Octavio Pérez, senior researcher, MSI²
As an Army officer, my first job as a lieutenant was as a training officer in a Basic Combat Training Brigade at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, from 1978 to 1980. Attending the Non-Commissioned Officers Academy for the ITC (Instructor Training Course) and completing 13 cycles of Basic Training over 8 weeks, often without a break (graduating one group on Friday and starting a new one the following Monday), was a true revelation.
TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) is responsible for first contact with civilians to soldiers. It is also responsible for all training through the CSMA (Command Sergeants Major Academy) and the AWC (Army War College). My last active duty assignment was as Director of the Special Operations Intelligence Training Department at the SOA (School of the Americas), where I taught courses to Latin American officers from 17 countries in various Basic and Advanced Intelligence courses, as well as parts of the Spanish version of the CGSC (Command and General Staff College). When I transitioned to the Reserve, I also taught as an IMA (Individual Mobilization Augmentee) as an instructor in the basic and advanced armor course at Ft Knox, KY.
TRADOC is currently at a complete review point of its military doctrine with the advent of drones. It must revise all its documents to absorb changes from the new air-ground battle. The number of innovations and adaptations made to commercial drones, as well as the creation of new categories of drones and loitering munitions in the last three years, both in the Ukraine War and the Middle East, are forcing armies to daily readjust their ways of fighting, defending, and conducting special operations.
The war with drones has undergone a classic evolution. It began as an intelligence platform for reconnaissance, then as a multipurpose platform to disrupt communications, aid in target location, and act as an airborne command post with multiple cameras.
In 1990-91, we had the Pioneer, a divisional asset, although data was collected, exploited at the national level, and its final product disseminated to front-line units. Since then, we have used drones in strategic tactical operations over Iraq, Afghanistan, the pursuit of Osama Bin Laden, and many terrorists worldwide.
Drones have experienced significant improvements. We have submersible drones, ground drones, and the ever-popular flying drones. Their functions evolve according to needs. We have disposable drones, also known as loitering munitions or killer drones, that will pursue you until death.
During the 1990s, we began researching unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Germany began creating an autonomous artillery unit, the RCH 155, and South Korea developed the K9a3 and many more variants. Tanks were also under development, but over the years, the trend to integrate robotics has led to smaller vehicles or ground drones. Some serve to lay mines, others to breach mined areas, and others to aid in troop recovery. Therefore, the field of ground drones remains open to imagination and needs.
Submersible drones (unmanned underwater vehicles, UUVs), also known as drones, also demonstrated their effectiveness during the Ukraine War. Thus, the battlefield has been a testbed for research and development of these innovative drones.
Currently, drones in Ukraine account for more than 60% of combat deaths. The latest drone developed by the Russians, an optical fiber drone that is unaffected by interference and offers a clearer image, has debuted on the battlefield. Flying at lower altitudes and being able to zoom in on video with greater quality while pursuing you to your bunker or hideout offers no solution.
That said, attention must shift back to battle doctrine and what must be done to adapt to this new threat. Static defenses, trench warfare, and reinforced positions are becoming deathbeds, graves, and tombstones for infantry. In the past, the doctrinal conception of the battlefield, infantry was considered the queen of the battlefield, given that whoever possessed the ground could be considered as controlling it. Artillery is attributed the title of queen of the battle, as its rain of lead can temporarily control the ground through fire. That is, firing at a place to prevent others from possessing it.
But now, on the front, you have drones in surveillance mode, others as hunters, and others as loitering munitions. This combination will detect your movements, assign a kamikaze drone for your execution, and complete the job with an airborne glide bomb to bury your position (Die in Place, DIP).
The longer you stay in your trench, the less you can patrol, walk the perimeter, or reinforce your area. The fear of the buzzing above your head is constant; you cannot sleep; you must be alert if you don’t have restrooms or areas for your basic needs; stepping out may cost your life and that of your squad.
So, how will static defenses, fronts, and perimeters defend themselves in the future?
When going on the offensive again, you become prey to kamikaze drones, loitering munitions that can glide and be GPS-directed toward you, your vehicle, or your column. What battle formations will be taught for tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in an open valley? On a road cutting through a battlefield?
The U.S. Army is exploring the use of tethered drones for aerial surveillance, situational awareness, rescue operations, reconnaissance missions, perimeter security, and as many other possible missions as can be imagined. But will this prevent a swarm of drones (kamikaze drones) deployed by a mother ship in open combat? What if the amphibious assault carrier Fujian also became a drone carrier? Could it launch hundreds of drones simultaneously?
The integration of drones into smaller tactical formations (at the platoon level), a unit of 30 to 40 men and four squads, is part of the planned new tactical concept. The creation of a dedicated drone squadron (new military occupational specialty) is another necessary step.
This squadron would be the first umbrella defense for the platoon, utilizing killer-hunter drones and electronic warfare equipment to intercept enemy drone signals and eliminate them from the sky.
The anti-drone doctrine will be a new subject taught in basic training and at all other training levels. Having inexpensive and easily replaceable killer drones at the platoon level would be a standard issue.
The defensive part of this doctrine must address:
Drone defense
Drone detection
Interruption of enemy drones
Killer drone operations
Another important consideration relates to ethical limitations in drone combat. This would be a clear guideline for interfacing with civilians in combat zones, in line with the Geneva Convention, defining an enemy combatant versus a civilian.
