The presentation of the new national party "La Libertad Avanza," led by Karina and Javier Milei, on September 28 in Parque Lezama, highlighted a phenomenon that has grown in recent years, both locally and internationally, and deserves analysis: the increasing popularity of economic liberalism among the lower classes in Argentina and the rightward shift of popular sectors in other countries.
Already in the 2021 legislative elections, Milei performed well in neighborhoods with the highest poverty rates in CABA, finishing as the third force at the local level: in Comuna 8 (Villa Soldati, Villa Riachuelo, and Villa Lugano) he achieved 14.8%, and in Comuna 9 (Liniers, Mataderos, and Parque Avellaneda) he obtained 15.03% of the votes, tripling the votes of the Left Front and doubling that of United Republicans' candidate Ricardo López Murphy. The paradox is that, in neighborhoods with higher purchasing power, such as Comuna 2 (Recoleta) and Comuna 14 (Palermo), he obtained a lower percentage (13%), and candidate López Murphy received 7,000 more votes than the libertarian. These figures could have been the seed of the phenomenon that is currently growing.
In the 2023 presidential elections, Milei not only surprised nationally but also consolidated himself as the most-voted candidate in the popular neighborhoods of the City of Buenos Aires. In the PASO (primary elections), he obtained the highest percentage of votes in Villa 21-24, "without political ties, without local leaders, and without posters," as stated by Heber Segovia, a construction worker from the neighborhood, in an interview with Página 12. Segovia also pointed out that "no one says face to face, 'I voted for Milei'." Barrio 31 was another bastion of libertarian victory, where Milei was the most voted candidate by a wide margin at the Manuel Belgrano Nautical School and the N°5 Preschool. This neighborhood was also the location Milei chose for a tour during his 2021 campaign.
Various analysts attempted to explain the popular support for Milei at the time. Among the main factors, they mentioned the exhaustion of the previous model, the increase in poverty, dissatisfaction with the political class, and unmet promises. The rise of the idea of individual work as a means of dignification and social mobility, mainly driven by social media and led by Milei himself, also played a part. Additionally, there was a rejection of intermediaries or "managers" of poverty, accused of extorting public funds for mobilization or forced work in a clientelistic system. This model, reflected in Karina Milei’s phrase in Lezama, "there's nothing worse for a politician than a worker who doesn't need him," contributed to generating a "spiral of silence." Many people, fearing losing the little that politicians or their intermediaries offered them or due to fear of social judgment, remained silent until they expressed their frustration in the voting booth by choosing the only ballot that openly challenged the system that no longer offered them real benefits or opportunities for progress.
In this sense, Sofia D’Aquino, political analyst, stated that 7 out of 10 voters for Milei come from the lower class and the informal economy, while Patricia Bullrich's voters mostly come from the upper class; the latter is linked to the historical voters of PRO: the upper classes of the Federal Capital, a phenomenon that later became nationalized from the 2015 elections, where the upper-class vote for Mauricio Macri made up 40.9% of the total, compared to 28.8% from lower classes. This was replicated in 2019, with the famous legacy of the phrase “Macri won abroad, and Alberto Fernández in prisons.”
This indicates that it is the first time that an effective opposition has emerged in our country to defeat Kirchnerism rooted in the lower class: that is, it is built from the same socioeconomic base, at least in the previous elections.
There have been various historical examples where working classes supported leaders whose policies were associated with liberalism, deregulation, or downsizing the State. In the United States, the "Democrat Reagan" were those factory workers from the northern United States who used to vote for Democrats and their interventionist policies, but due to disillusionment during the crisis of the 70s, a particularly difficult situation because the United States government was caught between two problems: unemployment and inflation resulting from interventionist policies, as well as social discontent due to the widespread perception of excessive state regulation and undue protection for unions, which diminished the competitiveness of large American companies against European ones. This led to lower classes, suffering due to job loss, inflation, and excessive regulations, voting for those promising to return power to the people: “We, the people, tell the government what to do. Not the other way around. We, the people, are the drivers; the government is the car, and we decide where to go, which route to take, and at what speed. Almost all the constitutions in the world are documents where the government tells the people what their privileges are. Our Constitution is a document where we, the people, tell the government what it is allowed to do. We, the people, are free. As the government expands, freedom contracts.”
On the other hand, Margaret Thatcher implemented a series of reforms that drastically reduced the size of the State, privatizing public companies and deregulating the British economy. Although her government is remembered for confrontations with unions, she received support from segments of the popular classes. This especially happened in southern England, where small property owners and independent workers saw in her policies an opportunity to thrive without state intervention. In current Argentina, the government seems to maintain a "controlled fire" with unionism: a possible cause of this is the common electorate: the workers who chose Milei are also those who prefer the continuity of several union leaders in each sector, thus an open battle among them would threaten each's individual representativeness.
