NATO annual summit in Vilna: Agenda and results

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has again been strongly delayed in the world's media scenes. In addition, everything seems to indicate that we have witnessed a strengthening of the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, especially after the events that have occurred in recent years as the “voltage” with the European project of strategic autonomy, the chaotic exit of Afghanistan and the signing of the AUKUS military agreement (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States), among others. NATO seems to have left its “brain death” (album to the words of French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019), to show itself more united and assertive to the new challenges that Russia raises and the consolidation of its strategic partnership with China.

The annual NATO summit in the Lithuanian capital, held on 11 and 12 July, was marked by the vavenes of the current counteroffensive that Ukraine is leading mainly south of its territory, to cut the ground bridge that Russia has since the oblasts of Lugansk and Donetsk to the Crimean peninsula. To ensure military success, Ukraine needs greater commitments from the Alliance, especially in what it does to send weapons and ammunition. The first weeks of counteroffensive seemed to evidence certain difficulties to break the Russian fortifications.

Ukraine was the summit with renewed promises of more Western weapons and long-term security guarantees. Finally, the NATO countries seem to be aware that Ukraine's accession to the Alliance is already a fact, but that it should expect its stated time. In order not to undermine Kiev’s expectations, Ukraine “premised” with a shorter NATO membership process, as it advanced with the creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council for enhanced cooperation.

Another theme linked to the expansion of the Alliance has to do with the “sorpressive” lifting of the veto that Turkey kept on Sweden. It should be recalled that, although both Sweden and Finland started their formal request in May 2022 (BBC, 2022), the paths were divided. The reasons are mainly in the vetoes of Turkey and Hungary (but mainly Turkish). On the one hand, President Erdogan used this strategy to get Sweden and Finland to extract members from Kurdish associations, considered “terrorists” by Turkey. On the other hand, Erdogan sought to unlock negotiations with other NATO partners for the acquisition of state-of-the-art weapons and technologies, as well as other strategic objectives.

Finland was able to become an official NATO member in April this year, while Sweden was still waiting. Resistances of the Swedish government to hand over to the “buses” by Ankara, the exponential growth of Islamophobia in the Nordic country, the incidents with Quoma in the streets of Stockholm, added to the concessions that Erdogan still sought to obtain from NATO, delayed accession.

With this scenario, the tension was such that everything seemed to indicate that Sweden would not be able to unlock its income before the July summit in Vilna. However, the agreement between Turkey, NATO and Sweden has arrived. The concessions that have been negotiated for Turkey are not entirely of public knowledge, but so far are known at least three considerable weight decisions. Sweden committed itself to boosting Turkey's entry to the European Union (a long-standing theme full of resistance and unfolding), Canada raised the arms embargo that weighed on Ankara (relating to components needed for the manufacture of drones), and the same did the United States in relation to the latest-tech combat aircraft. In particular, the Turkish government sought to advance with the acquisition of American F-16 fighter aircraft (among other technologies) to modernize the Turkish Air Force (Military Zone, 2023).

In military terms, the summit resulted in the decision to strengthen the eastern flank (eastern NATO) unprecedented. Still, this was already a trend since 2014, year of the Russian invasion and annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The big difference is that, from now on, the early warning troop system is abandoned, moving to a more active defense policy with a rapid deployment force that will move from 40,000 to 300,000 soldiers (Euronews, 2023). In addition, of the four multinational battalions installed in 2014, another four will be added in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

A final consideration of the summit deserves discussions on defence expenditure. Again, the need to achieve the 2% target of the GDP of each member country of the Alliance was underlined. To 2022 only seven of the thirty countries belonging to NATO (without Sweden and Finland) fulfilled this rule (RTVE, 2023). The Russian invasion in Ukraine fired its defence expenditure, committing more and more Alliance countries to speed up the achievement of the goal. Moreover, in Vilna, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg sought to redefine the 2% “middle” as a “minimum pit”.