Just as the Air Force now has more drone and aircraft pilots, the Army may need to create a specialized Drone Corps. This would break down resources from the division to the platoon level, integrating operational tactical attack drones, defensive destroyer drones, and surveillance for the entire unit.
At the TRADOC level, three key principles must be considered:
Comprehensive training and testing to achieve maximum integration and utilization
Interoperability, which involves training our allies to ensure equal operational training in the event of combat in a joint operation
Considering the overall context of information as a whole and how it influences operational activities
There is no doubt that the Army needs to adapt to drone warfare; current internal struggles focus on whether to create a new corps or integrate it into existing units.
Ukraine has led the way, and the Russians have followed by incorporating it into their existing units.
Congress passed resolution 8070 (June 2024) allowing the establishment of this Drone Corps, but has met stagnation since Army Chief of Staff General Randy George believes we should follow the model as the Ukrainians have integrated existing units.
This decision, in any case, will represent the most significant decision the Army will make in the future.
The war with drones has followed patterns of geometric evolution since the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. According to an article in Army Aviation Magazine (December 2023 edition), both General Jim Rainey and Dr. James Greer state that in less than two years, the doctrine and development of drones have gone through four generations of tactical adjustments. This same period, under normal circumstances, would be what we consider the usual evolution from one generation to another.
Following the Ukrainian model would make more sense, as the proliferation of drones with specific functions constantly changes.
The doctrine relied in the past on after-action reports, in-depth studies, white papers, lessons learned, and the study of other wars. Given these new changes on the battlefield and accelerated innovation, which is quadrupled in technology, adopting the old Soviet concept of R&D: "put it into practice, let the troops detect the failures, and we modify it" seems more appropriate. Moreover, writing the doctrine on the fly might be the way forward.
The U.S. Armed Forces are plagued with prototypes of tanks that were never deployed. The XM1202 is one of them. U.S. R&D has always invested millions of dollars into weapon systems development, following cost overruns and many other emerging issues. This also applies to other branches.
With the advent of AI and the battlefield evolution, there is no time to waste in implementing new technologies and integrating them into doctrinal training. A faster and fiercer battle that takes advantage of the lack of response.
Drones that monitor the battlefield, working together with kamikaze drones and loitering munitions that follow you to your lair, trench, or bunker. Drones are small enough to enter the structure and detonate on demand or upon impact.
Due to speed and personnel shortages, the Ukrainian army has drone operators who are not drone specialists. Depending on the type of drone used, its purpose, and the level of integration with other platforms in a combined arms battlefield (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), only then would there be equipment with specialized drone operators assigned, OPCON (operational control). This would be a reason to form drone units that can be detailed to operate in specific scenarios. Only then would an order of battle for drones be established along with an MTOE (Modified Table of Organization and Equipment), for example, within a division.
This would create a defense system from the platoon to the division, where a centralized headquarters, whether brigade, regiment, or division, could mobilize its resources to support its operations. However, the real need is for infantry soldiers to feel protected while moving, so they can defend themselves with an anti-drone device or a destroyer drone.
Therefore, some sort of command would eventually be needed, as the operation and integration of drones can become very complex. Creating these teams and units is imperative and must have personnel trained in different disciplines (armor and infantry operations, as well as artillery and reconnaissance). Only then can an operator of these units effectively integrate and support a unit in combat.
The doctrine must evolve as technology revolutionizes demand-based innovation and the rapid implementation of this new family of weapon systems.
Drones do not replace basic tactics or conventional or asymmetric warfare, but they are an important force multiplier that provides advantages to those who know how to integrate them in support of their operations.
Changes are occurring even as we write this article.
References
Al-Ubaydli, O. (May 28, 2025). Drones are rewriting Gulf defense doctrine. Semafor. https://www.semafor.com/article/05/28/2025/analysis-drones-are-rewriting-the-gulfs-defense-doctrine
Cronin, A. K. (October 14, 2021). The future of the U.S. campaign against drones: It’s time to break with a failed approach. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/future-americas-drone-campaign
Finer, J., and Shimer, D. (July 7, 2025). The drone revolution in Ukraine: And what the U.S. should learn from it. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/ukraines-drone-revolution
Hollenbeck, N. (January 9, 2025). How to transform the Armyfor the war with drones. War Room – U.S. Army War College https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/transform-for-drones/
Schneider, J., and Macdonald, J. (July 31, 2025). How to Lose the Drone War: U.S. Military Doctrine is Stifling Innovation. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-lose-drone-war
Vogt, K. (May 2025). Adapting Air and Missile Defense Training and Doctrine for Hypersonic Drones: Numerous Changes Required to Defend NATO from Emerging Threats. Joint Air Power Competence Centre Journal, 39. https://www.japcc.org/articles/adapting-air-and-missile-defence-training-and-doctrine-for-hypersonics-and-drones
Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Pérez is a U.S. Army intelligence officer with extensive experience, having served more than two decades of active duty and additional assignments in the reserves. He specialized in intelligence and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, commanding operations at Fort Leonard Wood and serving in the Republic of Korea. At the Defense Intelligence Agency, he focused on North Korean military analysis and responded to crises related to the Achille Lauro incident and TWA 847. Pérez volunteered for the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Shield/Desert Storm and subsequently served as Chief Intelligence Instructor at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, where he trained Latin American officers in low-intensity conflicts. His career in the reserves culminated at U.S. Southern Command as a strategic intelligence officer (J2 Ops).
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