In Brazil, in the face of corruption scandals and the institutional crisis the country experienced in the 2010s, and although its economic policy was characterized by downsizing the State and deregulation, Bolsonaro managed to capture the support of popular sectors, especially in rural areas and peripheral urban zones. Bolsonaro used a strong rhetoric of order and security, promising to end corruption and crime, issues that deeply resonated with popular classes tired of violence and disorder. Although his policies favored economic liberalization and reduced state programs, his nationalist and anti-establishment message attracted a considerable popular base.
While we can mention more examples, including the benefits the lower class received from stabilization during Carlos Menem's government in the 90s, maintaining strong support, **never before has there existed a libertarian and anarcho-capitalist president with the backing of popular classes.** The economic crisis that resulted in social and cultural degradation due to demagogic and macroeconomic populist policies in our country, coupled with financing deficits through debt and issuance (spending money we do not have, hence printing it causing inflation), and the subsequent drop in poverty affecting 53% of the population, with worse social indicators than those of 2001 and more deficit financial indices than those causing the most severe crises in Argentine history, led society to seek the answers that the State was either failing to provide or worsening, in the market and in freedom, **resulting in an unusual coexistence between posts from the President with Jordan Belfort or Elon Musk, the most renowned billionaires in the United States and the world, and likes or reposts from young informal workers from the outskirts of Buenos Aires.**
Javier Milei, during his electoral campaign, did not hire expensive consulting firms or complex international communication advisors; nor did he spend lavish amounts on social media and marketing (in fact, he did not spend); Milei did not pay for extra advertisements on television or radio, other than those provided free of charge by the National Electoral Directorate; he did not finance multi-million dollar surveys from dubious consultants; Milei was responsible for repeatedly conveying the same message to which he dedicated his entire professional career, on the most diverse platforms, at every electoral event, and with the few tools he had at hand. The message was simple: hold traditional politics responsible for the inflation, which rose month by month, and for all the fiscal crises in Argentina that plunged millions into chronic poverty, destroying the noblest institutions that our own history had bequeathed to us, and which set us apart from our immediate neighbors: the middle class and upward social mobility. **Today, the impoverishment resulting from successive crises has become chronic, and we maintain a base poverty rate of 30% that has never returned to middle-class indicators; and the upward social mobility that once characterized our public education, free and of quality, has turned into downward and chronic mobility because of poor management of scarce resources, with the main cause being the fiscal deficit.** In short, we have become so impoverished that education has become a privilege despite being free, and work an informal obligation, thus lacking time limits, age restrictions, or labor rights.
Perhaps this is why, during the first months of management, Milei's government has faced the toughest challenges and mobilizations from urban middle and upper-middle sectors: unionists, beneficiaries of public universities, traditional politicians, reluctant businessmen to competition and trade openness, leaders of social movements and picketers, but with an acceptance rate that does not drop below 50% of society, with its core in the lower and lower-middle sectors, which can be explained by the reduction in inflation (which directly impacts the informal economy); the slight recovery of registered wages in real terms; the increase in private credit and also the predictability in economic policy, which is no minor issue due to the instability and volatility we had become accustomed to during 2023.
The transformation of the Argentine electorate, marked by the rise of Javier Milei and his focus on economic liberalism, evidences a profound change in the social base that historically sustained the traditional political system. The support of popular sectors, previously tied to clientelism and the State as a central actor in their lives, reveals a widespread fed-up and a search for solutions outside the interventionist framework. Milei, with a message that simplified the causes of the economic and social crisis to state inefficiency and the fiscal deficit, capitalized on discontent and the need for change.
**The popular liberalism he leads not only redefines political alliances in Argentina but also underscores a timeless global phenomenon (not biased, but spontaneous) where the lower classes seek in the market and individual freedom answers that the State failed or refused to provide.** As his government advances, the key will be the ability to maintain this popular support in the face of pressures from traditional sectors and the obstacles of old politics while confronting the challenges of implementing a model that promises to break the structures that have kept a large part of the population in a state of dependence on the State for decades.
Time (and economic recovery indices) will tell whether support from these popular classes remains for Milei's government, and if improvements in economic activity directly impact poverty levels, it will at least lead to maintaining the pre-existing electoral base; to the short-term stability of the government due to legislative minorities, and to the guarantee of future electoral victories. **On the other hand, an improvement in economic activity that solely benefits middle/upper or urban upper classes, historically inclined towards the Socialist Party and UCR, will not necessarily translate into growth of Milei's electoral base, since this social nucleus will likely continue to demand the preservation of the pre-existing social and political pact without major structural modifications, maintaining its historical condition of ideological center-left.**
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