William Acosta for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
The U.S. Government is the First to Evade Sanctions — Venezuela Knows It. Recent evidence shows that the U.S. government is systematically the first to break or relax its own sanctions regime toward Venezuela, a reality that Nicolás Maduro’s regime has learned to exploit. This week is illustrative: following the release of American veteran Joseph St. Clair, who was detained in Venezuela for six months, the Trump administration extended Chevron's license to operate in the country by 60 days and OFAC sanctions were lifted on Venezuelan officials, including Alejandro Fleming and Leonardo González Dellán (The Wall Street Journal, 2025; Energy Intelligence, 2025).
As reported by The Wall Street Journal (2025), “Venezuela has handed over a U.S. Air Force veteran to U.S. representatives… as part of Caracas' strategy to improve diplomatic relations and persuade the Trump administration to allow Western oil companies to maintain their operations in the country.”
A Pattern of Concessions: From Humanitarian Posture to Strategic Weakness.
This cycle is not exclusive to a single administration. Both the Trump and Biden administrations, with advisors like Jake Sullivan and Juan Sebastián González, have followed a similar pattern: first, a humanitarian façade is presented — such as the release of American prisoners — and then strategic concessions are made, whether in the form of licenses for oil companies or the lifting of sanctions on figures of the regime (Energy Intelligence, 2025; NPR, 2024). The result is a weaker international stance of the U.S. and the strengthening of narco-authoritarian regimes in the region (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).
Legitimization and Loss of Leverage to Negotiate Directly with Maduro.
Excluding internationally recognized opposition figures like the people’s elected President Edmundo González Urrutia and María Corina Machado not only weakens U.S. pressure but also grants international legitimacy to the Chavista regime.
By not including the democratic opposition in negotiations, the U.S. validates Maduro as the sole interlocutor, contradicting its own discourse of non-recognition and sidelining those who represent the popular will (El País, 2024; EFE, 2025).
As noted by El País (2024), “the U.S. pressure — which has intensified ahead of the presidential elections in July 2024 — is not new. It extends across three administrations and has become increasingly complex.” Additionally, EFE (2025) quotes Kaja Kallas, head of the EU's foreign diplomacy: “Venezuelan authorities missed a key opportunity to respect the will of the people and ensure a transparent democratic transition with guarantees for all. Nicolás Maduro, therefore, lacks the legitimacy of a democratically elected president.”
Rewarding Bad Behavior and Multiplier Effect
This pattern of concessions without guarantees allows rogue states to dictate the pace of diplomacy. By handing over power without demanding concrete results, bad behavior is rewarded and a multiplier effect is generated: other authoritarian regimes observe that capturing American citizens and using them as bargaining chips is an effective and profitable tactic (DNews, 2024; NBC Miami, 2023). Thus, extortion and the use of hostages become institutionalized as diplomatic tools, eroding deterrence and the credibility of U.S. foreign policy.
As the Council on Foreign Relations (2024) warns, “the first to break the sanctions is not the enemy: it is the U.S. government. Sanctions without enforcement are not a strategy; they are just theater.” Impact on International Cohesion and Citizen Security. The alternation between strict sanctions and selective relief creates uncertainty among allies and undermines the credibility of the U.S. as a global leader. Adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran have seized this space to strengthen their influence in Venezuela, diversifying the regime's sources of support and making coercive measures less effective (Marinho, Ventura & Ribeiro, 2024; Hispanopost, 2025).
According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2024), “the support from China, Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Turkey has helped keep Maduro's regime afloat.” Marinho, Ventura, and Ribeiro (2024) assert: “The relationship between Venezuela and China is strategic and has allowed Caracas to bypass some of the restrictions imposed by the West.” Regime Adaptation and Economic Resilience Despite international pressure, the Venezuelan government has diversified its exports and strengthened domestic production to mitigate the impact of sanctions.
The recent imposition of additional tariffs and restriction on oil operations have had immediate effects, but they have also encouraged the search for new partners and mechanisms to evade sanctions, diluting their long-term effectiveness (Paul Hastings LLP, 2025; Floridian Press, 2025). Floridian Press (2025) notes: “China is currently Venezuela's largest crude oil customer... Sanctions simply mean discounts for economies like China and India.”
The Need for a Comprehensive and Coordinated Strategy
Experts and think tanks agree on the urgency of a smarter and coordinated sanctions policy. The Atlantic Council (2025) recommends “prioritizing sanctions aimed at those directly responsible for repression and corruption, avoiding massive impacts on the civilian population.” Furthermore, the importance of conditioning any relief to verifiable and sustainable results, strengthening multilateral coordination, and resisting unilateral concessions that perpetuate the cycle of extortion is emphasized (CSIS, 2019; FIU Gordon Institute, 2024). As CSIS (2019) warns, “unilateral sanctions, even from the most powerful economy in the world, have limited results. Multilateral adoption is essential for achieving real change.”
