William Acosta for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
An unprecedented security crisis is hitting Colombia. Criminal groups are becoming much more powerful and are acting with greater boldness, while the Petro administration seems too inept to confront them (Semana, 2025). Violations of the 2016 peace agreement, backed by the United States, have led to a return to a Colombia that, at times, is indistinguishable from what existed before 2016 (Human Rights Watch, 2025). The National Army of Colombia has recently suffered serious setbacks, with a significant increase in the number of recruits who are absent without leave or deserting (Semana, 2024). Meanwhile, the Gulf Clan is probably the largest and most dangerous group currently active (Wikipedia, 2024).
Colombia is undergoing an unprecedented security crisis, where the advance of criminal groups and the lack of effective responses from Gustavo Petro's government have returned the country to scenarios of violence and territorial control by armed actors, something that has not been seen for decades (El País, 2025). Institutional weakness, the proliferation of gangs, and the absence of a clear strategy have allowed crime to gain ground (Semana, 2025).
The crime map: who they are and how they operate
1. Gulf Clan (Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AGC)
The Gulf Clan is currently the most powerful and dangerous criminal organization in the country. It is characterized by its lethal violence, large-scale criminality, and control of drug trafficking. The Gustavo Petro administration has attempted to implement a “total peace” policy. Unfortunately, the strategy has yet to yield results. It has failed to get armed groups to lay down their arms, and those seeking to reduce violence have been frustrated by the expansion of these actors. Under the pretext of “peace,” these policies have allowed organized crime to strengthen itself and expand its territorial control (Semana, 2025).
• The Gulf Clan has about 7,000 members and a presence in at least 392 municipalities. Its activities range from drug trafficking and extortion to illegal mining, having grown by 55% in the last two years (Wikipedia, 2024).
• They control key routes in Antioquia, Chocó, Córdoba, and the Caribbean Coast, and maintain both alliances and confrontations with other armed groups.
• Their various cells, such as the Edwin Román Velásquez Valle, extort miners, ranchers, and merchants, displacing those who cannot pay the criminal “vaccines” (Semana, 2025).
2. National Liberation Army (ELN)
• It is the second most important illegal armed force, with over 6,000 members and a presence in 232 municipalities, representing a 23% increase compared to 2022 (Semana, 2025).
• Its operations are concentrated on the border with Venezuela (Catatumbo), as well as in Chocó, Cauca, and Nariño, where it competes for territorial control with FARC dissidents and the Gulf Clan.
• The ELN resorts to kidnapping, attacks on the Public Force, and control of illegal economies, in addition to forcibly recruiting minors (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
3. Dissidents of the FARC-EP
• After the 2016 peace agreement, several factions emerged:
• The Joint Chief of Staff (EMC), with nearly 3,000 members, dominates the north and east of the country.
• Calarcá, with over 2,100 members, split from the EMC and rejects any negotiation.
• The Second Marquetalia, led by Iván Márquez, has another 2,000 members and operates in the south and the Pacific region.
• Other groups like the Border Command and the Carolina Ramírez Front operate in Nariño and Putumayo, strategic areas for trafficking to Ecuador and the Pacific (El País, 2025).
• Altogether, the dissidents are present in 299 municipalities, 30% more than two years ago (Semana, 2025).
4. Criminal gangs and emerging groups (Bacrim, GAO, GDO)
These organizations, also known as criminal gangs (Bacrim), organized armed groups (GAO), and organized delinquent groups (GDO), emerged after the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and have evolved into mafia networks that operate throughout the country and, in some cases, in neighboring countries (Semana, 2025). Their main activities include drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, homicides, illegal mining, micro-trafficking control, illegal urbanization, theft, arms trafficking, and attacks against social leaders.
Among the most relevant and dangerous gangs and groups are:
• The Office of Envigado
• The Rastrojos
• Black Eagles
• ERPAC
• The Caparrapos
• The Paisas
• The Machos
• Renacer
• The Pachelly
• The Cordillera
• The Mesa
• The Coasters
• The Local
• The Mexicans
• The Shottas
• The Spartans
• The Palmeños
Main gangs by city:
Medellín and Valle de Aburrá:
The Office of Envigado, The Triana, El Mesa, The Mondongueros, La Sierra, The Pachelly, The Chatas, The Caicedo, The Pesebreros, The Pamplona, The Robledo, The Camilos, Satanás, Las Independencias, The BJ or Chamizos, The Shottas, The Spartans, The Coasters, The Local, The Mexicans, The Palmeños (El Colombiano, 2024).
Bogotá:
Dissidents of the FARC (EMC), ELN, Gulf Clan, Tren de Aragua, Satanás, The Paisas, The Pereiranos, The Lucky, The Maras, The Camilos, The Bury, The Zetas, The Boyacos, The Maracuchos, Blue Clan, Gancho Millos, The Aguaceros, more than 40 neighborhood gangs.
