By José Adán Gutiérrez, senior member, MSI² Rafael Marrero, Founder and Executive Director, MSI²
Key Points
● The November 2025 elections will determine whether Honduras continues under the reformist government of Libre, despite being plagued by scandals, shifts to the leadership of the conservative National Party, or chooses a centrist reformist alternative. Each decision will have different implications for national politics, regional alliances, and ties with the United States and China.
● China's influence has rapidly expanded since Honduras recognized the People's Republic of China in 2023, making alignment with its foreign policy a central electoral and strategic issue. The electoral results could consolidate Beijing’s presence or redirect its stance toward positions aligned with the United States.
● The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for approximately 80,000 Hondurans in the United States will expire pending judicial outcomes. Washington's management of TPS, along with cooperation on security and economic matters, will significantly influence the stability of Honduras and the direction of its foreign policy. U.S. policy toward Honduras must balance firm expectations on anti-corruption, migration management, and security cooperation with pragmatic flexibility, particularly concerning TPS, to avoid economic destabilization and reduce the appeal of Chinese proposals.
● The U.S. military presence at Soto Cano Air Base remains a fundamental pillar of bilateral security cooperation, granting Washington significant influence and also serving as a symbol of debates over sovereignty in Honduran politics.
Executive Summary
Honduras is approaching a decisive political moment. The November 2025 elections follow four turbulent years under the presidency of Xiomara Castro, whose victory in 2021 ended 12 years of National Party dominance. Castro's government has made progress in security, health, and attracting foreign investment—especially through its engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC)—but has been marred by scandals of corruption and political polarization.
This document examines the political evolution of Honduras from the 2009 coup to the present, profiles viable candidates for the 2025 elections, and assesses what each potential outcome would mean for internal governance, regional relations, and ties with both the United States and China. It also analyzes key issues—corruption, migration, human rights, drug trafficking—and the persistent U.S. military presence in Soto Cano. Furthermore, it highlights the expiration of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Hondurans in the U.S. as a critical issue both economically and diplomatically.
1. Introduction
The trajectory of Honduras' internal and foreign policy is in full transition. The November 2025 elections will determine whether the country continues on the current reformist path or shifts toward a conservative restoration. The outcome will have direct repercussions on U.S.-Honduras relations, regional alignments in Central America, and the strategic balance between Washington and Beijing in the hemisphere (Americas Quarterly, 2024; World Bank, 2024).
2. Historical Context (2009–2021)
The June 2009 coup ousted President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, initiating 12 years of National Party (PN) rule under Porfirio Lobo and Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH) (Booth et al., 2023). This period was characterized by the increasing capture of the state by organized crime; U.S. prosecutors described Hernández’s Honduras as a “narco-state” (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], 2024). Hernández's reelection in 2017, facilitated by a re-interpretation of the constitution, sparked national protests and was widely condemned by international observers (Freedom House, 2024).
In 2021, Xiomara Castro of the Liberty and Refoundation (Libre) party won the presidency with 51% of the votes, basing her campaign on the fight against corruption, social investment, and democratic restoration (Americas Quarterly, 2024).
3. Progress Since 2021: The Presidency of Castro
3.1 Achievements
Castro's initial actions included the extradition of JOH to the U.S., the abolition of the controversial Employment and Economic Development Zones (ZEDE), and the lifting of the ban on emergency contraception (Al Jazeera, 2023). GDP grew on average by 3.8% between 2022 and 2024 (IMF, 2024). Homicide rates fell from 38.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to 26.5 in 2024 (Honduras Violence Observatory, 2025).
3.2 Corruption Scandals
In September 2024, a leaked video showed Carlos Zelaya, the president's brother-in-law, negotiating a payment of $525,000 with the “Los Cachiros” cartel, supposedly for Mel Zelaya's campaign (Reuters, 2024). The scandal caused high-profile resignations, including that of the Minister of Defense, and severely damaged Libre's anti-corruption narrative (Insight Crime, 2025).
3.3 Dispute over the Extradition Treaty
In August 2024, Castro announced her intention to terminate the extradition treaty with the U.S. following criticism from Ambassador Laura Dogu regarding a meeting of Honduran military officials with a sanctioned Venezuelan general (Al Jazeera, 2024). In February 2025, under internal and international pressure, she reversed the decision and agreed to extend the treaty with “sovereignty safeguards” (AP News, 2025).
4. Viable Candidates and Electoral Scenarios
4.1 Rixi Moncada — Libre Party
● Domestic policy: continuity of social programs and state-led development projects.
● Regional policy: closer ties with Venezuela and Nicaragua.