Conclusion
The policy of quick concessions and asymmetrical negotiations has turned American citizens into bargaining chips, eroded the deterrent capacity of the United States, and by excluding the legitimate opposition from negotiations, reaffirms Nicolás Maduro's international legitimacy. If this trend is not reversed, U.S. national security and global influence will continue to decline while regimes like Maduro's consolidate their power and export their model of diplomatic extortion. As Damarys Canache (2025), a professor at the University of Illinois, concludes: “Despite the sanctions, Maduro has consolidated his power... and the sanctions have only exacerbated the economic crisis caused by mismanagement and corruption.”
References
•Atlantic Council. (2025, February 13). Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/recalibrating-the-use-of-individual-sanctions-in-venezuela/•BBC Mundo. (2025, February 17). 3 keys to the rapprochement between the U.S. and Venezuela and how it can affect Latin America. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c626y50q664o•Canache, D. (2025, February 12). What should U.S. policy be toward Venezuela? Illinois News Bureau. https://news.illinois.edu/what-should-us-policy-be-toward-venezuela/•Council on Foreign Relations (2024, September 18). The Failure of Biden Administration Venezuela Policy. https://www.cfr.org/blog/more-hostages-no-more-sanctions-failure-biden-administration-venezuela-policy-0•Congressional Research Service. (2025, March). Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10715•CNN. (2025, January 10). María Corina Machado asks Edmundo González not to enter Venezuela. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/01/10/venezuela/machado-pide-edmundo-gonzalez-no-entrar-venezuela-orix•DNews. (2024, December 18). Foreigners used by Maduro as bargaining chips. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=48TdJdCVmn4•EFE. (2025, January 10). The U.S. and EU deny legitimacy to Maduro in Venezuela. https://efe.com/mundo/2025-01-10/estados-unidos-ue-legitimidad-maduro-presidente-venezuela/•El País. (2024, April 19). How U.S. sanctions have affected Venezuela. https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-04-19/how-us-sanctions-have-affected-venezuela.html•El País. (2025, January 10). The EU condemns Maduro for lacking democratic legitimacy and doubles its sanctions. https://elpais.com/internacional/2025-01-10/la-ue-condena-a-maduro-por-carecer-de-legitimidad-democratica-y-redobla-sus-sanciones.html•Energy Intelligence. (2025, May 21). Trump Admin to Extend Chevron’s Venezuela License: Sources. https://www.energyintel.com/00000196-ef6b-de95-abd7-efef264f0000•Floridian Press. (2025, May 15). U.S. Oil Companies Face May 27 Exit from Venezuela as China Deepens Influence. https://floridianpress.com/2025/05/western-oil-companies-face-may-27-exit-from-venezuela-as-china-deepens-influence/•Hispanopost. (2025, May 17). China, Russia, and Iran gain more influence with the revocation of licenses to Venezuela. https://hispanopost.com/china-rusia-e-iran-ganan-mas-influencia-con-la-revocatoria-de-las-licencias-a-venezuela/•Marinho, J., Ventura, J., & Ribeiro, L. (2024, December 8). A Geopolitical Analysis of Venezuela: China’s, Iran’s and Russia’s Defiance of the United States. Diplomat Magazine. https://diplomatmagazine.eu/2024/12/08/a-geopolitical-analysis-of-venezuela-chinas-irans-and-russias-defiance-of-the-united-states/•NBC Miami. (2023, December 20). Alex Saab, ally of Venezuela’s Maduro, released by U.S. https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/us-releases-ally-of-venezuelas-maduro-in-swap-for-jailed-americans-ap/3188294/•NPR. (2024, April 18). Biden reinstates sanctions on Venezuela. https://www.npr.org/2024/04/18/1245650630/biden-reinstates-sanctions-on-venezuela•Paul Hastings LLP. (2025, April 3). Venezuela Sanctions: Wind-Down of General License 41 and Introduction of Secondary Tariffs. https://www.paulhastings.com/insights/client-alerts/venezuela-sanctions-wind-down-of-general-license-41-and-introduction-of-secondary-tariffs•The Wall Street Journal. (2025, May 20). Venezuela Frees U.S. Air Force Veteran in Overture to Trump. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/venezuela-frees-u-s-air-force-veteran-in-overture-to-trump-da13eb55•Wikipedia. (2025, March 30). Narcosobrinos affair. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcosobrinos_affair•CSIS. (2019, September 3). Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela? https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela•FIU Gordon Institute. (2024). Strategic Engagement in Venezuela: Advancing US Interests Under an America-First Agenda. https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/policy-innovation-series/strategic-engagement-in-venezuela-advancing-u.s-interests-under-an-america-first-agenda-v5.pdf
About the Author
William L. Acosta: Graduated Magna Cum Laude from PWU and Universidad de Alianza. He is a retired police officer from the New York Police Department and founder and CEO of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc., a licensed agency in New York and Florida with global reach. Since 1999, he has conducted investigations on narcotics, homicides, and missing persons, also participating in state and federal criminal defense. A specialist in international and multijurisdictional cases, he has coordinated operations in North America, Europe, and Latin America.
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