Jesús Daniel Romero from Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute for FinGurú
In the ongoing fight against transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) maintains one of its most effective operational initiatives, albeit one that is less understood: PC-2439, the designation for Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT) under U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Despite its proven success in dismantling illicit networks in Latin America, the TAT has faced chronic institutional neglect, poor inter-agency coordination, and a lack of codified normative guidelines. This situation threatens national security and undermines confidence in strategic programs.
An operational success trapped in administrative limbo
Since its inception, PC-2439 has operated with remarkable efficiency, supporting anti-drug missions at the inter-agency level throughout the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, from Guatemala and Colombia to the Caribbean. These small teams provide tactical intelligence support to host nations and inter-agency partners, leveraging U.S. military capabilities to address evolving narcotic threats. Its performance has been repeatedly validated through measurable operational metrics: dollar for dollar, few DoD programs offer such a high return on investment in drug interdiction and partner capacity building.
And yet, PC-2439 has been stuck for more than two years in bureaucratic limbo.
Members of the program face inconsistencies in assignments, delays in benefits, and unequal treatment, especially when assigned to embassies. While other DoD employees receive delivery procedures, accolades, and letters of appreciation, TAT members are often marginalized, their contributions quietly disregarded. In my case, after my planned departure from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, I received no formal recognition, no transfer, and no thank you letter, despite nearly two decades of service. A program with such clear national value should not be subject to such structural neglect.
Misconceptions, mismanagement, and the civil control dilemma
Much of this dysfunction originates from the ambiguous position of PC-2439 within the DoD's anti-drug structure. Although it is administratively housed in SOUTHCOM's J2 (Intelligence), the program has been influenced—and in some cases managed—by civil law enforcement agencies, including the DEA and the Department of Justice. Though well-intentioned, this overlap has injected unnecessary confusion, exposing program members to institutional biases, conflicting guidelines, and cultural frictions that divert from their primary mission within the DoD.
New rotations of Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers and representatives from agencies outside the TAT concept have occasionally questioned its legality or necessity, undermining morale and fostering operational stagnation. Rather than reinforcing one of the most agile and productive assets in the fight against drug trafficking, key actors have allowed it to deteriorate, without support or appreciation.
Poor talent management and structural inequity
The sustainability of any critical program depends on recruiting and retaining the right talent. However, JIATF South has systematically undervalued qualified candidates and maintained opaque hiring practices. When I applied to JIATF South—after supporting both JIATFS and JIATF East since the nineties—I did so with the intention of serving and growing. Instead, I was offered a GS-12, level one position, despite being a retired O-4 officer, double FAO (Foreign Area Officer), with language proficiency and operational experience in Latin America. The decision reflected a pattern: institutional disdain for experience directly aligned with mission success.
This mismatch was compounded by a human resources office that operated more like a closed club than a professional entity. Without external oversight and prone to internal favoritism, the personnel system of JIATFS systematically undervalued mission-aligned experience. Language skills, inter-agency experience, and cultural fluency—critical for success in TAT deployments—were routinely ignored. This insular approach has drained the human capital that makes PC-2439 viable.
Language blindness: a self-inflicted weakness
TAT personnel must coordinate closely with Latin American and Brazilian counterparts—often in real time and crisis situations. Language proficiency is not optional. It is operationally essential. And yet, for years, JIATF South refused to incentivize or support language development. Unlike the Army Department, which offers language pay and structured training, JIATFS offered nothing. Only recently, and under external pressure, has this begun to change. But the damage is already done. By neglecting the development of this core skill, the command diminished interoperability and undermined trust with allied forces.
From neglect to collapse: the terminal assignment policy
The final blow came with JIATF South's shift towards “temporary positions,” treating TAT assignments as disposable rather than formative. These overseas deployments are challenging and require continuity, but the command implemented a policy of not guaranteeing subsequent roles, regardless of performance. This actively disincentivized excellence. Combined with the current hiring freeze, this policy has led the PC-2439 program to alarming stagnation. A vital tool in the anti-drug fight has been neutralized not by enemies, but by internal policies. This is inequality in its purest form: rewarding mediocrity and driving out mission-oriented professionals.
