For more than two decades, the clandestine use of low-profile vessels (LPV, for its acronym in English), semi-submersibles, and, in rare cases, technically advanced true submarines, has evolved from a maritime curiosity to a powerful logistical tool for transnational criminal organizations (TCO). These vehicles are often referred to as "narco-submarines" in popular media, but this term is technically incorrect. Most are not true submarines: they do not fully submerge or operate like military submarines. Instead, they are designed to evade detection by minimizing radar, visual, and thermal signatures, staying just at or slightly below the waterline (Felbab-Brown, 2020). Based on my previous assignments in Peru, Ecuador, and Guatemala, I have witnessed firsthand the transformation of this covert capability—developed deep in the jungles of the Pacific corridor and now expanding toward the Caribbean basin. These platforms are optimized for a single purpose: the undetectable transport of tons of cocaine and illicit cargo across hemispheric waters (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], 2024).
The Tactical Evolution of Narco-Submarines
The technology of “narco-submarines” has progressed rapidly since the early 1990s, when Colombian cartels began experimenting with rudimentary fiberglass vessels. Today, LPVs can exceed 30 meters in length, transport cargoes of several tons, and navigate thousands of nautical miles using GPS, radar reflectors, and satellite communication: a fusion of low-profile technology and high-tech navigation (Bonner, 2019). During my assignment in Guatemala, I personally witnessed the arrival and endpoint of hundreds of low-profile and semi-submersible vessels transiting through the Eastern Pacific corridor. Local villagers regularly reported grounded or drifting vessels along Guatemala's Pacific coast. These incidents were not rare anomalies: they constituted a persistent and highly organized logistical operation, consistently feeding northern drug markets with industrial regularity (DEA, 2024). On the other hand, Ecuador's jungles have become key construction hubs, particularly in the Esmeraldas region and its interior river systems. Clandestine shipyards—camouflaged under dense vegetation and protected by cartel militias—construct these vessels with alarming speed and efficiency, using modular materials and adapted truck engines (Felbab-Brown, 2020).
Venezuela's Entry into the Game
In recent years, Venezuela has emerged as a growing new player within the narco-submarine ecosystem, not only as a launch point but also as a producer of these platforms. Intelligence reports and interdiction cases confirm the existence of clandestine construction facilities in Venezuelan coastal states, particularly in Zulia and Falcón, with vessels destined for Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean (InSight Crime, 2023). This expansion represents a significant shift in hemispheric drug trade. While traditional narco-submarine routes focused on the United States via Central America, Venezuelan operations increasingly target markets in Europe and West Africa, taking advantage of poorly patrolled waters and fragmented maritime cooperation in the Atlantic (MAOC-N, 2022).
Advanced Semi-Submersibles and Geographic Expansion
Some of the most advanced semi-submersible vessels have been discovered in border regions between Colombia and Ecuador. These highly sophisticated vessels, capable of transporting large cargoes over considerable distances, demonstrate how drug trafficking organizations have responded to increasingly robust interdiction efforts (DEA, 2024). Semi-submersibles have also been detected operating in the Meta and Orinoco rivers—two critical areas in Colombia and Venezuela—which are becoming logistical hubs for illicit drug shipments, operating in conjunction with transnational crime syndicates (Felbab-Brown, 2020). In Venezuela, LPVs, including Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), navigate the Meta and Orinoco rivers, using dense vegetation, remote tributaries, and navigable channels to transport cocaine from production areas to exit points on the coast. The Orinoco River, with its vast delta and connections to the Atlantic, acts as a critical smuggling artery, especially in the Delta Amacuro. The Meta, a natural border between Colombia and Venezuela, facilitates cocaine trafficking from Colombian fields to centers like Puerto Carreño. These operations exploit weak governance, state corruption, and Venezuelan political instability, constructing LPVs in hidden shipyards along jungle-covered rivers. Interdiction in these river environments poses enormous challenges, requiring specialized river surveillance and real-time intelligence gathering (Felbab-Brown, 2020). The Caribbean basin, including areas near Puerto Rico, has also consolidated as a corridor for narco-submarines. In April 2021, U.S. authorities intercepted a 52-foot narco-submarine carrying 5,500 pounds of cocaine, valued at $75 million, bound for Puerto Rico (Bloomberg, 2021). In August 2024, a joint operation between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Royal Navy seized 1,239 pounds of cocaine, valued at $54 million, from an LPV in the Caribbean Sea (MAOC-N, 2022).
Design, Performance, and Tactical Challenges for Law Enforcement
The design and operation of narco-submarines present severe challenges for their detection and interdiction: ● Low Radar Signature: Most vessels are made of fiberglass, drastically reducing their radar signature (Bonner, 2019). ● Minimal Freeboard: LPVs navigate barely 30 to 45 centimeters above the waterline, making them hard to spot (DEA, 2024). ● Great Range and Endurance: Some models travel over 2,000 nautical miles without refueling. ● Autonomous or “Ghost Sink” Capability: Some are equipped to self-submerge using GPS mechanisms. ● Compartmentalization for Crew: They are designed for multi-day voyages, carrying satellite phones, oxygen tanks, and provisions. U.S. legislation classifies these vehicles as Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS). The Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) of 2008 criminalized the operation of SPSS without a flag in international waters (U.S. Coast Guard, 2023).