● Relations with the U.S.: cooperation on security, resistance on migration issues.
● Relations with China: deepening ties in infrastructure and trade.
4.2 Nasry “Papi” Asfura — National Party
● Domestic policy: pro-market reforms, possible rollbacks of some Libre social programs.
● Regional policy: closer ties with pro-U.S. governments, such as Guatemala.
● Relations with the U.S.: alignment on migration and drug-fighting efforts.
● Relations with China: reconsidering recognition of the PRC in favor of Taiwan.
4.3 Salvador Nasralla — Salvador de Honduras Party (PSH)
● Domestic policy: reformist and anti-corruption approach.
● Regional policy: center pragmatism.
● Relations with the U.S.: strong cooperation on governance and security.
● Relations with China: neutrality and pragmatism in investments.
5. Key Issues in the 2025 Elections
5.1 Corruption and Governance
Libre's stalled efforts to establish the CICIH (International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras) with UN support (2025) and ongoing scandals will be central to the campaign.
5.2 Migration, U.S. Policy, and Loss of TPS
Castro has rejected U.S. mass deportation initiatives, calling them an “affront to human dignity” (La Prensa, 2025). The TPS for about 80,000 Hondurans in the U.S. is at risk; its expiration could reduce remittances by $1 billion annually (World Bank, 2024). As of August 2025, beneficiaries remain protected and can work legally until November 18, pending judicial resolutions.
Quick Facts: Migration and Remittances
Year
Remittances (USD)
% of GDP
TPS (U.S.)
2022
8.6 billion
26%
79,900
2023
9.18 billion
27%
80,300
5.3 Geopolitical Considerations of TPS
● U.S. Leverage: Washington could link decisions on TPS to migration cooperation, drug fighting efforts, or alignment against China.
● China Factor: a Libre government could offset losses in remittances through greater engagement with the PRC.
5.4 Drug Trafficking
Although drug seizures increased by 20% between 2022 and 2024 (Honduran Armed Forces, 2025), political protection for traffickers remains a problem (Insight Crime, 2025).
6. U.S. Military Presence in Honduras
Soto Cano Air Base houses the Joint Task Force Bravo, with between 500 and 1,000 U.S. personnel supporting drug interdiction, disaster assistance, and regional training (U.S. Southern Command, 2025). The base is valued by both militaries but is politically sensitive; Castro has occasionally used it as leverage in migration disputes with the U.S.
7. Regional Electoral Context
● Guatemala: the reformist presidency of Bernardo Arévalo aligns with U.S. anti-corruption objectives (Reuters, 2023).
● El Salvador: Bukele's advances in security contrast with democratic backsliding.
● Nicaragua: Ortega's authoritarian regime aligns with Libre's foreign policy.
● Costa Rica: stable, pro-U.S. democracy under Rodrigo Chaves. One of the few countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan against the PRC.
8. Policy Implications
For Honduras:
● Speed up the establishment of the CICIH to regain anti-corruption credibility.
● Prepare contingency plans for the expiration of TPS.
For the U.S.:
● Maintain security cooperation while pressing for governance reforms.
● Manage a gradual transition from TPS to avoid economic collapse.
For Regional Actors:
● Coordinate migration policies with the U.S. and regional partners.
● Align anti-corruption initiatives to generate collective impact.
Conclusion
The November 2025 elections will chart the course of governance, foreign policy, and Honduras's role in a changing regional environment. Whether the country remains under Libre, returns to the National Party, or opts for a reformist alternative, decisions in Tegucigalpa will resonate beyond its borders.
China's presence has already deepened since recognizing the PRC in 2023, with agreements in infrastructure, trade, and technology that expand its economic footprint. If the post-electoral government feels isolated from Washington—particularly in the face of mass deportations, the expiration of TPS, or an apparent disinterest from the U.S.—Beijing will be positioned to fill the vacuum with financial incentives and political backing. This could tilt Honduras more firmly toward the Chinese orbit, complicating strategic interests.It is essential for the United States to achieve a skilled balance. By combining firm expectations on anti-corruption, security cooperation, and migration management with pragmatic flexibility, particularly regarding TPS, Washington can help stabilize the Honduran economy, protect millions of people from economic crises, and maintain its role as a key partner for Tegucigalpa. This approach would preserve U.S. influence, mitigate the factors driving irregular migration, and reduce the appeal of Chinese proposals. This strategy, implemented consistently, can help ensure that Honduras remains anchored in democratic governance and a cooperative regional security architecture, rather than becoming just another node in Beijing's growing network of influence in Latin America.
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