José Adán Gutiérrez from Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute for FinGurú
The Confucius Institutes (CIs), established under the pretext of cultural exchange and language instruction, have rapidly expanded to over 160 countries since 2004. Though they publicly present themselves as benign educational centers, deeper investigation reveals that they often operate as strategic tools of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beyond influencing foreign narratives, these institutes provide Chinese intelligence services with sustained institutional access to students, professors, journalists, and future leaders, laying the groundwork for long-term recruitment and elite capture. This article examines the evolution of CIs globally and in Latin America, highlighting their utility in shaping public discourse, forming sympathetic influencers, and subtly undermining academic independence. While China courts journalists with paid trips despite its internal repression of the press, the West must confront the contradiction: authoritarian soft power may not be soft at all. The United States should view the Confucius Institutes as national security concerns and reinvest in its own public diplomacy to compete in the struggle for global influence.
Introduction
The Confucius Institutes (CIs), launched by China in 2004, officially present themselves as centers for Chinese language instruction and cultural exchange. Operating through partnerships with foreign academic institutions, they have established a presence in over 160 countries, often well-received for their generous funding and the expansion of educational opportunities (Peterson et al., 2017; Myers, 2024). However, intelligence professionals and academic observers have begun to view these institutes not merely as educational tools, but as state-sponsored access points to identify, cultivate, and train future sympathizers and potential assets (Zuppello, 2024; Wray, 2018).
In the Americas—especially in Latin America—the proliferation of CIs has been remarkable. As Chinese influence has grown through trade, infrastructure, and diplomacy, cultural platforms such as the CIs have helped reinforce Beijing’s soft power, while laying the foundation for long-term ideological and intelligence influence. This article analyzes the multilayered functions of the Confucius Institutes, with particular focus on Latin America, where the opening of democratic institutions and the lack of alternatives have made these state-sponsored centers uniquely influential.
Origins and Expansion: A Platform for Cultural Diplomacy and Beyond
The CIs were modeled after Western cultural organizations such as the Alliance Française and the Goethe-Institut of Germany, but they are structurally and politically different: they are wholly state-funded and integrated within China's propaganda and intelligence ecosystem (Peterson et al., 2017). Initially supervised by Hanban and now by the Center for Language Education and Cooperation (CLEC), these institutes are directly linked to China's Ministry of Education and, by extension, to the ideological apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party (Gao, 2020).
By 2019, China operated over 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius Classrooms worldwide. This global network offers more than Mandarin classes: it provides the CCP with a means to shape perceptions about China abroad, promote pro-Beijing narratives, and, critically, cultivate future elites under friendly auspices (Zuppello, 2024). Intelligence recruitment is not a one-night transaction—it is a long game. These institutes are ideal for “identifying and assessing” future journalists, academics, bureaucrats, and decision-makers, especially those who show an early interest in China and global affairs (Wray, 2018; Myers, 2024).
Li Changchun, then head of propaganda for the CCP, admitted in 2009 that the CIs are “an important part of China's overseas propaganda apparatus” (Peterson et al., 2017). While framed as soft power, they are more accurately described as strategic penetration tools designed to shape elite opinion, facilitate indirect intelligence gathering, and exert long-term influence.
Strategic Concerns: Intelligence Actions Disguised as Cultural Exchange
Several areas of concern reinforce the idea that the CIs serve purposes beyond pedagogy:
Cultivating Future Assets and Sympathizers
The Confucius Institutes provide state-linked entities with prolonged access to students, educators, and institutional leaders, often during formative phases of their careers. From the intelligence trade's perspective, such prolonged exposure allows Chinese actors to assess individuals based on their ideological alignment, susceptibility to flattery or incentives, or future utility as policy influencers (Wray, 2018; Myers, 2024). The concept of “elite capture”—training journalists, think tank analysts, or even future politicians—fits well within the mandate of many of the CIs' related activities.
As Zuppello (2024) points out, the Chinese government has utilized the Confucius Institutes and sponsored exchange programs in Latin America to identify promising local figures. Many students are awarded scholarships to study in China, where they are exposed to state-approved narratives and networks. Upon returning, these alumni often ascend to professional or academic roles, carrying with them an embedded, and sometimes unexamined, sympathy for Chinese perspectives.
Soft Power with Sharp Edges: Journalists and Influencers as Targets
One of the most concerning developments is China's approach towards foreign journalists. Despite maintaining one of the most repressive media environments in the world at home, the Chinese state regularly invites journalists from Latin America and Africa on lavish all-expenses-paid trips to China—a tactic known among intelligence officials as grooming or “recruitment through hospitality” (Peterson et al., 2017). These trips often include curated tours, access to “model” cities, and meetings with selected opinion leaders. The goal is to create a cohort of foreign journalists who are not just neutral towards China, but actively sympathetic—or at least silent in the face of abuses.
This influence operation leverages the information asymmetry: journalists leave with favorable impressions shaped by controlled experiences, often unaware that they are being manipulated. In turn, they may publish articles or comments reflecting CCP narratives, effectively becoming “multipliers” of China's strategic message in their home countries.
Institutional Leverage and Academic Self-Censorship
In many universities, the Confucius Institutes are integrated into departments or programs with limited funding. This financial dependence, combined with formal agreements that often require alignment with Chinese law or approval of teaching content, leads to subtle but significant restrictions on academic freedom (AAUP, 2014). Topics like Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square massacre, or human rights abuses are systematically excluded from the curriculum.
