Infobae COLOMBIA Add Infobae to Google The security challenges facing the Government of De la Espriella in Colombia (Robert Evan Ellis)

The new Government of Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia has drastically deviated from the political orientation of his predecessor, Gustavo Petro. It has shifted from the total peace approach of the latter, which sought negotiations with armed criminal groups in Colombia and a permissive orientation towards coca cultivation, to an aggressive campaign, backed by the military, against criminal and terrorist groups, as well as to the forced eradication of coca crops, including the announced attempt to resume aerial spraying.

De la Espriella has markedly distanced himself from Petro's public reproaches to the counterterrorism, drug trafficking, and migration policies of the Trump administration, to align Colombia with the "Shield of the Americas" led by the United States and the "Coalition of the Americas against the Cartels" associated (A3C). In the process, his government has opened new possibilities for security cooperation between the United States and Colombia against armed groups and has obtained from the Trump administration a promise of up to USD 1 billion in assistance for that purpose.

In many ways, De la Espriella's shift resembles the transition from the efforts of former Colombian president Andrés Pastrana, between 1998 and 2002, to negotiate with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to the comprehensive government effort, led by the military, of his successor, President Álvaro Uribe, to reestablish Colombian state control over national territory. However, the challenge facing De la Espriella's Government today differs in some respects from the one Uribe faced. It confronts a more complex international environment and must depend on Colombian security forces whose capabilities deteriorated significantly during the administration of his predecessor.

The Colombian Government can reimpose order on the landscape of armed groups and criminal economies that have spread throughout the country since the 2016 agreements with the FARC, with challenges exacerbated by the pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic and Petro's total peace approach. However, that path toward the stabilization of Colombia amid its current crisis will be fraught with risks of escalating violence and fragmentation, internal polarization, paralyzing legal disputes, and challenges to securing the necessary international cooperation. This article examines the security challenges faced by De la Espriella's Government, its collaboration with the United States and other partners, and recommendations for an effective response.

The deterioration of the security situation in Colombia began, possibly, with the 2016 agreements with the FARC. The agreements themselves generated dissatisfaction among people of very diverse political orientations. Some, generally on the right, were unhappy with the payments to the demobilized members of the FARC and with the temporary assignment of seats in the Colombian Congress to the successor political organization of the group, which had not been elected. Others, generally on the left, were dissatisfied because the Colombian state did not fulfill its promises of agrarian reform and investment in infrastructure at the expected pace. Many were unhappy with the transitional justice mechanism, some for what they perceived as prosecution of military officials and leniency towards the FARC, and others for the opposite reason.

Beyond those controversies, although the agreements made an important contribution by incorporating 13,000 combatants into the demobilization process, their benefits were neither complete nor permanent. Even before their implementation, some members of the FARC transferred to the previously smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), rapidly increasing its power and allowing it to enter territories abandoned by the FARC. Other organizations of the FARC, including the First Front, deeply involved in criminal activities in areas such as Guaviare, refused to demobilize and continued their military operations and associated criminal activities. After the implementation of the agreements, some historical leaders of the FARC who had accepted their benefits and demobilized, primarily Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich, attempted to continue their criminal activities, entered into conflict with the state, and ultimately renounced the agreements to return to fighting under the name of Segunda Marquetalia.

Below that level of elites, as happened with members of self-defense groups a decade earlier, many demobilized FARC members did not find sufficient opportunities in the legal economy and reverted to the only way they knew to make a living — the use of weapons — by joining criminal groups such as the Urabeños (later renamed the Gulf Clan). The aggregated effect was a redistribution of combatants among the groups and an expansion of violence, accompanied by fragmentation and uncertainty.

As Colombian criminal groups reorganized without a lasting reduction in their ranks after demobilization, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly limited state presence and opportunities in the legal economy. Then, faced with those limited opportunities and reduced state security presence, the incoming Colombian administration of Gustavo Petro replaced confrontation with armed groups with a new approach of Total Peace. The new policy created a mosaic of temporary agreements and restrictions on the employment of the Colombian Armed Forces, allowing groups, which were already expanding in number and competing violently for territory, to consolidate their control and expand more quickly.

The U.S. Department of State estimated that in 2015 there were approximately 12,000 armed combatants in Colombia, including 7,000 from the FARC, 2,000 from the ELN, and 2,400 Urabeños. By 2025, the Ideas for Peace Foundation estimated that the number of combatants was approximately the same. The number of municipalities reporting the presence of at least one armed group in Colombia skyrocketed from 195 in 2019 to more than 410 in 2025.

Part of the evolution of criminal groups in Colombia during this period was a consequence of their financing, including increased revenue from cocaine production and illegal mining.

