Fabián Calle, Senior Fellow at MSI² for FinGurú
There is broad academic consensus, from defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz to offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, to neoconservatives like Charles Krauthammer or to liberals like Gilford John Ikenberry; that the Soviet collapse between 1989 and 1991 initiated a unipolar moment of two decades or a little more. A consensus as strong in the academic world and international politics as that between the 15th century and 1945 the world was multipolar and that between 1945 and 1989-1991 it was bipolar. One of the peculiarities of these years is the absence of that consensus. For a substantial part of those who think and carry out international policy, we are rapidly entering a multipolar world. For many others, including myself, the traits are clearly bipolar.
Beyond this debate that will accompany us for a long time, there is little doubt that it is China that has been deploying with more strength and success its hard and soft power in Latin America. Both to use them as a source of massive amounts of raw materials and to poke and disturb Washington's hegemony in the region. Without control of the Western Hemisphere, which the United States has enjoyed for more than a century, the strategies for projecting American forces into Asia and Europe would become extremely complicated. It would no longer be so easy to carry out what was done in 1917, 1941, and during the Cold War. China knows how to take advantage of the traditional ideological niches of leftist and Marxist nationalism of various types, but mostly centered in Cuba and backed politically and economically by the powerful Brazilian left, which has spent a century or more clashing and criticizing American power in the region. Leaving aside the ideological cloak of the famous Global South, a category that Chinese propaganda has managed to use to disguise itself as a power that understands the suffering of weak states supposedly suffering from American imperialism.
From now on, China in the last 200 years has never had the power to subjugate Latin America. Therefore, one should know what the traditional neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region think of this supposed benevolence from Beijing. From India to Tibet, passing through Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, etc.
Since the arrival of Kirchnerism to power in Argentina, the left and those opposed to the US and to the idea of a world of republican and liberal democracies politically and economically have sought to bring this country from the Southern Cone into the anti-Washington crusade. Especially since 2005 with Néstor Kirchner's famous aggression against George W. Bush at the Summit of Presidents in the city of Mar del Plata, even more so shortly after Cristina Fernández began her first term and even more acutely in her second term, including an agreement with Iran. While Kirchner was alive, the geopolitical romance with Venezuela was fundamentally based on financial reasons, namely, Bolivarian dollars quickly buying and shedding Argentine debt bonds, helping to shake off the IMF's financial accounting scrutiny over public accounts. With Cristina Fernández, it adopted more ideological and narrative forms. This was combined with fostering a close and admiration-filled relationship towards Putin's Russia, including a private meeting between the Argentine ex-President and the spy Edward Snowden, who was taking refuge in Russian territory. This extended over the traumatic and fragile mandate of Alberto Fernández, with Cristina Fernández as Vice-President and mentor of the government, when in the midst of a pandemic it was decided to abandon already advanced and articulated cooperation with a very important US laboratory to prioritize the purchase and local production of Russian vaccines. National production that never materialized despite the document and video with Putin in person.
Returning to China, starting in 2010 it began to explore the best location in Argentina to place a powerful antenna linked to its military and scientific deep space program and the dark side of the moon. Its construction, initiated in 2014, was completed in 2017 and since that moment about twenty Chinese military scientists have made use of those facilities. But as often happens in the volatile human experience, the 2023 presidential elections brought an enormous Black Swan. The arrival of a controversial and media-savvy libertarian, with excellent economic training, and forms and styles that quickly reached broad sectors of youth from all social strata: Javier Milei. His candidacy, initially encouraged by Kirchnerism and their ally Sergio Massa to split the opposition vote, mutated into a political Frankenstein that crushed them in the second electoral round with a 12-point lead and victories in historically kirchnerist clientelist areas. While from the beginning the new President highlighted that his priority would be the economy and avoiding the outbreak of hyperinflation from massive monetary emission carried out by the government to try to win and postpone the explosion until after 2023, he did not hesitate to set clear lines in foreign policy. The priority would be a strong rapprochement and cooperation with the US and Israel, as well as with democratic, capitalist Western powers in Europe and Asia. This should not imply harming or altering trade or private flows with Lula Da Silva's Brazil, Gabriel Boric's weak Chile, Gustavo Petro's Colombia, or Andrés Manuel López Obrador's and his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo's Mexico. Much less with China as Argentina's second commercial partner and the same with Russia.
