In 2007, after a strong mobilization of environmental organizations and native communities, the Argentine Congress passed Law 26.331 on Minimum Standards for the Environmental Protection of Native Forests, better known as the Native Forest Law. Its approval was historic: it succeeded in putting a momentary brake on the uncontrolled advance of the agricultural frontier over the last remnants of native forest in the country. Under this law, each province had to draw up its own Territorial Ordinance of Native Forests (OTBN), classifying its territory according to three conservation categories:
Red zones, of high ecological value, where no transformation can take place;
Yellow zones, of medium value, where certain sustainable uses are permitted;
Green zones, where land use changes are authorized (e.g., for livestock or agriculture).
In theory, this scheme made it possible to make productive development compatible with the preservation of ecosystems. In practice, however, its application was subject to the discretion of each province. The national law did not establish effective control or sanction mechanisms to ensure that provincial regulations respected the general conservation objectives. Thus, each jurisdiction was free to define its maps according to its own political and productive interests, with very different consequences in environmental terms.
The case of Formosa is particularly worrying. Despite having one of the largest areas of the Chaqueño Forest, its application of the OTBN has been deficient. Deforestation continues to advance, especially in the less populated departments, where there are no organized social actors that can demand compliance with the law. This article analyzes this dynamic and proposes some possible ways to reverse it.
Why is the OTBN not being enforced in Formosa?
Formosa has had a stable political configuration for more than four decades: the same party has governed uninterruptedly since the return of democracy. But this stability does not translate into effective environmental policies.
The explanation lies not so much in the capacity of the State, but in the absence of organized social pressure. In provinces such as Chaco or Santiago del Estero, where there are strong conservationist movements, the Forestry Law is more rigorously implemented. In Formosa, on the other hand, large landowners have a free hand to push for a more lax use of the land, without effective counterweights.
Furthermore, although each province must pass its own land use planning law inspired by the guidelines established by National Law 26.331, there is no rigorous control mechanism to ensure that these provincial regulations are faithfully in line with national objectives. This leaves a wide margin of discretion to local governments, which can design permissive regulations without legal consequences or concrete sanctions. Thus, the spirit of the national law can be blurred in its concrete implementation.
This is aggravated by the demographic distribution: more than 70% of the population lives in two departments in the eastern part of the province (Formosa Capital and Pilcomayo), while the rest of the territory - where most of the Chaco forest is concentrated - is practically empty. Without organized neighbors, without active NGOs and without indigenous movements with negotiating power, there is no one to defend the forest. Thus, the "green" areas (of low conservation and enabled for productive transformation) coincide almost perfectly with the less populated departments. Deforestation, therefore, advances silently.
The Bermejo case: a sample of the problem
The department of Bermejo, located in the west of Formosa, condenses the main flaws of the current model. It is an extensive region, with very low population density and large areas classified as green zones, i.e., suitable for the productive transformation of the land. This makes it an ideal terrain for the advance of extensive cattle ranching and land clearing, without any significant social resistance.
In Bermejo there are no active environmental movements or organized communities that can articulate conservation demands. Nor is there a constant presence of the provincial government or effective oversight mechanisms. Enforcement of the OTBN is almost non-existent. As a result, the fate of the forest is left exclusively in the hands of productive interests, mainly large rural landowners who operate without controls.
The choice of Bermejo as a case study reveals a worrying logic: where there is no social pressure, the law is not enforced. The lack of inhabitants not only facilitates deforestation, but also prevents the formation of what researchers call "conservationist coalitions", that is, social groups with the capacity to exert political influence to demand the protection of the forest.
For the same reason, Bermejo also represents an opportunity. Any strategy that seeks to improve the implementation of the law -such as introducing economic incentives for sustainable production, attracting new actors with an interest in conservation, or strengthening state presence- must begin in the areas where the law is currently absent. If the trend can be reversed in areas such as Bermejo, it could set a precedent that could be replicated in other regions of the country.
What can be done?
Faced with this scenario, it is necessary to think of innovative strategies that do not depend solely on social pressure (which does not exist) or political voluntarism (which is unlikely). One alternative explored in our research is Forest Management with Integrated Livestock Management (MBGI): a technique that combines livestock production with environmental conservation.
Although MBGI does not solve the underlying structural problem, it can generate new actors interested in preserving the forest, by offering economic profitability to those who produce in a sustainable way. Furthermore, its implementation could be financed through green or social bonds, financial tools that channel investments with environmental criteria. Can this create a new environmental coalition in Formosa? Can it interest the provincial government in exchange for tax benefits or rural votes? There are no guarantees, but there is an urgent need to think of alternatives.
The history of the OTBN in Formosa is a warning: having good laws is not enough. If the norms are not applied, and if there is no one to defend them, deforestation will continue to advance. The solution is not a single technical tool or a magical new plan, but a combination of political incentives, social pressure and sustainable development strategies. For the forests to be saved, they must have someone to defend them - and for that, they must first be populated with new interests that look beyond immediate deforestation.
Acknowledgements
This note was inspired by research carried out within the framework of the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. I am especially grateful for the guidance of professors Candelaria Garay and Florencia Gallinger, as well as for the work shared with Pilar Bartolomé, María Lourdes Castillo and Lisandro Zilbervarg. The focus of the analysis takes up, in part, ideas developed by Garay and Fernández Milmanda in their research on environmental policy in Argentina (2019; 2020), whose contributions were key to thinking about the institutional challenges of environmental compliance and protection in subnational contexts.
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