Fabián Calle for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
More than two years after Russia's offensive against Ukraine, two little-mentioned facts can start to come to the forefront. The first, the harsh reprimand that the head of external intelligence, Sergei Naryshkin, received from Vladimir Putin in the televised staging that took place the day before the attack began. An angry Putin urged his minister to leave no doubt about the advisability of starting military operations. Was it just shyness in a televised session? Or was the official's ambiguity based on some information or analysis that anticipated the incursion would not be a victorious stroll that would lead to the collapse of the Ukrainian government in a maximum of three to four days, as the Russian leader apparently estimated?
The other aspect to look at closely is the broad consensus existing in recent months among the world's major strategic think tanks, and even in Russia itself, about the low probability of a military offensive like the one we are witnessing: with the deployment of 200,000 troops.
The most prominent specialists in international and geopolitical issues, including many who were sharp critics of the true strategic utility of the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, did not tire of warning that a massive Russian invasion would have serious consequences. Among them, making Russia economically more dependent on China, as well as the real possibility of getting into a quagmire of guerrilla warfare and sabotage should a significant part of the Ukrainians' will to fight emerge.
As the Realist thinking of IR teaches us, since the late 18th century, the most powerful force driving States and their peoples is nationalism, not Marxist, liberal, anarchist, or theological ideologies. A prominent Realist like J. Mearsheimer, who always emphasized the aggressive and mismanaged approach the US took from the mid-90s regarding NATO's eastward expansion, advised against an operation on this scale. Noted specialists in defense, insurgency, and counterinsurgency from the US and Europe did not doubt the convenience of Russia getting trapped in the Ukrainian quagmire, leading to serious human, economic, and reputational costs. Those more specialized in grand geopolitics called for avoiding, both in Moscow and Washington, a break situation that would permanently distance Russia from Western capitalism and leave it hostage to China's state capitalism. A hard pill to swallow for Russian nationalism. Quite the paradox that a war against Ukraine to raise Russian pride and nationalism high ends up facilitating Beijing's influence over Moscow.
Analyses also abounded where Russian pacifism, postmodernism, and post-heroism were seen as favorable factors, especially from a substantial part of European Union countries, particularly an economic giant like Germany: with its armed forces' decreasing budget and low operational level, as well as growing dependence on Russian gas. Berlin's public decision to increase Defense spending and supply sophisticated anti-tank rockets and anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine is a clear example in this regard. France under Emmanuel Macron, seen for years as a dialogue and understanding channel with Russia, has begun to show its teeth. Divergences within NATO countries on how to respond to Russia—extended over years—are narrowing to almost disappearing. Not coincidentally, NATO has decided for the first time to extend its massive rapid deployment force of 40,000 troops. Even the always prudent and neutral (and armed to the teeth) Sweden and Finland have raised their voices to Moscow. Erdogan's Turkey, which in recent years had been giving headaches to the US and European countries, has shown a firm stance of diplomatic support and sophisticated armament delivery to Ukraine.
Returning to the start, it is possible that Putin saw things that neither his head of external intelligence nor almost all the best minds and international studies centers in IR and geopolitical issues worldwide saw. If this concludes with a Ukrainian surrender and collapse, Putin will have seen an unparalleled opportunity. If the military clashes continue, perhaps the eternal wisdom of realism was once again ignored by a decision-maker.
Fabián Carlos Calle
Master in International Relations, Universita di Bologna, Italy; Master in International Relations, FLACSO.
Degree in Political Science from the University of Buenos Aires, Specialization in International Economic Strategy from the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires, Master in International Relations from FLACSO, Master in International Relations from Universita di Bologna, Specialization at the National Defense University Washington DC, PhD Candidate in History at the University Torcuato Di Tella. Professor at the University Torcuato Di Tella, UCEMA, Catholic University of Argentina, Universita di Bologna and Joint Armed Forces War School. Former analyst of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Navy, former advisor to Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena, former Senior researcher at CARI, former Ford Foundation fellow, former Initiation, Improvement, and Postdoctoral fellow at CONICET. Currently in charge of the Defense area at the Codesur company and is Editorial advisor for the DEF Magazine and columnist on security and defense issues for DEF TV program. Also, advisor at the Ministry of Defense since May 2011 and Grupo Bapro.
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