A Visual Record of the Threat
During several visits to the Naval Special Forces (FEN) base in Puerto Quetzal, Guatemala, I witnessed a disturbing sight: a graveyard of captured narco-submarines, decomposing under the scorching coastal sun. The base has become a repository for hundreds of seized vessels—ghostly relics of thwarted journeys. At its center is a “VIP row,” a carefully organized line showcasing the evolution of LPVs and semi-submersibles. I have seen similar scenes in Guayaquil (Ecuador) and Bahía Málaga (Colombia), where the structures of confiscated LPVs are stacked near naval shipyards. These remains are not merely tactical trophies but monuments to a persistent and evolving threat.
Limitations of Maritime Interdiction
Although maritime interdiction operations have seized record volumes of cocaine in recent years, they have failed to reduce the overall flow. Criminal networks have demonstrated resilience and adaptability (UNODC, 2023). The U.S. Coast Guard operation aboard the USCGC Munro in 2019 became iconic after intercepting a 40-foot SPSS, seizing 17,000 pounds of cocaine, valued at $232 million. A Coast Guard member jumped onto the vessel shouting “Stop your boat!”, in an image that went viral (U.S. Coast Guard, 2023). However, these successes do not permanently break the supply chains emerging in regions like the Meta and Orinoco rivers. The experience of “Stop your boat!” underscores the endless nature of these operations and highlights the need to tackle the sources of the problem (Felbab-Brown, 2020). The de-prioritization of coca eradication by Colombian President Gustavo Petro has further compounded the situation. The 2023 UNODC report confirmed that coca cultivation reached historic levels (UNODC, 2023). Adding to the crisis is the suspension of the U.S. coca crop monitoring program in Colombia, a decision made by the Biden administration at the end of 2023—a strategic mistake that eliminated one of the most effective early warning systems for detecting increases in cocaine production. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has also shown a lack of leadership and has not adapted drug policy tools to the new realities of hemispheric drug trafficking. The U.S. response has become reactive, limited, and lacking critical data. The lack of proactive intelligence gathering and systematic monitoring of coca cultivation will leave the United States in a position of strategic vulnerability against increasingly sophisticated criminal networks.
Strategic Implications: A Nexus Between National Security and Transnational Threats
Narco-submarines symbolize a strategic convergence between criminal innovation and state collapse. Each successful voyage undermines the rule of law, fuels regional instability, and strengthens organized crime networks. Their potential dual use—for smuggling weapons, personnel, or even non-state actors—renders them potential vectors within “gray zone” conflict scenarios (Felbab-Brown, 2020). A single successful SPSS can generate up to $125 million in the United States and $375 million in Europe, depending on the purity and route of cocaine (InSight Crime, 2023). These astronomical financial gains further incentivize innovation and risk-taking by transnational criminal organizations.
Policy Recommendations
1. Focus Coca Reduction in Colombia: Prioritize the eradication of crops and comprehensive rural development in coca production zones.
2. Disrupt the Supply Chain: Target welders, financiers, and suppliers of materials used in the construction of narco-submarines.
3. Expand ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) Capabilities: Improve real-time intelligence sharing among regional allies.
4. Strengthen Coastal and River Security: Train allied forces in river patrol and specialized coastal operations.
5. Apply Selective Sanctions: Use the Kingpin Act to sanction key actors in Ecuador and Venezuela involved in the production and operation of narco-submarines.
6. Engage European and African Partners: Treat narco-submarine trafficking as a truly global issue, especially on routes to West Africa and Europe.
Conclusion
Narco-submarines represent a hybrid maritime threat. These vessels evolve, innovate, and persist, operating beneath the radar of conventional security frameworks. From the mangroves of the Colombian and Ecuadorian Pacific to the opaque Venezuelan coasts and vulnerable Caribbean waters near Puerto Rico, they chart a silent yet lethal course through the hemispheres. Our allied nations—Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico—constitute the first line of defense in this struggle. Equally fundamental is the work of U.S. law enforcement and the Coast Guard, whose tireless efforts in interdiction and intelligence gathering have saved lives and thwarted countless illicit shipments. This is not just a war on drugs: it is a battle for maritime sovereignty, regional stability, and the defense of the rule of law at sea. References Bloomberg. (2021, April 23). U.S. seizes submarine carrying $75 million in cocaine off Puerto Rico. Bloomberg.
Jesús Daniel Romero is a Retired U.S. Naval Intelligence Commander. He has also conducted prominent diplomatic and military missions for his country overseas.
He is the author of the Amazon bestseller "The final flight: the queen of air," where he recounts part of his experiences in the fight against drug cartels in Central America.
He is currently Co-Founder and Senior Fellow at the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute and a permanent consultant on matters of his specialty for major media outlets in the state of Florida.
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