In the arena of drug trafficking, the 2016 agreements created incentives for farmers to maximize coca cultivation hectares, hoping to be subsequently compensated for ceasing to produce coca on those lands. The Colombian state's fight against coca production was further complicated by a 2015 court ruling that ended aerial spraying and, later, by the logistical demands of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Colombian Army, which partly diverted it from the manual coca eradication, which is labor-intensive, and the territorial control it required.

The cultivation of coca, which was already expanding, skyrocketed under Petro's administration, which effectively reduced forced eradication and associated actions against coca-growing farmers. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia increased from 96,000 hectares in 2015 to 261,000 hectares by 2024. This growth, combined with higher yields achieved through genetic improvements and denser planting, generated an explosion of income for armed groups, which transformed that coca into cocaine and exported it to Europe and the United States. A benchmark study estimated that revenues of criminal groups based in Colombia from cocaine multiplied by 5.5 between 2014 and 2024, reaching USD 16.5 billion annually.

Together with cocaine revenues, the earnings of armed groups from illegal mining in Colombia also increased during this period. This phenomenon reflected the already mentioned ...

The growing criminal economy in Colombia was also reinforced by the displacement of 2.8 million Venezuelans to the country, coupled with millions more who passed through Colombia to other destinations, creating opportunities for illicit income derived from smuggling, prostitution, extortion, and theft for groups like Tren de Aragua, which took advantage of them.

As a reflection of the combination of all these dynamics, the Colombian countryside and urban areas became more violent as these groups competed with each other to control criminal economies, from cocaine and gold to kidnapping. According to the Ministry of Defense of Colombia, extortion related to kidnappings almost tripled between 2015 and 2025, the reported thefts nearly doubled and homicides increased by 11% during this period.

At the end of Petro's administration, the most violent departments of Colombia could be understood as separate but interconnected wars for territory and associated criminal revenues among rival armed groups. In Guaviare, the most violent department in Colombia, with 120 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, it is estimated that 85% of the homicides were linked to the struggle between the Amazonas bloc of the dissidents of the FARC linked to Iván Mordisco and the Córdoba dissidents of the Calarcá bloc, known as the General Staff of Blocks and Fronts.

In San Andrés, with 66 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the main dispute occurs between the Los Pusey faction of Clan del Golfo (AGC) and the La Fortaleza group for trafficking routes and local drug markets on the island of San Andrés.

In Cauca, with 54 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the main dispute is between groups linked to the dissident organization of the FARC Central General Staff (EMC) of Iván Mordisco, particularly the Carlos Patiño fronts and other western fronts, the ELN and the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), a group that emerged from the fragmentation of the previously mentioned Segunda Marquetalia.

In Valle del Cauca, where the homicide rate is 53 per 100,000 inhabitants, the dispute is between other dissidents of the EMC, including the Jaime Martínez front, the ELN and elements of Clan del Golfo. There is also a separate but related conflict, between the Shottas and Espartano gangs.

In Arauca, with 49 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the main dispute is between other dissidents of the EMC from fronts 10 and 28 and the Eastern Front of the ELN, particularly its Domingo Laín front.

The atrophy of the Colombian security apparatus

As the threat of armed criminal groups expanded during Gustavo Petro's government, driven by an expanding illicit economy and struggles between groups for territories and criminal revenues, his administration obstructed and discouraged the national security forces from acting aggressively against the threat, restricted the resources they desperately needed to fulfill their mission and limited important types of cooperation with traditional partners like the United States and Israel.

As noted earlier, Colombia's military forces began Petro's administration at a disadvantage, given that the emergency response necessary due to the COVID-19 pandemic weakened military readiness for other operations.

Petro also set the tone for his administration by removing an unprecedented number of 52 high-ranking generals to pave the way for military leadership of his preference. The loss of so many high-ranking leaders, whose experience had been forged over long command careers, weakened capabilities at the highest levels, as less experienced officers were promoted to fill vacant positions.

Such decisions by Petro, along with new policies to reduce the risk of collateral damage from military actions, such as prohibiting airstrikes on armed group camps unless it could be demonstrated that no minors were present, sent a strong message that the new government penalized errors and rewarded caution over taking risks to achieve results.

Petro's choice of Iván Velásquez as Minister of Defense, a lawyer and former magistrate of Colombia's Supreme Court who had built his career investigating the military for human rights violations, reinforced that message and strongly disincentivized commanders from taking initiative on the battlefield.   When Velásquez resigned in February 2025, Petro's decision to appoint Pedro Sánchez Suárez, a leader with over 35 years of military experience, as his replacement was considered by many Colombian military colleagues I informally consulted as a significant improvement.

