On July 28, 2026, Keiko Fujimori assumed the presidency of Peru, becoming the country's tenth president in the last ten years. Her administration, facing serious problems of organized crime, public insecurity, corruption, and political fragmentation, has had a complicated start.

The government has been questioned due to public discontent generated by some of its ministerial appointments, certain delays in presenting its legislative agenda to Congress, and the perception of many Peruvians that Keiko is more a leader oriented towards seeking consensus —and less a decisive leader, like her father— than many had expected. Her Prime Minister, Luis Galarreta, has significant political experience, although some consider him too close to the leftist elites known as “caviares” and too moderate in communicating the presidential agenda.

As a counterbalance to these concerns, Keiko appointed a respected technocrat, Elmer Cubas, as Minister of Economy and Finance. Her chancellor, Carlos Espa, has taken steps to rebuild Peru's relations with the United States, Mexico, and its immediate neighbors, including Chile. Keiko's government has also communicated a reasonable vision regarding its priorities.

Given the challenges facing the nation, Keiko's government requested the Peruvian Congress 120 days of extraordinary legislative powers. However, it is unclear how much and what part of that request the newly left-dominated Chamber of Deputies will grant, nor how long it will take to make a decision.

This article examines the main challenges and strategic decisions of Keiko Fujimori's government, with special emphasis on transnational organized crime and insecurity, the country's relations with the People's Republic of China and the United States, and issues of corruption and governance. The analysis is based on the author's conversations with specialists during his visit to Peru in August 2026 and on supplementary research.

Organized Crime and Insecurity

The public's discontent with organized crime and insecurity, along with the perception that Keiko would face these problems through policies similar to her father's "hard hand" approach, was an important factor in her election.

The Peruvian criminal dynamic reflects a combination of significant illicit rural economies —driven by coca cultivation, illegal mining, and illegal logging— and equally criminal economies in urban areas, where the profits from these activities are laundered through construction and predominantly informal commercial activities.

This urban dynamic is exacerbated by the presence of at least 1.5 million Venezuelans and other displaced and marginalized people, who are victims of extortion, theft, and exploitation by violent gangs like Tren de Aragua, Los Pulpos, and Los Choneros, in addition to small groups made up of Colombians, more concentrated on extortion and usurious loans known as "gota a gota."

According to the Peruvian anti-drug organization DEVIDA, there are about 85,000 hectares of coca cultivated in Peru, an area that only Colombia surpasses globally.

Illicit production is concentrated not only in the valleys of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers —the VRAEM— but is also increasing in lowland areas of Loreto and Ucayali, particularly along the borders with Colombia and Brazil. Coca cultivation has even been detected in the southeast, in Puno, near Bolivia.

Illegal mining remains a problem throughout the country, especially in Madre de Dios, Junín, and in the north, in places like Pataz and La Rinconada.

International actors like the First Command of the Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV) from Brazil are reportedly involved in both mining activities and the production and transport of cocaine.

Illegal logging is particularly present in the eastern departments of Loreto and Ucayali, where human, logistical, and financial networks overlap with the illicit cocaine economy.

According to some specialists consulted for this work, illegal mining poses a particular risk to Peruvian democracy due to its economic ties with numerous former and current congress members, local politicians, and other elites.

This criminality and the weak presence of the state are compounded by the ongoing activity of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso, which maintains approximately 250 members concentrated in the VRAEM, especially in Vizcatán.

According to various reports, the group helps to protect criminal activities in the region and receives funding from them, especially from coca cultivation.

In urban areas, during 2026, local media reported high-profile cases related to extortions not only in the poor neighborhoods of northern metropolitan Lima and Callao but also in other regions, particularly in the departments of La Libertad and Piura.

These problems are compounded by the expectation of an unusually intense El Niño phenomenon, with elevated water temperatures affecting fishing and record rainfall harming agriculture and causing floods and landslides, impacting the livelihoods of approximately 1.2 million Peruvians.

The Government's Early Responses

The outgoing government had achieved modest progress against organized crime and insecurity.

The 85,000 hectares of coca represented a 5.8% decrease from the previous year, marking the third consecutive annual decline.

The homicide rate, at seven murders per 100,000 inhabitants, was approximately 7% lower than in 2025 and significantly less than the peak of 10.1 per 100,000 inhabitants recorded in 2024.

