William Acosta for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
Introduction
In recent years, the idea has been promoted that certain U.S. policies have directly or indirectly facilitated China's expansion in Latin America (Americas Quarterly, 2019). However, this phenomenon requires a more comprehensive analysis that takes into account not only the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China in the region but also the autonomy of Latin American countries and changes in the global economy (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016).
Contradictions in U.S. Policy and Opportunities for China
Recent U.S. policies, such as the imposition of tariffs and pressure on traditional allies, have generated discontent in the region (Faiola, 2025). This perception, driven from the White House, has been used by Beijing as part of its global expansion strategy (Baptista, Cash & Lee, 2025). China offers trade and investment without political conditions, which is very attractive for many Latin American governments (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). The belligerent rhetoric and the lack of a clear strategy in Washington have led several Latin American countries to diversify their international relations and seek new partners, like China (GIS Reports, 2025).
The Phenomenon of Regional Multi-alignment
A good number of Latin American countries have drawn a very clear policy: not to choose between Washington and Beijing but to practice a strategy of multi-alignment (Atlantic Council, 2025). In this path, countries maximize the benefits of being in the camp of both actors. This trend is discussed in the recent book by Brian Winter titled The Dark Side of Pimping: Nicaragua and Latin American Countries that Maintain Relations with Beijing, in which profound reflections on the topic can be found (Winter, 2025).
Limitations of the U.S. Deterrence Strategy
The tactic of the United States to establish “red lines” to stop Chinese penetration has a quite limited effectiveness balance (Rouvinski, 2025). While there have been some successes, such as Panama's exit from the Belt and Road Initiative, Washington's pressure has not succeeded so far in containing Beijing in its effort to achieve a deeper and stronger presence in the region, where it has been making investments and signing strategic agreements (Jütten, 2025). In contrast, China's policy is long-term and has already allowed it to secure a strengthened presence in the region in strategic sectors (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016).
Structural Factors: Relative Decline of U.S. Hegemony
The Growth of China's Presence in Latin America
This is not solely due to errors or misguided policies of the U.S., but responds to a series of structural opportunities that have been seized by countries in the region (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016). Since the year 2000, investments coming from China have grown at a much greater pace than those of other external actors, and have already surpassed actors like the European Union or Japan in many sectors (Jütten, 2025). Among the reasons explaining this phenomenon are the diversification of investment sources, China's enormous demand for raw materials, and access to almost unlimited financing, which is offered without the political conditions that usually accompany other sources of financing (Americas Quarterly, 2019).
Threat or Complement? The Perspective of the U.S. and the Region
China's presence does not directly threaten the United States, but it does raise concerns in several fields, such as critical infrastructure, technology, and strategic resources (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). In any case, if its presence could lead to a dual use, it would have to be in infrastructure, which, by its nature, is a sector where China could utilize whatever it deems necessary in a conflict scenario. The same applies to technology and strategic resources (Rouvinski, 2025).
Strategic Intelligence: Implications and Scenarios Risks for the U.S.:
• Less control over key areas and international organizations (Atlantic Council, 2025).
• Unclear business practices in the region that could expose us to various risks (Baptista, Cash & Lee, 2025).
• Potential use of Chinese infrastructure against us in a worst-case scenario (GIS Reports, 2025).
Opportunities for Latin America:
• More diverse sources of financing and technology (Americas Quarterly, 2019).
• A much wider diplomatic maneuvering room (Atlantic Council, 2025).
• Much better negotiating conditions with the U.S. and China (Jütten, 2025).
Challenges for the Asian Giant:
• Addressing uncertainties and criticisms it receives locally and from abroad regarding alleged malpractice in labor rights compliance, environmental protection, and transparency and involvement with espionage issues (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).
• Avoiding that overexposure to the outside world, particularly to the United States, provokes irritations that lead to punitive measures by that country and its allies (Faiola, 2025).
Conclusions
The myth that U.S. actions are the main facilitator of China's advance in Latin America oversimplifies what is actually a very complex issue. Certain U.S. policies may, of course, give a boost to China's arrival, but the growth of the Asian giant in the region has many other ingredients (Americas Quarterly, 2019; Winter, 2025). Among these, the main one is that, despite the democratic deficiencies of many governments in the region, there is a very strong and clear interest in forging alliances and developing relationships with China that involve both parties (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016). So then, what exactly is this myth about? What do U.S. policies say or fail to say about it? It is not only about competing with China, which has already fallen under several labels. It is something much more complex: offering Latin America and the Caribbean, in the context of deteriorating bilateral relations among countries in the region, something that counters the appealing cooperation offers from Beijing (Rouvinski, 2025). Therefore, what Washington needs to do is not only to visit the region but also to offer it the “good living” that seems hard to achieve in an increasingly divided world (Faiola, 2025).
References
• Americas Quarterly. (2019, August 15). China and Latin America 2.0: What the Next Phase Will Look Like.
• Armony, A. C., Dussel Peters, E., & Cui, S. (2016). China Builds the Way to a New Era in Latin America and the Caribbean: Infrastructure Projects and Their Impact. University of Pittsburgh.
• Atlantic Council. (2025, May 15). Four Questions (and Expert Answers) about the China-Latin America Summit.
• Baptista, E., Cash, J., & Lee, L. (2025, May 13). China suggests it can compete with U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean by providing billions in investment and development. Reuters.
• Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, January 10). The Growing Influence of China in Latin America.
• Faiola, A. (2025, May 12). Following Trump's Trade Policies, China Seeks to Ally with Lula and Win Over Latin America. The New York Times.
• GIS Reports. (2025, May 20). Latin America Sandwiched Between the U.S. and China.
• Jütten, M. (2025, February). China's Growing Presence in Latin America: What It Means for the EU. European Parliamentary Research Service.
• Rouvinski, V. (2025, May 13). Tariff Cause of Concern? In Its Courtship with Latin America, China is Unveiling an Alternative to the United States. Deutsche Welle.
• Winter, B. (2025, May 15). China Doubles Down on Latin America. Americas Quarterly.
About the Author
William L. Acosta: Graduated Magna Cum Laude from PWU and Universidad de Alianza. He is a retired police officer from the New York Police Department and founder and CEO of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc., a licensed agency in New York and Florida with global reach. Since 1999, he has conducted investigations into narcotics, homicides, and missing persons, also participating in state and federal criminal defense. A specialist in international and multijurisdictional cases, he has coordinated operations in North America, Europe, and Latin America.
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