The obstacles to the effectiveness of Colombia's security forces resulting from leadership changes and restrictive policies were exacerbated by the proclamation or negotiation of a multitude of truces and ceasefires by the Petro administration, often in overlapping territories, which significantly limited where Colombian security forces could operate and against whom they could do so. Upon taking office in August 2022, the Petro government announced five ceasefires with the ELN, the Clan del Golfo, the “Central General Staff” of the FARC dissident groups (EMC), the Segunda Marquetalia, and the Self-Defense Conquerors of the Sierra Nevada (ASCN). During 2023, the Petro government negotiated additional truces with successors of the ELN and Segunda Marquetalia as those groups fragmented. Additionally, during 2023 and early 2024, it announced eight extensions of ceasefires or new agreements that covered the ELN, the EMC, the General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (EMBF, formerly Calarcá), the Segunda Marquetalia, the National Coordinating Bolivarian Army (CNEB), the Comuneros del Sur and the Clan del Golfo. It also announced four agreements with urban criminal organizations, including the Shottas and Espartanos of Buenaventura; the Mexicanos, Locos Yam, RPS, Los Z, and Revolución Cabí of Quibdó; severalcriminal groups in Medellín and the Aburrá Valley; and the Pepes and Costeños of Barranquilla, among others.

Finally, as noted before, amid these other obstacles to the effectiveness of Colombia's security forces in facing the growing national security crisis, the Petro administration deeply reduced and blocked disbursements of funds to those institutions, with increasingly serious effects on the availability of equipment and personnel. Petro's cuts included a reduction of 606 billion pesos to the armed forces and police in 2024. In January 2025, he issued Decree 0069, which froze the use of already assigned funds for the armed forces to acquire necessary goods.

The publicly reported consequences of such cuts during Petro's presidency are anecdotal but serious. In July 2024, the head of the Colombian Army's aviation organization reported that only 92 of its 138 aircraft were operational. In 2025, the Colombian Navy similarly reported that it had funds to cover only 59% of its maintenance needs and acknowledged negative effects due to this insufficiency. A September 2026 report from the Ideas for Peace Foundation of Colombia details the devastating deterioration of availability across the force, with 56% of military aircraft out of service, 48% of naval and riverine vessels non-operational, and gaps between operational needs and financing provided of 96% for Army artillery, 93% for Army transport, and 78% for Army cavalry.

The new path of Colombia

The response of De la Espriella's government to the security challenges and institutional deterioration of Colombia since he took office has been promising, although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of his new direction.

De la Espriella's choice of Major General Jorge Mora López as Minister of Defense is well-regarded due to his extensive military command experience in special forces, anti-narcotics operations, and strategic defense planning.

Within a month of taking office, De la Espriella ended practically all peace negotiation processes created by his predecessor through nine resolutions and initiated a series of significant operations against armed groups. His new military initiatives included a major air operation against the ELN in Catatumbo, just three days after assuming office. They also included the Operation Amón, a bombing of the Jorge Suárez block camps of the Calarcá group in Guaviare; Operation Azarías, against the Carolina Ramírez front in the same department; and the creation of the Joint Task Force Urano, with 1,200 members from all armed forces, to combat fuel theft.

The De la Espriella government also declared that it would resume aerial spraying against coca production and expand other forms of forced eradication. Colombia has already announced a pilot program in the department of Putumayo, utilizing a herbicide different from previous efforts, glufosinate ammonium, although the initiative has been legally challenged.

De la Espriella has also revitalized security cooperation between the United States and Colombia, including intelligence sharing and the possibility of joint operations. Reportedly, he and his team coordinated with U.S. political and military leaders since his election, allowing them to act quickly once he took office. In fact, just five days after De la Espriella's inauguration, U.S. Secretary of War Hegseth announced that Colombia had authorized joint military operations. Then, less than two weeks later, the commander of U.S. Southern Command, General Francis L. Donovan, met with De la Espriella and his Colombian military counterparts to advance cooperation.

On September 8, 2026, in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, De la Espriella announced the “Patriot Plan for the 21st Century,” suggesting that the USD 1 billion in security cooperation committed by the United States could include support for modernizing aircraft, helicopters, radars, drones, anti-drone systems, air defense, intelligence, cyber defense, special forces, and Colombian maintenance systems.

In addition to strictly military cooperation, De la Espriella's government also resumed extraditions to the United States, which his predecessor had suspended, sending 94 people there during his first month in office.

Risks and challenges

De la Espriella's security initiatives, with strong support from the U.S. government, are possibly heading in a very positive direction, but also pose significant risks that should be recognized and managed.

First, in the short term, Colombia's intensified efforts against armed groups may increase violence, both by ending peace negotiations and by fragmenting armed groups through targeted operations against them and their leaders. Examples of such consequences in other conflicts include the violence produced when the government of Felipe Calderón in Mexico intensified its actions against drug cartels in that country.

