René F. Bolio, President of the Mexican Commission on Human Rights
China and India are the two giants of Asia, but today they are moving in different directions. India, a democracy with a young population, is gaining momentum and attracting investment. China, a one-party communist regime (a dictatorship), is showing signs of cooling: real estate problems, an aging population, and trade clashes with the West. This divergence reshapes global trade, supply chains, and international politics—and closely affects the United States and Latin America.
The trajectories of both countries are divergent, and to this day we can clearly observe the sense:
India on the rise (democracy): Grows steadily, supports infrastructure, digitization, and manufacturing, and takes advantage of the interest of companies looking to “not put all their eggs in the Chinese basket.” Its great advantage is demographic: more young people entering the labor market and an expanding middle class. India is the largest democracy in the world, with many challenges ahead, but its free elections and multiparty system are examples of democracy functioning despite enormous demographic, linguistic, religious, and racial challenges.
China on the decline (dictatorship): Maintains industrial muscle but is dealing with a long adjustment in the real estate sector, lower consumer confidence, and a declining population. Tensions with the U.S. and Europe (tariffs and technology controls) add friction. The strong repression of the Chinese population, espionage, and lack of freedom complicate the scenario, which depends on fragile economic well-being.
With various indicators, we observe how each maintains its path:
Growth: India remains among the fastest-growing major economies. China is still growing, but at slower rates than a decade ago.
Employment and wages: India needs to transform informal jobs into formal ones and create more industrial positions; nevertheless, the arrival of new investments helps. In China, young people have more difficulties finding work than before.
Demographics: India is adding workers; China has already started to lose population and is aging rapidly.
Technology and manufacturing: China remains strong in advanced supply chains (batteries, solar energy, electronics), although with more barriers in the West. India is making progress in digital services, pharmaceuticals, and, little by little, in electronics and automobile manufacturing.
Meanwhile, the relationship between these giants, rival neighbors, and partners is not simple. Trade does flow: India buys many Chinese inputs (electronics, chemicals, equipment). However, strategic trust is limited by border clashes and competition for regional leadership. The result: economic interdependence with political caution.
Recently, the United States and, to some extent, Europe, have raised tariffs on Chinese products (electric cars, semiconductors, solar energy, metals). This increases the cost of those goods entering the West, accelerates the “diversion” of production to third parties (Southeast Asia, Mexico, India), and pushes China to seek more clients in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
For India, there is a mixed effect: it gains investment and export opportunities but depends on Chinese inputs that can also become more expensive.
Relations with the United States have changed, and they have yet to take a definitive character; they are in constant evolution, let’s see:
China: Open rivalry in trade and technology. Washington seeks to reduce risks: less dependence on critical sectors and controls over chips and advanced equipment.
India: Rising connection: more dialogue on Indo-Pacific security, cooperation in defense and technology, and American companies establishing part of their production in India. There are occasional frictions (tariffs, regulations), but the general direction is one of rapprochement. The closeness to Russia due to the purchase of cheap oil has led to tariff sanctions, but not enough to define a realignment.
In the case of Latin America, let’s see how it will be in these new times
With China:
The region has counted on China as a major buyer of raw materials (soy, minerals, oil) and as a financier/builder of infrastructure. The new barriers in the West may lead to more Chinese presence in Latin America, seeking markets and political alliances. There is also a growing interest in setting up parts of the supply chain (for example, electric cars or batteries) where there are treaties with the U.S.—Mexico is a clear case due to T-MEC. In addition, there is a constant promotion of colonization of nations in the region.
With India:
It is still a minor partner for the region, but it is gaining ground in pharmaceuticals, digital services, and auto parts. Several Latin American countries are exploring agreements to attract Indian investments and diversify exports (not just commodities).
In political matters:
China cultivates relationships with governments of different stripes and uses state banks to generate debt, and public companies with dumping as a lever. India prioritizes technical cooperation (health, IT, education) and trade forums, with fewer visible political conditions. For Latin America, diversification between both can translate into better prices and more investment, if project quality and rules of play are safeguarded.
The BRICS group (initiated by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has expanded to gain weight in the “Global South.” China is pushing for a more active BRICS (finances and infrastructure). India participates, but with caution, as it also values its closeness to the West. For Latin America, Brazil acts as a bridge, and other countries are watching whether the bloc offers credit, markets, or concrete projects.
What can be expected in the coming times in that region of the world will have global significance, and we will closely observe the development of each in economic, political, and social spheres.
Indian democracy is in a phase of economic and geopolitical rise that brings it closer to the United States and arouses interest in Latin America. The Chinese dictatorship retains enormous industrial capabilities but is undergoing a period of adjustment with more barriers in the West and internal doubts. The relationship between the two—characterized by intense trade and strategic distrust—will be one of the forces defining how global trade and politics are reordered… and where the jobs of the future in our region will be created, which will choose between alliances and complicities.
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