Why a merger between SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM makes sense now
One of the main takeaways from the PC-2439 experience is the urgent need to reconsider the structure of U.S. Combatant Commands. Current drug supply chains do not respect arbitrary borders. Drugs coming out of Colombia pass through the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, enter Mexico and the Caribbean, and then cross into NORTHCOM territory. Yet, despite this clear continuity, institutional fractures persist.
Although JIATF South is labeled as a “national-level task force,” it still operates under regional limitations. Its coordination with NORTHCOM is often fragmented, and cross-border operational continuity is more aspirational than real. The artificial division between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM weakens the U.S. ability to wage a coherent and unified campaign against this transnational threat.
A merger—or at least a joint command structure for anti-drug operations—would ensure that programs like PC-2439 do not get lost in bureaucratic cracks. A single combat command would allow for consistent oversight, fluid operational alignment, and mission clarity, preventing the program from being undermined by institutional contradictions.
It’s time to codify what works
After more than 30 years, the fact that PC-2439 still lacks a codified and permanent place within the DoD's anti-drug doctrine is concerning. For a program with extensive operational validation, this lack of institutional protection creates instability. Leadership changes, inter-agency confusion, and administrative neglect have produced a revolving door of misunderstandings and misalignment. The program must be formally integrated into DoD policy, with clear definitions of roles, authorities, benefits, and operational frameworks.
Despite its proven track record, PC-2439 remains structurally vulnerable. Although it has appeared in recent budget justification documents—specifically as Project 2439 in the drug interdiction and anti-drug activities of the Department of Defense for fiscal years 2024 and 2025—the program continues to be treated as a budget line item, not as a strategic pillar. These documents confirm federal recognition of its value, with funding directed toward analytical support, travel, and operations in the areas of responsibility of SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM. However, no formal doctrine or long-term personnel policy has been established. The program is funded but not protected, recognized but not codified. This contradiction places PC-2439 in a precarious position, subject to leadership changes, mission drift, and eventual erosion.
Moreover, the fact that months went by before a successor was permanently assigned in Guatemala—despite having been alerted months in advance—speaks volumes about the disconnection between institutional rhetoric and operational priority. This is not just about one person’s experience. It is about the failure to protect and preserve what works.
JIATFS has liaison officers in Portugal, Mexico, and other key locations. Why not afford the same respect and clarity to one of its most effective operational tools?
Conclusion: Stopping the drift, strengthening the shield
At a time when U.S. adversaries are adapting, innovating, and infiltrating all aspects of regional instability—from Venezuela and Mexico to the ports of West Africa—we cannot allow poor internal management to erode our response. Programs like PC-2439 represent the best that the DoD has to offer: agile, integrated, and proven solutions. But without structural reforms, they risk becoming just another victim of bureaucracy.
Unless these institutional blind spots are corrected, we will lose one of the few programs that consistently delivers results in the fight against transnational crime.
At the very least, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (DASD-SO/LIC), which oversees the funding for these efforts, should initiate a formal review of the PC-2439 program. This review must assess whether current personnel practices, supervision gaps, and program fragmentation are aligned with national security interests—or are undermining its operational effectiveness.
This initiative should also be part of the broader strategic analysis regarding the potential merger of the U.S. Northern and Southern Commands. A unified anti-drug command structure, guided by mission effectiveness rather than regional borders, is essential to defend domestic territory against transnational threats.
References
● Department of Defense. (2022). Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities: FY2022 budget justification. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Drug_Interdiction_and_Counter-Drug_Activities.pdf
● Department of Defense. (2023). Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities: FY2024 budget justification. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_Drug_Interdiction_and_Counter-Drug_Activities.pdf
● Department of Defense. (2024). Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities: FY2025 budget justification. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Drug_Interdiction_and_Counter-Drug_Activities.pdf
● Ruggiero, A. (2023, April 26). Written testimony before the House Oversight Committee on transnational crime and money laundering. U.S. House of Representatives. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/04-26-23-Ruggiero-Written-Testimony-FINAL.pdf
● SOUTHCOM. (2023). 2023 Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/526350/southcom-chief-talks-threats-military-engagement-more
● U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. (2022, March 23). Transcript: Hearing on drug interdiction programs and gaps in counter-narcotics capabilities. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-16_03-23-2022.pdf
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