In fact, Colombian initiatives undertaken to date have already generated violent consequences, including drone attacks from the ELN and other reprisals and side effects. For example, the operation on September 21, 2026, in Santa Marta, which killed José Luis Pérez Villanueva, alias “Cholo,” second commander of the ASCN, provoked a series of retaliatory actions from the group in the area, including an “armed strike” during which the group burned several vehicles. An ELN attack on September 4 with explosive drones in Ocaña, Norte de Santander, is linked to government operations in that area. In Bolívar department, the capture on September 24 by the Colombian Army of ELN leader Isaís likely contributed to the fighting on September 2 between the ELN and the Gulf Clan in Montecristo, south of the department, in which explosive drones were used. These consequences do not mean that the Colombian government should avoid confronting the armed groups operating in the country, but rather that it must prepare for the military and political consequences of these actions.

In addition to such military and political reactions, it is likely that the Colombian government's initiatives will also generate resistance from Colombia's strong legal system, as De la Espriella has publicly acknowledged. In fact, the attack on August 27, 2026, against ELN camps in Guaviare led to a lawsuit alleging that Colombian military had reasonable evidence that there were minors in the camp. On September 11, a judge in Puerto Asís suspended the pilot aerial spraying program due to alleged health risks.

In addition to legal actions, human rights groups, including Amnesty International and Save the Children, have spoken out against De la Espriella's military approach. The often confrontational style of the president may exacerbate the effects of his actions by deepening polarization in the already divided Colombian society, giving opportunities to those on the left seeking to paralyze De la Espriella's government through legislative actions or to overthrow it.

The evolution of the situation in Venezuela will also heavily weigh on Colombia's success. Groups such as the ELN and the dissidents of the FARC obtain substantial income from illegal mining and other criminal operations in Venezuela. A considerable number of ELN groups, FARC, and others continue to have refuge and resources on the Venezuelan side of the border, enabling them to sustain criminal and terrorist activities in Colombia. This reality has not substantially changed with the U.S. ousting of Nicolás Maduro and his relationship with his successor, Delcy Rodríguez.

Beyond the importance of cross-border collaboration with Venezuela on criminal groups and illicit flows, restoring a legitimate democratic government and economic stability in Venezuela would substantially benefit Colombia's economic and security situation, even by...

to facilitate the possible return of some of the 2.8 million Venezuelans living in the country. Alternatively, destabilizing the transitional regime of Rodríguez could increase pressure on Colombia due to migration and cross-border criminal activity.

Beyond Venezuela, Colombia today faces a different and possibly more complex strategic environment than it did two decades ago, when the Uribe government successfully regained control of its national territory. Although Uribe had to deal with a variety of “self-defense” armed groups and other criminal groups, the current landscape of such groups is possibly much more complex and aligned against the government. The Uribe government also did not have to contend with armed drones, cyberattacks, cryptocurrencies, artificial intelligence in the hands of criminal groups or distant wars in the Middle East that threatened to keep oil prices extraordinarily high and destabilize the Colombian economy and that of the rest of the global economy.

Finally, the success of De la Espriella's initiatives will possibly depend on the effectiveness of inter-institutional and international coordination, as well as attention to detail in the implementation of those policies. While De la Espriella's active confrontation with criminal groups is much better than the accommodation and improvised policies of his predecessor, examples from Mexico to Honduras and current Ecuador show that confronting criminal groups can bring order, but not always. The achievements of the previous Colombian government under Uribe in reclaiming control of the Colombian state over national territory were possibly the result of its sustained attention to detail in inter-institutional and international cooperation. De la Espriella will need no less to succeed.

Recommendations

Under the Shield of the Americas and the Coalition of the Americas against the Cartels, the United States has an important opportunity to help the De la Espriella government regain control over Colombian national territory. To do this, it must pay attention to the differences in Colombia's national circumstances, its international environment, and its current political leadership compared to those of the Uribe era. It should not assume that a “repetition” of Plan Colombia, whose success was in turn misinterpreted and incomplete, will yield similar results.

Then, as now, it will be important for the United States to work closely and flexibly with Colombia to understand its institutional needs, capacities, limitations, and idiosyncrasies, and to ensure that U.S. assistance meets Colombia’s needs for long-term success, while helping a willing De la Espriella government address U.S. priorities in the fight against organized criminal groups.

The government and people of Colombia have systematically demonstrated that they are capable, resourceful, and tenacious. With effective public policies and a qualified government, Colombia can again turn tragedy into triumph. It will require hard work, coordination, and patience. However, for Colombia and the region, the consequence of failure is unacceptable.

R. Evan Ellis, Research Professor on the Americas at the U.S. Army War College