Moreover, research in the U.S. revealed that some CI contracts required confidentiality about their details, further shielding the institute's operations from scrutiny (U.S. GAO, 2023). In some cases, local faculty were discouraged from holding critical events related to China, fearing that they might jeopardize institutional ties or funding. This chilling effect undermines not only individual rights but also the broader mission of higher education.
Case Study: Confucius Institutes in Latin America
In Latin America and the Caribbean, over 45 Confucius Institutes currently operate across more than 20 countries, with Brazil hosting 12 of them (Myers, 2024). The presence of the CIs in this region closely correlates with the rise in investment, trade, and diplomatic activity from China. For example, the CIs were rapidly established after countries like Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic shifted their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing.
While the academic benefits are real, the strategic implications are often overlooked:
• Training of Local Elites: The Confucius Institutes in Brazil and Mexico regularly invite local officials, professors, and journalists to China, fostering networks aligned with Beijing (Zuppello, 2024).
• Support for Broader Propaganda Campaigns: During the COVID-19 pandemic, several CIs in Latin America disseminated materials praising China’s response to the pandemic, overlooking its cover-up of the virus's origins.
• Shaping Educational Ecosystems: In countries with limited resources for teaching Asian languages, CIs often become the sole custodians of information about China, giving them disproportionate influence over what students learn—and do not learn—about an emerging global power.
China's Defense: Cultural Diffusion or Calculated Strategy?
Beijing defends the CIs as no different from other cultural institutes, citing examples such as the British Council or the Alliance Française (Gao, 2020). However, these comparisons fall short when considering China’s track record on press censorship, academic repression, and information control. China is not a country that values free expression, yet it goes to great lengths to attract foreign professors, students, and journalists. The question is not whether China has the right to promote its culture, but whether these promotions serve strategic and even intelligence purposes disguised as pedagogy.
The lack of public evidence directly linking the CIs to espionage is not what’s relevant: intelligence influence operations are designed to operate in gray areas, below the threshold of overt illegality. Their success is not measured by stolen secrets but by influenced minds and altered narratives.
Conclusion: Soft Power is More Power than Soft
The Confucius Institutes, like many other state-linked entities operating abroad, are examples of “soft” tools with hard strategic intent. They offer language classes and cultural events but also facilitate long-term influence operations. These centers allow Chinese intelligence and political organs to evaluate, shape, and build relationships with foreign elites from the early stages of their careers.
Latin America has proven to be fertile ground for this type of operation, with little resistance and considerable success in shaping local discourse and elite networks. As Beijing continues to court journalists, professors, and students—while silencing those same professions at home—the contradiction becomes a warning: the cultural diplomacy of an authoritarian regime should never be taken at face value.
For the United States, this means taking soft power seriously: not only countering Confucius Institutes when appropriate but also investing in credible and transparent alternatives. Funding independent Mandarin teaching programs, supporting journalism training, and expanding Fulbright-style scholarships across the Americas are steps in the right direction.
A key partner in this effort is Taiwan. As a vibrant democracy that also shares the Chinese language and cultural heritage, Taiwan is in a unique position to offer an alternative to the tightly controlled version of “cultural diffusion” promoted by Beijing. Taiwan can partner with prestigious think tanks and academic centers in the Americas to establish independent Mandarin and culture teaching programs free from ideological censorship and the geopolitical agenda of the Chinese Communist Party. A Taiwan-backed initiative would promote genuine cultural understanding rather than narrative control, empowering students to learn about Chinese civilization without being fed propaganda.
Above all, Washington must recognize that the battle for global influence is not only fought in boardrooms or diplomatic summits, but in classrooms, university auditoriums, and press trips. If left unchecked, Confucius Institutes will continue to shape the narratives of a generation of global leaders—leaders who may one day formulate policies with Beijing's perspective already embedded in their worldview. A strong partnership with Taiwan offers a principled democratic counterweight that upholds freedom of thought while preserving access to one of the world's most significant cultures and languages.
References
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Brown, K. (2023, September 30). Debunking the Confucius Institute Spy Myth. Asia Times. Retrieved from https://asiatimes.com
Gao, C. (July 2020). China Renames Confucius Institutes in Response to Global Backlash. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com
Hvistendahl, M. (August 30, 2013). The Global Propaganda Push from China. Science, 341(6149), 1035–1036. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.341.6149.1035
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Myers, M. (2024). China's Educational Diplomacy in Latin America. Report from the Latin America Program at the Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinas-education-diplomacy-latin-america
Peterson, R., & Wood, M. (2017). Subcontracted to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in U.S. Higher Education. National Association of Scholars. Retrieved from https://nas.org
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2023). Confucius Institutes: Status of Programs in the U.S. and Oversight Mechanisms (GAO Report 24-105981). Retrieved from https://gao.gov
Wray, C. (February 13, 2018). Global Threats Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Congress. Retrieved from https://intelligence.senate.gov
Zuppello, M. (November 22, 2024). China's Infiltration into Latin America Through Cultural Networks. Diálogo Américas. Retrieved from https://dialogo-americas.com
José Adán Gutiérrez oversees operations and strategy in Latin America, with more than 40 years of experience in the military, civil, and private sectors. He is fluent in Spanish and has extensive experience in intelligence, security, and diplomacy across the Americas, including over two decades as a Naval Intelligence Officer and U.S. Naval Attaché in Panama. Previously, he held senior positions at SAIC, Mission Essential, and INDETEC, and holds advanced degrees from the Naval War College and New York University.
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