Uribe Reactivates His Criticism: Negotiated Peace or Strengthened Criminality
Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez returned to the center of the political debate after issuing strong statements on his X (formerly Twitter) account on July 25, 2025. In his message, he openly questioned the peace policies of former presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Gustavo Petro, stating that both have contributed to the resurgence of criminal organizations, the increase in drug trafficking and the territorial expansion of armed structures.
His most resounding phrase did not go unnoticed:
"Criminals regained power with Santos' Havana process and the Petro government has helped them consolidate."
With this, Uribe rekindled the national discussion on the relationship between security, justice and reconciliation in Colombia.
Structural criticisms: peace, cocaine and territorial extortion.
Uribe argues that decisions made following the 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC, coupled with the current government's "total peace" policy, weakened the state's ability to impose authority, creating vacuums that were filled by illegal armed groups. According to his analysis, between 2010 and 2025, Colombia went from exporting 150 tons of cocaine to more than 1,800, and much of the country "has returned to being extorted."
The former president points especially to the alleged "instrumentalization" of the transitional justice process, assuring that armed figures have obtained benefits without real commitments to reparations or disarmament, which for him represents a "legalization of impunity". From his perspective, the peace process with Santos offered excessive concessions, while Petro's policy has not placed firm limits on the growth of dissidents, the Clan del Golfo or the ELN.
Disputed models: reconciliation vs. territorial control
Uribe's approach revives an underlying tension that runs through Colombia's recent history: the dilemma between the negotiated reintegration of ex-combatants and the punitive approach of democratic security. Uribism has historically defended a model centered on the military presence of the State, the capture of armed leaders and the direct dismantling of illegal networks. In contrast, the Santos and Petro governments have opted for dialogue and institutional inclusion as central axes of their strategy.
Data on the territorial expansion of armed groups after 2022 fuels part of the argument. Various reports - including reports by Human Rights Watch and the UN - show that illegal armed actors have grown in firepower and coverage, particularly in regions such as Guaviare, Catatumbo, Arauca and Nariño. However, experts point out that the incomplete fulfillment of the Peace Accord commitments, the lack of social investment in rural areas and the capture of illegal rents continue to be structural factors of the conflict.
Cross reactions and alternative views
Juan Manuel Santos' response was not long in coming. The former president defended his legacy and pointed against what he considers a vacuum of institutional continuity since the signing of the agreement. According to Santos, the current deterioration is not the result of the pact, but of its poor implementation by subsequent governments. He reaffirmed that Plan Colombia is still active and that international support for the transition continues to be key, although insufficient, without sustained state commitment.
For their part, analysts such as writer Juan Gabriel Vásquez and independent political scientists have criticized Uribe's "linear" view, noting that attributing the growth of violence exclusively to the Peace Accord ignores factors such as institutional corruption, territorial informality, state neglect and the rise of illegal economies in the aftermath of the pandemic. They have also drawn attention to the repeated political use of the "rhetoric of fear" in contexts where public debate should be oriented towards structural solutions and not just punitive diagnoses.
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