Jesús Daniel Romero from Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
Preface
After decades of observing and working on the front lines of Latin American security, I have learned that the most dangerous threats are not always sudden — many times they are slow collapses hiding in plain sight. In 2008, I witnessed how Cuba was impacted by hurricanes Gustav, Ike, and Paloma — a “Trifecta” that caused billions in damages but did not provoke any international alarm. The regime survived, barely, because it still had some resilience, external aid, and a pinch of legitimacy to hold it up.
But what I have seen over the past year is different.
In 2024 and early 2025, Cuba has suffered some of the worst blackouts in its history, a total collapse of the housing sector, extreme food insecurity, and increasing public despair. Unlike in 2008, there is no lifeline coming from Venezuela. There is no Soviet net to support it. The regime is bankrupt, hollow, and completely unprotected.
This article does not seek to alarm. It is a forecast — a realistic analysis of current conditions, based on history, climate models, and the obvious signs of an imminent collapse. As we begin the hurricane season of 2025, we must consider that Cuba's breaking point will not come from a rebellion or an invasion, but from a natural disaster — perhaps two — that destroys what little remains.
This is not about politics. It's about anticipation.
With just a few days left until the official start of the Atlantic hurricane season in 2025, Cuba stands on the brink of disaster. A direct hit from a Category 4 or 5 hurricane would unleash a crisis like none that the Western Hemisphere has seen in modern times. The island's crumbling infrastructure, its collapsed economy, and its repressive regime have left it defenseless against a large-scale climactic blow (Reuters, 2025a; El País, 2025).
But what if it’s not just one hurricane? What if 2025 repeats the scenario of 2008?
That year, a devastating “Trifecta” of three hurricanes — Gustav, Ike, and Paloma — battered Cuba in rapid succession. The result: over $10 billion in damages, massive blackouts, agricultural collapse, and a lasting national trauma (Wikipedia, 2025a). The difference is that in 2008, Cuba still had some degree of resilience. In 2025, it has none.
The Cuban regime is much more fragile than we think. It presents an outward challenge, but inside it is empty. It is sustained by repression, propaganda, and decades of dependence. The electrical grid is on the verge of collapse, food is scarce, and medicines have practically disappeared.
Cuba has failed to attract more investments or financing than it did before 2008 — in fact, its infrastructure today is in even more precarious conditions (Reuters, 2025a; CiberCuba, 2025a).
Climate will prevail where armies cannot. No regime, no ideology, can stop a wall of water, collapsed roads, or the total loss of electricity and communications. And the conditions this year — record temperatures in the Atlantic and the arrival of La Niña — make a season with multiple storms not only likely, but dangerously inevitable (Adaptation Fund, 2021).
For years we have been led to believe that Russia or China would come to the rescue. But the reality is clear: neither Moscow nor Beijing has the capacity or will to provide large-scale assistance after a natural disaster. And if any aid does arrive, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) will ensure that it is used first to guarantee the survival of the regime — not for the well-being of the people. Aid becomes a tool of control, not of recovery.
Then there is the psychological cost. After decades of misery, a mindset of resignation has settled in. As one Cuban expressed:
“Cuba has been this way for years. It's always the common people who suffer, never the leaders. If someone complains, you already know what happens. We’ve been in misery for so long that we see it as normal. What’s the only real way out? Leave. Flee the island. Tomorrow the power goes out forever… and it will be more of the same.”
This is a national profile shaped by repression, dependence, and resignation. Since the revolution, Cubans have been conditioned to depend on others — from the Soviets to Venezuela and family abroad. Even the dream of freedom has been externalized. Freedom, like food, is expected to come from outside (IDMC, 2019).
Even the United States, with all its power and goodwill, could be overwhelmed if Southern Florida is struck simultaneously — an increasingly plausible scenario with each passing season (Reuters, 2025b).
There will be no Soviet airlift. No Chávez oil convoy. No Chinese hospital ship.
Mexico, with Sheinbaum at the helm, may send fuel, but it cannot stop the sea.
This is no longer a warning — it is a forecast.
One hurricane is enough. But a “Trifecta” in 2025 could be the final blow — not just for Cuba's infrastructure, but for what remains of its national soul.
The end of the Cuban regime may come, after all — but not through military conflict, foreign intervention, or internal uprising. It may come from something much more relentless: a natural disaster. After decades of neglect, broken infrastructure, economic collapse, and collective exhaustion, it only takes a Category 4 or 5 hurricane for everything to come crashing down.
It is impossible to predict the future, but this outcome is no longer speculation — it is a credible possibility, based on current conditions and the impending climate threats. The signs are there. The infrastructure is crumbling. The people are fatigued. The regime, empty.
This is a disaster that U.S. and regional planners should not view as a “potential crisis” — but as an inevitable one. It is not a matter of if it will happen. It is a matter of when.
And when it happens — if Cuba is struck directly — the consequences could be so severe that they would make the impact of the U.S. hurricane season in 2024 seem small by comparison.
References
Adaptation Fund. (2021, March 19). Cuba receives a $23.9 million grant from the Green Climate Fund for a coastal resilience project. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). https://www.adaptation-undp.org/cuba-accesses-us239-million-grant-green-climate-fund-coastal-resilience-project
CiberCuba. (2025a, May 6). Housing plan fails in Cuba: The government acknowledges its failure without consequences. https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-05-06-u1-e199370-s27061-nid302216-incumplen-plan-viviendas-cuba-gobierno-reconoce
El País. (2025, March 15). A new blackout leaves Cuba in the dark during its worst energy crisis in decades. https://elpais.com/america/2025-03-15/un-nuevo-apagon-deja-a-cuba-a-oscuras-en-su-peor-crisis-energetica-en-decadas.html
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2019, March). The domino effect: Economic impacts of internal displacement. https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/201903-economic-impact-cuba.pdf
Reuters. (2025a, May 15). Blackouts —and temperatures— rise in the Cuban capital, Havana. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/blackouts-temperatures-rise-cuban-capital-havana-2025-05-15/
Reuters. (2025b, March 26). Cargo transport in Cuba plummets: A signal of a deepening crisis. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cuban-domestic-freight-traffic-plummets-sign-deepening-crisis-2025-03-26/
Wikipedia contributors. (2025a, October 21). Hurricane Ike. Wikipedia. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurac%C3%A1n_Ike
Jesús Daniel Romero is a retired Commander of Naval Intelligence for the United States. Co-Founder and Senior Fellow at the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute and author of the Amazon best seller "Final Flight: The Queen of Air," he is currently writing a new trilogy on transnational crimes in Latin America.
A permanent consultant on matters of his specialty in the main media outlets of the State of Florida. He has also had a prominent role in diplomatic and military tasks and conducted investigations into drug trafficking in Central America.
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