William Acosta, CEO of Equalizer Investigations, for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
Introduction: Where Borders Draw Other Realities
The border that unites —and separates— Colombia and Venezuela is much more than a point on the map. Sometimes, it seems more like a living wound, marked by political tensions, desires for integration, and the stark evidence of clandestine economies and violence. The creation of a Binational Zone of Peace, Union, and Economic Development, as announced by the Presidency of Colombia, might initially seem like progress, but it has brought with it a new wave of doubts and fears (Presidency of Colombia, 2025). The maps published by the media make clear the impact of the project, which crosses historically vulnerable regions like La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Vichada, and Zulia. From these areas, concerns are growing that instead of bringing development, it may serve as a platform for criminal networks to consolidate routes of illegality (France24, 2025).
While government discourse repeats ideas of integration and growth, many experts, including Carlos Augusto Chacón, insist on the double-edged nature of the project: the possibility that it is a smokescreen that could shield the movement of illicit capital and protect binational mafias with diplomatic backing (NTN24, 2025; Diario Las Américas, 2025; Chacón, 2022).
The debate intensifies due to the perception of deception in the official discourse of President Gustavo Petro. According to various analysts and journalistic reports, the president uses the language of peace and cooperation to disguise what is actually happening: a proliferation of criminal structures, opaque alliances, and trafficking routes that are strengthened under the protection of the new binational legal order (Diario Las Américas, 2025; NTN24, 2025).
As Chacón expresses:
“We are observing how the border is blurred, ultimately leaving a criminalized state —like that of Venezuela— free to operate, calling into question Colombia's sovereignty. It is not about cooperation, but about creating a gray area where mafias assume control, sheltered by a discourse of integration.” (Chacón in NTN24, 2025)
Agreements without transparency and the protagonists behind the scenes
Among the names signing the memorandum are Diana Morales Rojas and Alfredo Saade from Colombia, alongside Delcy Rodríguez Gómez, Coromoto Godoy, and Yván Gil from Venezuela. At the head of both governments, Gustavo Petro and Nicolás Maduro endorse the pact (Presidency of Colombia, 2025; France24, 2025). However, what happens away from the formality of signatures and photos raises significant concern. Experts warn that the real beneficiaries could be organizations with dark interests, whose legal shielding is strengthened under the rhetoric of integration (Chacón in NTN24, 2025; Diario Las Américas, 2025).
The living border: a fertile land for crime
This strip is not only a commercial pathway: it is a space where decades of institutional abandonment have left the field open for the proliferation of criminal groups, guerrillas, and corrupt officials. Chacón's research, along with other experts, identifies three critical points:
• Illegal routes could operate even better, facilitating the trafficking of drugs, weapons, fuel, and people, dominated by gangs like the Cartel of the Suns (Chacón in NTN24, 2025; Wikipedia, 2023; Infobae, 2025).
• Money laundering is facilitated by the new binational regulations, favoring the emergence of shell companies and blocking fiscal controls (CNNE, 2025; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025).
• A new legal framework could be used to evade investigations and sanctions, using diplomacy as a shield of impunity (DW, 2025; Chacón in NTN24, 2025).
Terrorist groups and the role of the State
The border corridor has been fertile ground not only for mafias but also for groups considered terrorist, who, with the tolerance and even complicity of official officials, have found refuge and new opportunities for expansion:
• The National Liberation Army (ELN) has extended its influence on the Venezuelan side, receiving protection, resources, and freedom to act in vast areas, often with the consent of Maduro's regime authorities (DW, 2025; El País, 2025; Diario Las Américas, 2025).
• The dissidents of the FARC, especially 'La Nueva Marquetalia' and 'Estado Mayor Central', have rebuilt their armed and logistical networks on both banks of the river, counting on secure refuge, training, and illegal commercial opportunities thanks to their relationship with the Venezuelan government (El País, 2025; Wikipedia, 2023).
• International organizations have warned about the presence of Hezbollah and its economic operations in the region: illicit financing, money laundering, and participation in cross-border trafficking, activities that are only possible with political protection and a complete lack of state control (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025; Diario Las Américas, 2025).
• The Tren de Aragua and numerous Venezuelan paramilitary gangs operate with terrorist methods, using violence and extortion, and operate with the approval —or at least the indifference— of state bodies (DW, 2025; Infobae, 2025).
All of this shapes a scenario where governments, especially that of Venezuela and partly Colombia's, have ended up being direct or indirect accomplices in the expansion of national and international violent groups (Chacón, 2022; Diario Las Américas, 2025).
A direct threat to the security of the United States
While the border drama particularly affects Colombia and Venezuela, the tentacles of the conflict reach much further. Documents from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and numerous reports lay bare how the corridor serves as a highway for the transport of drugs, weapons, and money to the north, fostering crime in U.S. territory. Mexican cartels act as a bridge and, along with local mafias and terrorists, generate a network that contributes to the increase in violence, money laundering, and transnational crime with a direct impact on the national security of the United States (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025; Reuters, 2020; El País, 2021).
Who holds the real control of the corridor
Power lies neither with the governments nor at the negotiation tables, but in the hands of those who dominate the routes. On the Colombian side, there are the ELN, residual groups of the EPL (Los Pelusos), Los Puntilleros, and the Gulf Clan; in Venezuela and the intermediary zone, the Cartel of the Suns, Tren de Aragua, armed collectives, and the powerful dissidents of the FARC operate with flexible/temporary alliances based on current interests (Wikipedia, 2023; Infobae, 2025; DW, 2025; El País, 2025).
