After two horrific murders committed by minors in Argentina, the Milei government included by decree in the extraordinary sessions the review of the juvenile penal system to lower the age of accountability. The past year showed us how different leaders have appealed to punitive reflection as a campaign proposal. Donald Trump, Javier Milei, and José Antonio Kast have made increasing penalties a hallmark of their management.
The argument is not false. Legislation is essential to define which behaviors a state accepts or rejects. The likelihood of being arrested by the police increases the cost of committing a crime. And an independent judiciary, free from political power and sectoral pressures, is a basic condition for legal and personal security. However, taken to extremes, the punitive approach has costs: it infringes on individual and political rights.
Foucault described utopian hyper-surveilled societies. There are real and nearby cases of hard-handed pacification, such as that of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and also regimes where the armed forces do not serve justice but political leadership, as in Venezuela, North Korea, Russia, and China.
In addition to the infringement of rights, the coercive strengthening of the state has its own structural limits. Increased patrolling and penalties may reduce crime, but they are not sufficient: they exclude other public policies and actions from civil society. The relevant question is, beyond how severe the punishment should be, what is the most efficient way to prevent crime.
The penal system arrives late
Relying solely on individual will to choose virtuous paths is a shortsighted and reckless act of faith. Crime does not occur in a vacuum; it is embedded in personal histories, school trajectories, families, neighborhoods, possible and impossible jobs, accumulated stigmas, and lack of opportunities. When the penal system enters the scene, it is already too late: there have been victims and damage.
Comparative evidence shows that in countries with lower crime rates (Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland), security is not conceived as an emergency but as a long-term public policy. Many prisons are closed because they are not needed, as there are policies and institutions that anticipate: early education, mental health, urban planning, employment, community networks, and a professional police force. Security is not achieved by hardening penalties, but by reducing the conditions that foster crime.
There are alternative experiences to the classical penal logic that model paths where multiple actors are involved. Restorative justice models seek to overcome both the state’s appropriation of conflict and the focus on punishment or rehabilitation centered solely on the offender. They consider the victim, the harm caused, and the social fabric.
In Spain, the Unblock Foundation works with young prisoners or those at risk of exclusion. Its president, Carlos Trenor, states that “When one leaves prison, they are the same, but older. In many cases, it gets worse. This does not protect victims, taxpayers, or the convicted themselves.” Thus, at Unblock, the aim is to support those who are released from prison to rebuild their self-esteem, break the label of “ex-offender,” and remove the person from the circuits that push them to reoffend. The program costs less than a year in prison and achieves what confinement rarely does: it reduces recidivism and generates preventive effects that multiply in the convicted person's environment.
From Mar del Plata, the Gaia Program, developed at the Batán Penitentiary Unit, proposes a multidimensional approach to illicit conduct. Through the analysis of oral trials, testimonies, and expert evaluations, Judge Mariana Irianni frequently identifies a foundational trauma behind criminal repetition. The therapeutic and psychoeducational work of the program has decreased violence among those serving prison sentences. Without understanding the origin of the harm, recidivism is not an anomaly: it is a predictable consequence.
Against all intuition
High-impact crimes that fuel the retributive and punitive proposal dominate public imagination; however, they do not represent the majority of cases that overwhelm the justice system. In the broad range of lesser crimes and offenses, there is ample room to intervene before the damage escalates.
But even in contexts of extreme violence, there are programs that demonstrate pacifying success where the punitive apparatus fails. After an attempted murder at Hacienda Ron Santa Teresa in Venezuela, the Alcatraz Project was born - unusually given the national context - which combines sports, vocational training, and support, managing to disarm eleven criminal gangs and reduce homicides in the municipality of Revenga, according to local data, from 147 per 100,000 inhabitants to just two. Andrés Chumaceiro, the COO of the Hacienda, draws a suggestive parallel: “Making good rum takes time, skill, and patience; transforming biographies does too. There is no magic wand: there is a difficult return to the community, but by reconfiguring the environment and allowing the offender to forgive themselves, progress is possible.”
The law is essential, prison is necessary, and while betting exclusively on punishment brings an immediate sense of security, it impoverishes the debate and merely postpones the problem. A Venezuelan hacienda, a foundation in Madrid, and a penitentiary unit in Mar del Plata share a common thread: crime decreases when various actors in society interact with the penal system and feel responsible for the outcome.
In the face of the demand for security, governors have the opportunity to explore and clarify the causes, admit that the problem surpasses the prison and police systems, and invite politicians, civil society, the private sector, and foundations to work together. Preventing crime requires time, investment, and shared responsibility, and the results do not always align with the next electoral calendar. Security is not decreed; it is built.
Juliana Montani is a graduate in Political Science from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), specializing in International Relations, with a diploma from the INCAP School of Government. Analyst at the Institute of International Security and Strategic Affairs (ISIAE/CARI).
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