To the surprise of many, especially Kirchnerism and its internal and external allies, neither Pope Francis nor Joe Biden's administration indicated rejection or obstructed Milei's first months in power. The Holy Father treated the new Argentine president with affection and gestures rarely seen, and the democratic Washington embraced him since November, even before taking office, with unexpected supportive attitudes. The Biden administration had preferred the rise of leftist political leaders like Lula, Petro, and Boric since 2021, whose main asset was their personal and ideological distance from Donald Trump. It is unusual for a global superpower to have subordinated its geopolitics to internal ideological struggles intensified since Trump's victory in 2016 and the tough political-judicial fight after the 2020 elections. Everything pointed towards that continuing and making life difficult for Milei. Until his victory, when it came to Latin American policy, the democratic administration viewed positively the same leaders who preferred China, Russia, Venezuela, and even Cuba. Lula suggesting that Ukraine was to blame for the war with Russia for defending itself and accusing Israel of genocide with “millions” of deaths in Gaza, Petro and Boric harshly attacking the same country, seem to have led Washington to rethink certain things. Two meetings in a few months of Milei's former Chief of Cabinet with the CIA Director, the visit to Buenos Aires by the Secretary of State, the praise from Biden's Secretary of the Treasury, and then the presence and support for the Argentine economic plan from Trump's appointee, a constant flow of events with important second-tier figures from American power, and the visits of the Southern Command chief, General Laura Richardson, are a compelling example in this regard. Richardson had not one but two long meetings and ceremonies with President Milei, one in Tierra del Fuego and another in Buenos Aires. In the first, cooperation in stability in the South Atlantic and cooperation in the Antarctic sector was promoted. Her successor as chief of Southern Command, Admiral Alvin Hosley, would visit Argentina two more times between 2024 and 2025. A little over 50 years ago, Henry Kissinger defined Argentina as a dagger thrust into the South Pole. Not to mention its access to strategic natural passes in Magellan and adjacent areas. Sooner or later, China will challenge the control of the seas and strategic passages from the US. Milei put an end to any possibility of a Chinese port in that region, as pushed by Kirchnerism. Just days before, the Argentine government signed a letter of intent for the purchase of 24 F-16 MLU combat aircraft from Denmark, with strong support from the Pentagon.
Likewise, Buenos Aires's interest in advancing the acquisition and partial domestic manufacture of 127 Stryker 8x8 combat vehicles is taking shape. The first 8 were acquired in August 2025. In addition to this, there is the firm will to cooperate and coordinate in better and greater control of the waterway formed by the Paraguay and Paraná rivers, a strategic course where various analyses focus on considering it the outlet for Bolivian cocaine to Europe, Africa, and Asia. The solid presence of security apparatus forces from Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, and Russia on Bolivian territory gives this Argentine-American agenda a clear and present urgency. In the same vein, Israel seems to be becoming aware of the magnitude of the threat.
In other words, Milei in foreign policy is betting as strongly as in the economic field. His internal and external rivals and enemies know that his speech and actions represent a serious ideological and geopolitical challenge. Hence the urgency to weaken him as soon as possible and to show that his person and ideas were nothing more than a breeze that will soon be forgotten due to failure. Utilizing the tough adjustment months that were applied in the first half of 2024 and the legislative and municipal elections of 2025, to attempt to create an Argentine version of October 2019 in Chile. Milei's enemies clearly know what to do and that it must be done quickly. The coming months will show whether his allies, especially the US and also Israel, are willing to bet strongly to help him stabilize the Argentine economy and socio-political situation. As was heard in some corridors of power in Buenos Aires, by merely having Washington revoke the visa of those who consciously or unconsciously encourage the destabilization of the Argentine president, part of the threat would be neutralized. As is often said, behind every ironic joke, there is a grain of truth. It is worth noting that this recipe would not be very effective against those external actors that support the exacerbation of problems for Milei. On that front, the actions to be developed by the US, Israel, and other allies will likely remain state secrets for a long time. We will soon find out if Washington has the same determination to support Milei that his enemies have to end the liberal and pro-Western experience that started in December 2023 in Argentina. The failure of the Argentine president would be a seismic event that would go beyond the borders of his own country. Washington's disinterest in helping Argentina during the dire months of 2001 and 2002 paid dividends in two decades of Kirchnerism allied internationally to the most significant rivals of American power. It is often said that history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. We hope that some 2.0 version of the great George Kennan has written or is writing a long telegram that realistically guides the very necessary “grand strategy” of Washington towards the region.
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