The National Police also reported that extortions during the first quarter of 2026 had decreased by 46% compared to the same period in 2025. However, some consulted specialists warned that this reduction might partly be due to criminal gangs consolidating their territorial control and, therefore, victims reporting less.

Based on planning that probably began before Keiko's assumption, the military and police forces launched several significant operations against organized crime.

A day after the presidential inauguration, Peruvian forces killed in the VRAEM the "comrade Richard", an important leader of Sendero Luminoso. Keiko personally visited the region on August 1.

Other significant operations included the operation known as "Jaguar", against cocaine traffickers in Ramón Castilla, near the triple border with Brazil and Colombia.

In the following weeks, important military operations against illegal mining took place in Pataz and Madre de Dios, although some of the main areas of illegal mining, like La Rinconada, received much less state attention.

In response to urban insecurity, Keiko's government launched the "Shield Plan", using a name that references the U.S. initiative "Shield of the Americas."

The operation incorporated an additional 4,000 national police into the metropolitan area of Lima, with support from the Armed Forces.

However, consulted specialists pointed out that previous Peruvian governments had already carried out similar operations and that, so far, these measures had not produced a significant change in the security situation.

The government is also taking steps to prepare for the intensification of the El Niño phenomenon. It has allocated 450 million soles to reinforce 80 bridges identified as vulnerable and strengthen 380 intervention points, while also focusing preventive tasks in 607 districts considered particularly vulnerable.

Consulted specialists, however, expressed doubts about whether the government will be able to adequately finance and execute a minimum response to the floods and landslides anticipated in communities on the northwest coast.

Unlike organized crime, to which Peruvians have become somewhat accustomed, they believe that the government's response to El Niño will have a direct impact on public perception of the government's capacity to meet urgent basic needs.

Doubts About Security Leadership

Although these actions show that the government is taking measures in response to serious security issues, several consulted individuals expressed concern about the selection of those responsible for the area and the possibility that Keiko may not possess the decisive and charismatic leadership traits that many Peruvians valued in her father.

Among the main doubts is the Minister of Defense, Rafael Belaunde Llosa, a former presidential candidate perceived by some as progressive and who has been critical of the Armed Forces.

His experience for the position and his public ties to the mining company Poderosa in the north of the country, where the Armed Forces are carrying out significant operations against illegal activities, are also questioned.

Others consulted raised questions about familial and personal ties of the minister with Chile, historically considered a geopolitical rival of Peru.

The appointment of the Interior Minister, César Astudillo, a widely respected retired Army general, also generated some discomfort within the National Police, accustomed to having one of their own occupy that portfolio, particularly because Astudillo appointed several former Army colleagues to important positions within the Ministry of the Interior.

In contrast, other appointments received more positive evaluations, including that of retired General Hugar Cornejo Valdivia, appointed to lead the national intelligence service, DINI.

Cornejo had already headed the organization during the governments of Martín Vizcarra and Francisco Sagasti. Keiko would particularly trust him, partly due to the relationship he had with the president's father when he was a university dean.

Some specialists, however, expressed concern about Cornejo's delicate health condition and whether he will have the time and energy needed to implement the reforms required by DINI, especially to strengthen its analytical capabilities and give it a national strategic intelligence focus.

China and the United States

Navigating between strengthening relationships with Washington and the strategic risks arising from Peru's deep commercial ties with China will likely be one of the main foreign policy challenges of Keiko's presidency.

Keiko pledged to strengthen relations with Washington, including incorporating Peru into the Shield of the Americas coalition.

Her decision to increase the use of the Armed Forces to respond to internal security issues will complement existing commitments, such as Peru's purchase of U.S. F-16 fighter jets and the associated support package aimed at strengthening ties with Washington.

China's commercial activities and human networks in Peru, due to their magnitude and nature, will continue to raise concerns in Washington, but will be difficult for Keiko's government to reduce or control.

The current Minister of Defense is said to have been received in China before being officially appointed, while several Peruvian congress members have also been invited to visit that country.

One of the main elements of China's presence is the expansion of the Chancay megaport, operated exclusively and with little Peruvian administrative oversight by the Chinese logistics giant COSCO.