Cali:
The 40, El Platanal, The Chotas, The Bandits, The Hueco, The Cartucho, The Center, The North, The South, The East, The West, The Port, The Lido, The Calvario, The Aguacatal, The Guabal, The Vallado, The Caney, The Retiro, The Meléndez, The Siloé, The Terrón, The Nápoles, The Diamante, The Samán, The Poblado, The Brisas, The Guayacanes, The Prados, The Valle Grande, The Floralia, The Alfonso López, The Petecuy, The Mojica, The Charco, The Cañaveral, The San Judas, The San Nicolás, The San Fernando, The San Bosco, The San Cayetano, The San Antonio, The San Carlos, The San Pedro, The San Juan Bosco, The San Vicente, among others.
Barranquilla:
The Coasters, The Papalópez, The Vega, The Rastrojos, The 40 Negritos, The Pepes, Gulf Clan, The Pachenca.
Cartagena:
Gulf Clan, The Robledo, The Paisas, The Coasters, The Mellos, The Rastrojos, The Calvos, The Scorpions, The Gaitanistas.
Cúcuta:
The Rastrojos, Gulf Clan, Tren de Aragua, The Pelusos, The Urabeños, The Vultures, The AK47, The Camilos, The Paisas, The Coasters.
5. Tren de Aragua: Presence in Colombia
The Tren de Aragua is a transnational criminal organization originating from Venezuela, currently considered the most dangerous megaband in that country and one of the most active in Latin America (El Colombiano, 2024; Wikipedia, 2024). Since 2018, taking advantage of the Venezuelan migration crisis, it has expanded its operations to Colombia, where it has consolidated in several strategic cities through its own cells and alliances with local gangs (SciELO, 2024).
The main cities and regions of Colombia where the presence and operation of the Tren de Aragua has been confirmed are:
• Bogotá: The capital is one of the main operation centers for the Tren de Aragua. Authorities have captured dozens of members in the localities of Kennedy, Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, and Santa Fe. Additionally, operations have been carried out in nearby municipalities such as Chía and Cajicá, where the gang sought to expand its control over extortion, micro-trafficking, and selective homicides (Infobae, 2025).
• Cúcuta and Norte de Santander: The group operates on the border, especially in the La Parada district (Villa del Rosario), the metropolitan area of Cúcuta, and municipalities like Los Patios. They control routes for the trafficking of migrants, drugs, and illicit goods, and have infiltrated local institutions to facilitate their activities (SciELO, 2024).
• Bucaramanga: In this city in northeastern Colombia, captures of leaders and members of the gang have been carried out, linked to crimes such as homicide and extortion (Wikipedia, 2024).
• Barranquilla, Valledupar and Riohacha: The Tren de Aragua has extended its presence to the Caribbean coast, where it participates in extortion, micro-trafficking, and human trafficking, taking advantage of the migrant routes and illegal commerce in the region (SciELO, 2024).
• Cali: In the capital of Valle del Cauca, the gang has been linked to kidnappings, homicides, and drug trafficking, with recent captures of key members (Wikipedia, 2024).
• Quindío: In 2024, one of the historical leaders of the gang was captured in Circasia, demonstrating their presence in the Coffee Triangle (Wikipedia, 2024).
• Boyacá: In 2025, the capture of members was reported in the municipality of Chiscas, linked to high-impact crimes (Wikipedia, 2024).
The organization uses a franchise model and alliances with local gangs, allowing it to adapt to urban and border contexts and expand its criminal influence in Colombia (SciELO, 2024).
6. Cartel of the Suns
Venezuelan criminal organization primarily made up of high-ranking members of the Armed Forces NThe Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and officials from the Venezuelan government are involved in international cocaine trafficking as their main activity, but they also participate in fuel smuggling, illegal mining, and money laundering. The Cartel of the Suns has strengthened its networks on the Colombian-Venezuelan border, collaborating with dissidents from the FARC and other criminal structures to move drugs from Colombia to Venezuela and from there to Central America, Mexico, the United States, and Europe. It is estimated that the organization moves between 200 and 300 tons of cocaine annually and utilizes the infrastructure and state power of Venezuela to facilitate trafficking (Semana, 2025).
7. Transnational Alliances
Mexican cartels such as Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation, and Brazilian ones like PCC and Comando Vermelho, collaborate with Colombian groups to export drugs and firearms. The use of narcosubmarines and drones illustrates the technological sophistication of these networks (Semana, 2025).
The Impact on People
• Between January and July 2024, more than 71,000 people were confined due to fear of landmines, threats, or armed confrontations. In Chocó, Cauca, and Nariño alone, over 34,000 people were displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
• The forced recruitment of minors continues to rise, with at least 159 cases in the first half of 2024, particularly affecting indigenous communities (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
• The presence of armed groups in 347 municipalities and their control over strategic routes have aggravated extortion, displacement, and violence against social leaders and human rights defenders (Semana, 2025).
