Jesús Daniel Romero from Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
Executive Summary
The Venezuelan air defense is in critical condition: more than 60% of the radar fleet is inoperable, combat aviation barely flies, and drug trafficking networks exploit areas without coverage. Attempts at external assistance from China and Iran have been partial and selective, oriented towards protecting political power rather than national sovereignty. (Control Ciudadano, 2020; Infodefensa, 2023)
MSI2 operational capability rating (0–10): 2/10
Radar coverage: 1/10
Interception/alert: 2/10
Internal morale/cohesion: 3/10
External support: 4/10
Transparency Statement
This report is based on direct testimonies and verified communications from active personnel within the Bolivarian Air Force, who alert about operational deterioration and manipulation of the air defense system. The identity of the informants is reserved for security reasons. Their contributions have been contrasted with technical data, maintenance records, international reports, and reliable open sources. The objective is to highlight a critical situation that compromises regional stability and hemispheric security.
Operational Diagnosis
More than 50% of the JYL-1 and JY-11B radars are out of service due to lack of spare parts. The SU-30MK2 operates under severe restrictions. Only a few F-16s are available, and the AT-27s are used solely for training. The K-8W Karakorum are operational at less than 30%, lack air-to-air radar, and are used symbolically for anti-drug missions. Aerial coverage is limited exclusively to Caracas and La Orchila, areas under the direct protection of the high political command. (Infodefensa, 2023; Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2022)
Criminal Connections
The Cartel of the Suns has infiltrated structures like CODAI, ZODI, and REDI. These entities operate in coordination to manipulate radar shutdown schedules, facilitating the passage of illegal aircraft without detection. The accident involving Citation YV3217, where the wife and daughter of the CODAI commander died, as well as the desertion of several sergeants from the Bolivarian Air Force, reveal a deep internal fracture and the complete politicization of the defense apparatus. (Farah & Berríos, 2021; InSight Crime, 2023)
Foreign Interference
China has reduced its technical support to a minimum, only providing spare parts through civilian intermediaries. Iran has assumed a more active role since 2020, providing Mohajer-6 drones, electronic warfare technicians, and air surveillance systems. However, its intervention has only served to reinforce the regime's defensive ring in Caracas and La Orchila, without restoring the functionality of the national defense system. (International Crisis Group, 2022; Qods Aviation Industries, 2023)
Transnational Complicity
Aircraft from Venezuela continue to land on clandestine runways in Mexico, with the collaboration or permissiveness of local authorities. This cooperation has established an air corridor between Venezuela and Mexico as the main route for cocaine transport to North America, according to multiple intelligence reports from the DEA, the State Department, and UNODC. (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2023; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023)
Evaluation of Iranian Drones
Venezuela operates Iranian Mohajer-2 drones (in its local version “Arpía”) and Mohajer-6, used exclusively for surveillance missions in Caracas, Maracaibo, and La Orchila. Although some models can carry munitions, their use has been limited to observation and internal propaganda operations. The fleet has low technical availability and has not been employed in any confirmed aerial interdiction. The systems are not integrated into the CODAI network nor can cover key operational areas like Zulia or Apure. (Qods Aviation Industries, 2023)
External and Internal Threat Capability
Venezuela currently has no military projection capability abroad. Combat aviation is limited, the Bolivarian Navy is inoperative, and ground forces lack strategic mobility. There is no logistics to deploy troops outside the country or to sustain an operation beyond the Caracas–Maracay axis. (Brookings Institution, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2022)
Regarding internal repression, the regime relies more on intelligence, the Bolivarian Militia, FAES, and irregular groups such as collectives or armed elements from the Tren de Aragua. A structured opposition uprising with aviation or external support would easily overcome the regime's defenses in many regions, except for Caracas. The survival of the apparatus depends on political repression, not conventional military power.
Strategic Conclusion
The Venezuelan air defense system is captured by political and criminal interests. Foreign aid only strengthens specific enclaves of the regime and does not contribute to restoring real institutional capabilities. The country remains vulnerable to air violations, drug trafficking penetration, and regional collapse in the event of organized military pressure. With an overall rating of 2/10, the defense apparatus requires a deep institutional purging and a complete strategic redesign to become an instrument serving national sovereignty again. (Congressional Research Service, 2023; Romero & Tochterman, 2024)
References
Alvarado, J., & Ramírez, C. (2021). The Routes of Silence: Militarization and Drug Trafficking in Venezuela. Editorial Témis.
Brookings Institution. (2021). The Maduro regime and transnational organized crime. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-maduro-regime-and-transnational-organized-crime/
Control Ciudadano. (2020). Report on the operational situation of the Venezuelan air defense system. https://controlciudadano.org/documento/informe-especial-sistema-defensa-aerea/
Congressional Research Service. (2023). Venezuela: Background and U.S. relations (CRS Report R44841). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44841
Farah, D., & Berríos, C. (2021). Criminal State: Venezuela and the Cartel of the Suns (IASC Report). International Assessment and Strategy Center. https://www.strategycenter.net/reports
Human Rights Watch. (2022, October 6). Venezuela: Military abuse and impunity persist. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/06/venezuela-military-abuse-and-impunity-persist
Infodefensa. (2023, April 11). Operational Aircraft in the Venezuelan Air Force: Updated Analysis. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3860634/venezuela-aviones-fuerza-aerea-operatividad-2023
Infodefensa. (2024, January 9). Venezuelan K-8Ws: Balance of operability and real employment. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4322141/k8w-fab-entrenamiento-venezuela
InSight Crime. (2023, May 25). Venezuela’s airspace: A highway for cocaine. https://insightcrime.org/news/venezuela-airspace-cocaine-highway/
International Crisis Group. (2022). Broken defenses: Venezuela’s failing military structures (Report No. 91). https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/broken-defenses
Jane’s Defence Weekly. (2022, November 21). Venezuelan Air Force faces SU-30 readiness crisis.
Miami Herald. (2024, March 19). Jet linked to narco traffickers crashes off Venezuela’s coast. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article286552169.html
Qods Aviation Industries. (2023). Mohajer-6 UAV: Technical overview. https://qodsaviation.com/en/products/mohajer-6/
Romero, J. (with Tochterman, S.). (2024). The Final Flight: The Queen of Air. Miami Strategic Intelligence Press.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2023). Global report on cocaine 2023. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cocaine-report.html
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2023, October 18). Treasury sanctions actors supporting Iran’s UAV exports (Press release JY1752). https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1752
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. (2023). National drug threat assessment 2023. https://www.dea.gov/documents/2023/03/28/2023-national-drug-threat-assessment
U.S. Department of State. (2023). International narcotics control strategy report 2023 (2 vols.). https://www.state.gov/international-narcotics-control-strategy-report/
U.S. Southern Command. (2024, April 16). Posture statement before the House Armed Services Committee. https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/Posture-Statement/
Venezuelan Military Observatory. (2023). Desertion and corruption in the FANB: Indicators and testimonies. https://observatoriofuerzamilitar.org/informes-2023
Jesús Daniel Romero is a retired commander of the Naval Intelligence of the United States and has also had a prominent diplomatic role representing his country.
He has led inter-agency teams for the fight against drug trafficking in Central America and has served in the Persian Gulf aboard U.S. Navy ships.
Additionally, he is a writer, having already published his first book, a bestseller on Amazon titled "Final Flight: The Queen of Air," and is finishing a new trilogy on national security topics (drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational crimes, narco-states, etc.).
He is a permanent consultant on issues of his specialty for the main media in the state of Florida, United States.
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