The author suggests that, in a possible wartime scenario, COSCO's operation, combined with a Peruvian government willing or unable to prevent it, could allow the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy to use the port to resupply warships intended for operations against the United States in the eastern Pacific.

A consulted Peruvian security analyst asserts that COSCO employs hundreds of Chinese security agents at the port.

Chancay is also becoming an increasingly important port for imports from China. This presents challenges related to the transshipment of Chinese products and components that could enter through Chancay and then be exported to the United States tariff-free under the trade agreement between Peru and Washington.

In peacetime, the scale, automation, and cost advantages of COSCO's operations in Chancay could allow China to displace competitors in trans-Pacific shipping such as Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping.

This would grant Beijing influence not only over routes between Peru and Asia but also over other Latin American Pacific ports as Chancay solidifies as a major regional logistics hub.

The construction of a possible transcontinental railway connection between Brazil and Chancay, crossing the Andes, would further expand China's commercial influence on the continent.

China's influence in Peru goes far beyond Chancay.

China is the largest investor in the Peruvian mining sector. It also controls 100% of electrical distribution in the metropolitan area of Lima, is one of the country's largest oil producers, and has a significant presence in construction with hundreds of projects.

Chinese companies also have a strong presence in telecommunications.

The Chinese government is said to have donated Xiaomi phones to all advisors of the previous Peruvian Congress, which, according to the author, could turn that digital presence into an opportunity to gather intelligence.

China is also becoming an important destination for certain Peruvian agricultural products. For example,

For example, Peruvian exports of blueberries to China increased by 86% in 2026 compared to 2025.

In military matters, China has considerable influence thanks to informal networks built from previous arms sales and the numerous Peruvian military officers who have traveled to that country.

As commented by one of the retired Peruvian military colleagues of the author: “we allowed ourselves to be seduced by all the attention and trips to China”.

Currently, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has two colonels as students at the Peruvian Army War College and another two at the National High Studies Center.

During the author's visit to Lima, a group of students was reportedly planning to visit the port of Chancay, facilitated by those Chinese officers and by the Chinese embassy.

China has also sold Peru various military equipment, including trucks and multiple launch rocket systems.

Additionally, it has access to information from the Peruvian satellite PerúSat-1 and regularly sends delegations to Peruvian military institutions.

However, Dong Feng trucks and Tipo 90B rocket systems would be considered within the Peruvian Armed Forces as equipment with numerous problems and of low quality.

Beyond the military sphere, China regularly receives delegations from the Peruvian Congress, politicians, journalists, and professionals from think tanks.

It also maintains relationships with Peruvian businessmen linked to China through institutions like the Association of Chinese Companies in Peru and the Peruvian Chinese Association.

The relationship with the United States

Regarding the relationship with the United States, the Peruvian foreign minister Carlos Espa is already working to strengthen ties.

Although he is not a career diplomat, he is a journalist and grew up in an internationally oriented environment. He also held an important support position in public relations at the U.S. embassy in Lima.

That experience would have given him direct knowledge of the United States, its diplomatic system, and international relations.

Espa was also a candidate in the 2026 presidential elections and was highly respected for his proposals.

Although Keiko does not have the personal relationship with President Trump that has facilitated ties of other Latin American leaders with Washington, Espa's knowledge and contacts could help Peru manage the sensitivities of its relationship with the United States.

During the author's visit, Espa also took favorable positions toward Washington by breaking diplomatic relations with Iran, an independent decision but strongly aligned with U.S. objectives.

However, any attempt to address Washington's concerns that involves affecting China and its companies could be much more complicated.

The weight of Chinese companies that buy Peruvian products, operate strategic sectors of the economy, and maintain networks of influence through legitimate and also corrupt relationships with politicians, officials, and businessmen will make it difficult for Keiko to fully respond to U.S. concerns.

Corruption and Governance

As Keiko's administration progresses, its ability to address the deeply rooted issues of corruption and governance in the Peruvian system will likely be one of the main factors determining its success.

According to the Transparency International corruption perception index, in 2025 Peru ranked 130th out of 182 countries, one of the worst results in the region.

Corruption regularly appears in the Police and the Public Ministry and has repeatedly contributed to the paralysis and early exit of Peruvian presidents.