The role of Mexican cartels
The drug trafficking network that crosses this border is no longer only at the service of foreign buyers: major Mexican cartels —Sinaloa, CJNG, Los Zetas, Beltrán Leyva— invest in local production, provide weaponry and personnel, and establish their own cells to ensure a constant flow of shipments to Central America, the Caribbean, and U.S. territory (Reuters, 2020; Infobae, 2020; El Clip, 2023; BBC Mundo, 2024; El País, 2021).
Complicity and corruption as a gear
The operation of this entire illegal machinery is impossible without the facilitation, cover-up, and even direct involvement of state officials —police, military, bureaucrats— who have been documented favoring the transit of illegal loads, hiding evidence, or laundering money under contracts and mutual aid pacts (Razón Pública, 2025; Inseroca, 2025; Chacón in NTN24, 2025).
The Cartel of the Suns and the Venezuelan regime
The Cartel of the Suns, with ties to the highest echelons of the Venezuelan government, manages to control the entire business chain: from rural production and transport via rivers or roads to international exit from Venezuelan ports. The new binational order grants them legitimacy and operational margin never seen before, consolidating a significant economic and political power (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025; DW, 2025; Infobae, 2025; Diario Las Américas, 2025).
Conclusion: A Border That Continues to Hurt
The Binational Zone, far from being an integrating success, reveals structural weaknesses that favor the expansion of mafias, terrorists, and corruption networks. President Petro's complacent, ambiguous, and often misleading discourse obscures extremely alarming realities. The route remains in the hands of those who traffic with the lives and security of millions, pushing chaos beyond Latin America to become a hemispheric security problem, mainly for the United States. The only real way out is the eradication of the ties between crime and power, the demand for transparency, and the recovery of the rule of law for those who live, resist, and dream on the border (Chacón in NTN24, 2025; Diario Las Américas, 2025; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025).
REFERENCES
• Chacón, C. A. (2022, November 18). The Maduro regime and the ELN seek to legalize border criminality: interview with Carlos Augusto Chacón. Institute of Political Science.
https://www.institutodecientificapolitica.org/entrevista-carlos-chacon
• NTN24. (2025, July 25). “A gray area where criminal groups begin to assume control de facto with the support of a State”: Carlos Chacón on the binational zone between Colombia and Venezuela.
https://www.ntn24.com/america-latina/colombia/chacon-zona-binacional-petro-maduro-614550
• Diario Las Américas. (2025). The crime strip created by Petro and Maduro.
• Crisis Group. (2020, December 14). Disorder on the Edge: Maintaining Peace between Colombia and Venezuela.
• U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025, July 26). Treasury Sanctions Venezuelan Cartel Headed by Maduro.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1203
• Presidency of Colombia. (2025). Colombia and Venezuela sign Memorandum of Understanding to create the Zone of Peace, Union, and Economic Development.
• France24. (2025, July 26). What is the agreement between Colombia and Venezuela to create a binational zone about?
• Razón Pública. (2025). Corruption and crime on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.
"https://razonpublica.com/frontera-crimen-colombia-venezuela/
• Kaosenlared. (2025). Drug trafficking and illegal economies on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.
https://kaosenlared.net/narcotrafico-economias-ilegales-frontera-colombia-venezuela/
• Wikipedia. (2023). Drug trafficking in Colombia and Venezuela.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcotráfico_en_Colombia
• Infobae. (2025). New crime area on the border.
https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/07/26/nueva-zona-crimen-frontera-petro-maduro/
• CNNE. (2025). Money laundering in the binational area.
https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/07/26/blanqueo-capitales-zona-biunacional/
• DW. (2025). Legal framework and transnational crime.
https://www.dw.com/es/marco-legal-binacional-crimen-transnacional/a-69760172
• Defensoría del Pueblo. (2025). Criminal alliances on the border.
https://www.defensoria.gov.co/alianzas-criminales-frontera
• El País. (2025). FARC dissidents and strategic alliances.
https://elpais.com/internacional/2025-07-26/disidencias-farc-alianzas-frontera.html
• El Clip. (2023). Mexican cartels and the border.
https://elclip.org/carteles-mexicanos-frontera-colombia-venezuela
• BBC Mundo. (2024). Drug routes of the Colombian-Venezuelan border.
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-68896110
• Reuters. (2020). Colombia, Venezuela, and the Mexican cartels.
https://www.reuters.com/article/colombia-venezuela-carteles-idLTAKBN23X2A9
• Inseroca. (2025). Corrupt officials on the border.
https://inseroca.com/funcionarios-fronterizos-corrupcion
• YouTube/CJNG Invades Colombia. (2025).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJNG-Invade-Colombia
• Diario Las Américas. (2025). Economic power and criminality on the border.
https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/poder-criminal-frontera-colombia-venezuela-n5330192
About the author:
William L. Acosta graduated from (PWU) and Alliance University. He is a retired police officer from New York City, as well as the founder and CEO of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc., a licensed agency in New York and Florida with international reach. Since 1999, he has led investigations in drug cases, homicides, and missing persons, and has participated in criminal defense at both the state and federal levels.
Specializing in international and multi-jurisdictional cases, he has coordinated operations in North America, Europe, and Latin America.
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