral impasse.

2024–2025: Growing tensions.

2024: Controversy over the installation of solar panels near Landmark 1 in Chilean territory. Chile demands their removal; Argentina calls it a technical error (Agenda Malvinas, 2025a).

April 2024: President Javier Milei announces the construction of an "integrated naval base" in Ushuaia with U.S. participation. It is emphasized that it would be a major logistics center, "the closest development port to Antarctica," and would turn Argentina into the "gateway to the white continent."

April 2024: General Laura Richardson, then head of Southern Command, visits Ushuaia, reinforces strategic ties, and backs the project.

2024: Tense relations between Presidents Gabriel Boric and Javier Milei, marked by public statements, although without formal breaks.

November 2024: Milei decides not to send an Argentine representative to the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the agreement that avoided the Beagle war, reviving diplomatic tensions.

April 2025: Admiral Alvin Holsey (Southern Command) makes another three-day visit, including Ushuaia, to solidify the project's progress. An investment close to $360 million is estimated (SOUTHCOM Public Affairs, 2025; Mercopress, 2025).

4.2 The Argentina–China–United States triangle

The Ushuaia base cannot be analyzed in isolation from the Chinese presence in Neuquén. However, limiting the explanation to a "mirror effect" would be insufficient. For Washington, Ushuaia serves multiple functions: reinforcing operations in the South Atlantic, projecting rescue and observation capacity in Antarctica, and ensuring open bi-oceanic routes (El País, 2025).

Beijing, for its part, frames the discussion within its broader strategy of cognitive warfare against the United States and its global influence. Instead of responding to the substance of the concerns, its spokespeople resort to a predictable discourse pattern: disqualifying the U.S. view as a "Cold War mentality" and presenting their projects as strictly scientific initiatives and peaceful cooperation (Andrés Bello Foundation, 2025; South China Morning Post, 2025). Official Chinese media reinforces that narrative, projecting the image of a reliable partner and accusing Washington of "militarizing" the south of Argentina, another example of how Beijing seeks to shape strategic perceptions and weaken the legitimacy of the U.S. presence without directly confronting the merits of the critiques (Wall Street Journal, 2024).

4.3 The Argentina–Chile–United States triangle

For Chile, Washington’s support for Buenos Aires poses a diplomatic challenge: without balancing and transparency measures, it can be interpreted as a strategic inclination towards Argentina. This risk forces the exploration of trilateral cooperation mechanisms.

5. Strategic responses from Chile

Chile has already responded with parliamentary action, investment in southern ports, and legal monitoring (Agenda Malvinas, 2024; AInvest, 2025). However, Chilean military experts suggest that the country should promote mutual confidence measures:

• Trilateral naval exercises Chile–Argentina–U.S. in rescue and Antarctic security tasks.

• Transparency agreements regarding the uses of Ushuaia and Punta Arenas, including reciprocal visits of military delegations.

• Joint scientific cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty, allowing shared facilities and projects.

These initiatives would help reduce perceptions of threat, transforming Ushuaia from a potential friction point into an opportunity for regional collaboration.

6. Conclusion and political implications

The construction of the Ushuaia base falls within a larger board: the global China–U.S. competition. For Santiago, the key is not only to avoid imbalances today but also to project future scenarios. If the Chinese presence intensifies in the region, Chile could see the Ushuaia base as a useful counterbalance—provided it actively participates in its use framework.

In this sense, Ushuaia should not be viewed as an exclusive bilateral initiative, but as part of a trilateral arrangement that incorporates Chile as a partner in logistical, scientific, and security planning. Only then will Washington ensure that the base strengthens regional stability instead of generating insecurity.

A crisis avoided is a crisis prevented, but a shared opportunity can become a pillar of regional trust.

References

Agenda Malvinas. (2024, May 24). The Chilean Defense Commission met in Antarctica amid controversies with Argentina. https://agendamalvinas.com.ar/en/noticia/la-comision-de-defensa-chilena-sesiono-en-la-antartida-en-medio-de-controversias-con-argentina

Agenda Malvinas. (2025a). Chile claims Argentina for military construction within its territory. https://agendamalvinas.com.ar/en/noticia/chile-reclama-a-la-argentina-por-construccion-militar-dentro-de-su-territorio

AInvest. (2025). Chile’s earthquake sparks opportunities in Antarctic resilience. https://www.ainvest.com/news/chile-earthquake-sparks-opportunities-antarctic-resilience-tourism-recovery-2505

Americas Quarterly. (2025, April 22). A new stage in the race to develop Latin America’s ports. https://americasquarterly.org/article/a-new-stage-in-the-race-to-develop-latin-americas-ports

Arancibia Clavel, F. (2025, August 7). Zoom interview with JoseAdan Gutiérrez and Enzo Ibaceta. Personal communication.

Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. (2025). Chile: New port in Magallanes that will facilitate green energy projects. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/chile-new-port-in-magallanes

El País. (2025, May 1). The U.S. sets its sights on Antarctica in pushback against China. https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-05-01/the-us-sets-its-sights-on-antarctica-in-pushback-against-china.html

Andrés Bello Foundation. (2025, February 10). China rebuts U.S. ambassador designate’s remarks on Argentina. https://fundacionandresbello.org/en/news/argentina-%F0%9F%87%A6%F0%9F%87%B7-news/china-rebuts-u-s-ambassador-designates-remarks-on-argentina

Chilean Antarctic Institute (INACH). (n.d.). International Antarctic Center. https://www.inach.cl/iniciativas-de-divulgacion/centro-antartico-internacional

Mercopress. (2025, May 5). Argentina-US SouthCom chief passes through. https://en.mercopress.com/2025/05/05/argentina-us-southcom-chief-passes-through-consequences-to-be-seen-shortly

Orinoco Tribune. (2025). We are at serious risk: US pushes for naval base in southern Argentina. https://orinocotribune.com/we-are-at-serious-risk-us-pushes-for-naval-base-in-southern-argentina

Polar Journal. (2021, July 27). Argentina plans Antarctic logistics center in Ushuaia. https://polarjournal.net/argentina-plans-antarctic-logistics-center-in-ushuaia

Riotimes Online. (2025). South Atlantic stakes: U.S. counters China at Argentina’s Ushuaia naval hub. https://www.riotimesonline.com/south-atlantic-stakes-u-s-counters-china-at-argentinas-ushuaia-naval-hub

South China Morning Post. (2025, February 11). China slams U.S. envoy nominee for framing Argentina as ‘great power battlefield’. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3319506/china-slams-us-envoy-nominee-framing-argentina-great-power-battlefield

Southcom Public Affairs. (2025, May 1). Adm. Holsey meets with President Milei and defense leaders in Argentina. https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/4171706/adm-holsey-meets-with-president-milei-and-defense-leaders-in-argentina

Wall Street Journal. (2024, April 10). Argentina’s Milei finds it hard to decouple from China. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/argentinas-milei-finds-it-hard-to-decouple-from-china-6faae47f

Wikipedia. (2025a). Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984 between Chile and Argentina. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tratado_de_Paz_y_Amistad_de_1984_entre_Chile_y_Argentina

Wikipedia. (2025b). Beagle Conflict. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflicto_del_Beagle

José Adán Gutiérrez supervises operations and strategy in Latin America, with over 40 years of experience in the military, civil, and private sectors. He is fluent in Spanish and has extensive experience in intelligence, security, and diplomacy across the American continent, including over two decades as a Naval Intelligence Officer and Naval Attaché of the U.S. in Panama. He previously held senior positions at SAIC, Mission Essential, and INDETEC, and holds advanced degrees from the Naval War College and New York University.

Enzo Ibaceta holds a degree in Official Administration. Graduated with a Diploma in Security and a Diploma in Political Studies. He is a graduate in Higher Administration of Public Security, from the Academy of Police Sciences of Carabineros de Chile.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel of Carabineros, graduated in Police Sciences from the Academy of Police Sciences of Carabineros de Chile, with a diploma in corporate comprehensive security from the Academy of Police Sciences of Carabineros de Chile, fulfilling requirements set by the Private Security Law as a trainer consultant and advisor.

Diploma in Political and Strategic Studies from the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE), under the Ministry of National Defense.

Has completed a course in intelligence and protection of important persons with the U.S. Secret Service.

Completed the Defense and Security strategies course at the National Defense University, Center for Hemisphere Defense Studies, Washington D.C.

Attended various courses and seminars on security (Onemi, National Commission of Nuclear Energy) to detail upon request.

Has 10 years of experience in investigation techniques for crimes affecting the vehicle fleet, in the Section for Vehicle Retrieval and Search.

Served as Chief of Security for Presidents and Prime Ministers, Heads of State, and Kings during official visits to the country, including Presidents of Spain, Australia, Korea, Colombia, the Secretary-General of the UN, the Vice Premier of China, the Kings of Morocco and Jordan.

Worked as the Zonal Chief of Internal Control in CENCOSUD.

Chief of Security Center Management, Division of Shopping Centers, Chile CENCOSUD for 6 years.

Currently Branch Manager in Retail at Securitas Chile.