The Petro Government: Promises and Realities
1. The Failed Strategy of “Total Peace”
The government's gamble to negotiate simultaneously with various armed groups not only failed to demobilize them but also gave them time to strengthen and expand (Semana, 2025). Ceasefire agreements and dialogue tables were broken repeatedly, while groups took advantage of the truce to rearm and recruit more people.
2. Crisis of Leadership and Discoordination
Constant changes in the Ministry of Defense and the Police, with the exit of key figures and the arrival of new commanders without an orderly transition, have affected the morale and operability of the Public Force (Semana, 2024). The reduction of military personnel and capabilities, coupled with institutional demoralization, hindered the response to crises like that of Catatumbo and the expansion of the Gulf Clan.
3. Delayed and Insufficient Response
In 2025, the Public Force reported the capture of 3,249 individuals linked to criminal structures, the neutralization of 68 members, and the rescue of 134 recruited minors. However, these figures pale in comparison to the growth of criminal power and the loss of territorial control (Semana, 2025).
4. Denial and Disconnection from the Presidency
Petro has repeatedly denied the existence of a "chaos of violence," attributing it to a "media lie," while public opinion and international organizations warn of the worst humanitarian crisis since the peace agreement (Human Rights Watch, 2025). His leadership has been criticized for a lack of coherence, improvisation, and an ideological stance that complicates an effective military response against armed groups.
Conclusion
Colombia finds itself trapped in a spiral of violence and criminality, with more powerful and sophisticated criminal organizations than ever. The "total peace" policy not only failed to achieve its objective but also allowed for criminal expansion and the loss of state control in vast regions. The lack of leadership, institutional discoordination, and denial of the gravity of the crisis have left the population in a state of extreme vulnerability, as the country heads towards greater fragmentation and increasing regional risk (Semana, 2025).
References
• Semana. (2025). These four crises threaten the country's future. [https://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/estas-cuatro-crisis-ponen-en-riesgo-el-futuro-del-pais-sus-soluciones-seran-claves-en-la-campana-de-2026/202500/](https://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/estas-cuatro-crisis-ponen-en-riesgo-el-futuro-del-pais-sus-soluciones-seran-claves-en-la-campana-de-2026/202500/)
• Human Rights Watch. (2025). Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region. [https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/26/colombia-armed-groups-batter-border-region](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/26/colombia-armed-groups-batter-border-region)
• Semana. (2024). More than 8,000 soldiers and officers have requested their retirement from the Army during the Petro Government. [https://www.semana.com/nacion/medellin/articulo/mas-de-8000-soldados-y-oficiales-han-pedido-su-retiro-del-ejercito-durante-el-gobierno-petro-aqui-las-razones-de-la-desbandada/202454/](https://www.semana.com/nacion/medellin/articulo/mas-de-8000-soldados-y-oficiales-han-pedido-su-retiro-del-ejercito-durante-el-gobierno-petro-aqui-las-razones-de-la-desbandada/202454/)
• Wikipedia. (2024). Gulf Clan. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clan_del_Golfo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clan_del_Golfo)
• El País. (2025). Colombia adds almost 270 dead in massacres in 2024, the year with the fewest victims since the pandemic. [https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2025-01-06/colombia-suma-casi-270-muertos-en-masacres-en-2024-el-ano-con-menos-victimas-desde-la-pandemia.html](https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2025-01-06/colombia-suma-casi-270-muertos-en-masacres-en-2024-el-ano-con-menos-victimas-desde-la-pandemia.html)
• El Colombiano. (2024). Tren de Aragua: The story of the powerful criminal gang from Venezuela that operates in Colombia. [https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/tren-de-aragua-historia-banda-criminal-venezuela-opera-en-colombia-LB23994069](https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/tren-de-aragua-historia-banda-criminal-venezuela-opera-en-colombia-LB23994069)
• Infobae. (2025). Mayors respond to Gustavo Petro and claim that the Tren de Aragua is a structure dedicated to crime. [https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/04/08/alcaldes-afirman-que-el-tren-de-aragua-es-una-estructura-dedicada-a-delinquir-y-no-como-tratarlos-con-amor-y-comprension-como-habria-afirmado-petro/](https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/04/08/alcaldes-afirman-que-el-tren-de-aragua-es-una-estructura-dedicada-a-delinquir-y-no-como-tratarlos-con-amor-y-comprension-como-habria-afirmado-petro/)
• SciELO Colombia. (2024). An analysis of the expansion of the Tren de Aragua. [http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/recig/v22n46/2500-7645-recig-22-46-457.pdf](http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/recig/v22n46/2500-7645-recig-22-46-457.pdf)
About the Author,
William L. Acosta: Magna Cum Laude graduate from PWU and Alianza University. He is a retired police officer from New York and founder and CEO of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc., a licensed agency in New York and Florida with global reach.
Since 1999, he has directed investigations into narcotics, homicides, and missing persons, also participating in state and federal criminal defense. A specialist in international and multi-jurisdictional cases, he has coordinated operations in North America, Europe, and Latin America.
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