These included Alejandro Toledo, Ollanta Humala, Martín Vizcarra, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, in addition to Keiko's own father, Alberto Fujimori, convicted of corruption-related crimes.

Dina Boluarte and transitional presidents José Jerí were also removed through votes related to corruption accusations, although neither was convicted.

In 2019, Keiko Fujimori herself was subjected to preventive detention over corruption allegations that were never proven, an experience that, according to the author, affected her deeply.

An informally consulted Peruvian colleague wondered if the “agreements” that Keiko might have had to make with the corrupt establishment could prevent her from taking the necessary measures to challenge those interests.

Although the Peruvian Congress remains fragmented among numerous parties, Keiko’s party, Fuerza Popular, has a strong representation in both chambers of the new bicameral Congress.

However, both the right and left pose political risks.

On the left, figures such as Alfonso López Chau, Jorge Nieto Montesinos, imprisoned former president Pedro Castillo, and leftist candidate Roberto Sánchez emerge.

According to those consulted, the left is waiting for the results of the local elections in October to take advantage of the growing discontent with the perception of a government that is too moderate, rising oil prices, extortion of transporters, and other issues, aiming to boost strikes and other actions aimed at pressuring or paralyzing the government.

On the right, Keiko also faces pressure from her former electoral rival and current ally Rafael “Porky” López Aliaga and his party, Renovación Popular.

López Aliaga has pledged to support Keiko’s government. However, regarding the request for 120 days of extraordinary legislative powers, he stated that his party would evaluate each part of the proposal separately.

His strong rhetoric and political style may have also generated some friction with Keiko’s team.

In addition to these actors, Keiko could find unexpected alliances with some center and left-wing congressmen.

Among them is Fernando Respigiosi, a senator who was previously critical of Fujimorismo but is currently an experienced member of his bench.

Marlon Aguirre, from the leftist party Juntos por el Perú, also appears, who is considering leaving his bench to join Fuerza Popular.

More remotely, Keiko might find occasional common ground with General Óscar Reto Otero, from the leftist party “Buen Gobierno,” who has sometimes approached and other times distanced himself from the more anti-military sectors of the leftist opposition coalition.

Keiko's political survival is also favored by the new bicameral Congress, which makes it difficult for a coalition of opponents to remove a president through ambiguous arguments like the previous figure of “moral incapacity.”

However, Peruvian politicians are still learning to navigate and make use of the new rules of the system.

Conclusion

During most of the last two decades and even before, Peruvian governments have not proven to be sufficiently capable, transparent, or stable to manage the increasingly severe problems facing the country.

During that period, the nation’s challenges have only increased and there is still no compelling evidence that Keiko will break that trend.

As one of the author’s Peruvian colleagues cynically expressed:

“Peruvian presidents always come to power talking about everything they are going to do, but end up doing nothing.”

Several of the people interviewed in Lima anticipated a possible crisis after the local elections in October, roughly when the “honeymoon” period corresponding to the first hundred days of Keiko's government comes to an end.

At that moment, they pointed out, local criminal groups that have remained relatively contained during the past months could increase violence to consolidate their influence over territories and over the politicians elected in October.

A brutal kidnapping followed by a quadruple homicide in Trujillo, which occurred shortly before the author's visit, reminded of the terrifying effect that uncontrolled violence can produce.

The government’s response, including the detention and presentation of suspects whose physical build and characteristics did not seem to match the public images of the crime, deepened the disillusionment with the initial steps of Keiko's administration.

For the government, this disillusionment could be reinforced in the coming months by other sources of tension, such as the intensification of the effects of the rainy season associated with El Niño.

The combination of an opposing advance in the October elections and these tensions could push the left to adopt a more aggressive stance to take advantage of the growing discontent and paralyze or even topple Keiko's government.

The potential political conflict will also be shaped by national elections in Brazil, a possible political crisis in Bolivia, midterm elections in the United States, and Pope Leo's visit to Peru.

During his visit, the author asked a very high-level Peruvian politician whether, if the United States were to invest in a broader security and trade relationship with Peru, Washington could expect the Keiko government to last longer than the nine previous governments.

The answer was categorical:

“Their government shouldn’t worry about Keiko… she’ll be fine.”

The author concludes, however, that he hopes that assertion is correct, although he cannot guarantee it.