The Brazilian presidential elections of October 2026, with a second-round, will be a turning point to define the direction of the country that represents half of the territory, half of the population, and half of the economy of South America.

If the leftist president, 80-year-old Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, is re-elected, he will likely enter what is probably his last presidential term, with a possible urgency to complete his agenda, freed from the need to attract moderate voters while responding to pressures from the United States and other factors. If Flavio Bolsonaro wins, in an election that polls anticipate will be resolved in a second round and that currently presents a statistical tie, the regional implications would be equally profound. Brazil could shift from being the main political counterpoint to the Trump administration in the region to possibly joining the U.S.-led coalition known as “America’s Shield”.

Whoever wins, one of the strategically most important decisions of the next government will be to determine how Brazil manages its deepening and growing economic, political, and military relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Trade

Brazil is, by far, the most important trading and investment partner of the PRC in Latin America, which gives China considerable influence in the country and, at the same time, vast interests in the continuity and stability of that relationship. Approximately 36% of China's trade with South America and 31% of its investments in the region correspond to Brazil. Companies based in China invested US$6.1 billion in Brazil alone in 2025.

The main Chinese commercial interests in Brazil include access to food, strategic minerals, ports, and transportation infrastructure. China also views Brazil as a market for advanced goods and services, including manufacturing, electricity, telecommunications, artificial intelligence, robotics, and space technology.

Brazil's role as the primary Latin American supplier of soybeans, grains, and other agricultural products to China has allowed it, under Lula's leftist government, to act as a substitute for Chinese purchases from the United States when trade tensions increased between Washington and Beijing.

China's ability to leverage the so-called “Brazilian card” has not only provided strategic benefits but has also created enormous interests for the Brazilian agricultural sector in the Chinese market. By 2025, it is estimated that 80% of Brazilian soybeans were purchased by China.

In terms of strategic minerals, the China-led coalition that includes CBMM supplies 80% of the niobium used by China, along with other rare earth elements.

With the new investment from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in the Sierra Verde project and at least five other large Brazilian rare earth projects under development, Brazil will be a strategic battleground between the United States and China for critical minerals.

Consequently, the next president of Brazil will play a fundamental role in determining whether the country will be a net contributor to the Chinese global monopoly on rare earth supply and processing or if it will be part of the solution.

Ports and Railroads

In transportation infrastructure, entities based in China already have stakes in seven port projects on the Atlantic coast. Six Chinese construction companies are participating in concessions for the operation and expansion of the Brazilian ports of Santos, Itajaí, and Rio Grande over the next year.

Beyond ports, Chinese companies are interested in at least seven major Brazilian railroad projects: Ferrogrão; the West-East Integration Railway (FIOL); the Center-West Integration Railway (FICO); the North-South Railway; Malha Paulista; Transnordestina; and the São Paulo Metro/CPTM project.

The future of the so-called “Bioceanic Corridor”, which would connect Brazil to the Chancay port in Peru—operated by China—not only will determine China's access to Brazilian agriculture, minerals, and markets but also the relative commercial power of COSCO, operator of Chancay, against competitors like Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) in trans-Pacific shipping routes.

The enormous Brazilian market and the free access to neighboring countries through MERCOSUR have turned Brazil into a hub for Chinese manufacturers, particularly in strategic technological sectors like electric vehicles. Chinese companies like BYD have captured more than 80% of sales.

In pursuit of those markets, the Brazil-China Business Council identified 52 active Chinese investment initiatives in Brazil during 2025, a 33% increase compared to the previous year.

Electricity

In the electricity sector, nearly all major Chinese conglomerates—including State Grid, China Three Gorges, and SPIC—have a significant presence in Brazil. Together, they control more than 12% of the country's electricity transmission.

State Grid invested US$4.5 billion in high-voltage, long-distance power lines connecting the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant to urban areas in Brazil located 2,500 kilometers to the south.

In power generation, in 2025, Chinese companies invested US$1.8 billion in solar, wind, and other sources.

Telecommunications and Cloud Computing

In telecommunications and cloud computing, Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, Oppo, and other Chinese companies are important players.

Huawei's digital infrastructure alone reaches 1.7 million Brazilians in 800 cities and towns.

The Chinese company ZTE estimated that in 2026 it controlled 30% of the Brazilian fixed broadband market.

In cloud computing, Chinese companies have made Brazil the main focus of their investments in Latin America.

Alibaba entered the Brazilian cloud and storage market in 2026 and currently operates two data centers in the country.

Huawei's cloud services constitute one of the largest operators of this kind in Brazil. The company has three large cloud centers in São Paulo, Campinas, and Brasília that serve over 600 corporate and government clients.

Huawei estimates that its presence in Brazil has grown 15 times since entering the market in 2019.

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics

As a complement to cloud computing, Brazil is the Latin American country where Chinese companies have made the most significant investments in artificial intelligence and robotics, areas that are likely to be a central focus of Chinese competition for strategic technology markets in the future.

Huawei is currently supplying components for a supercomputing center equipped for artificial intelligence in Rio de Janeiro intended for the Brazilian government.

In robotics, a humanoid robot Unitree G1, acquired by the Brazilian Military Engineering School, was showcased during the parade for the country's Independence Day and greeted President Lula.

Beyond humanoid robots, Chinese automation is utilized in multiple Brazilian factories, including the China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC) rail production plant in São Paulo; the electric vehicles and batteries plant of BYD in Bahia; and the crop monitoring and logistics operations of COFCO and other Chinese agro-industrial companies, as well as the Renault car plant in Curitiba and the Great Wall Motors factory in São Paulo, among others.

Space

In the space realm, China and Brazil have collaborated since 1988 in the development and launch of satellites through the CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) program.

China is expected to launch a synthesized aperture radar (SAR) satellite for Brazil in 2028 and the first satellite of the program in geostationary orbit in 2030.

Additionally, the Chinese company Space Sail is currently collaborating with the Brazilian telecommunications company Telebras to launch a constellation of microsatellites from the strategic equatorial launch center of Alcântara.

Space Sail could have 10,000 satellites by 2030 and will compete with Starlink, from Elon Musk.

Political Cooperation

Brazil is strategically important to China as its largest Latin American partner with international presence.

China has recognized Brazil as a “Global Strategic Partner” since 2012, one of the first countries in the region to receive that designation.

The two countries maintain regular high-level coordination on bilateral issues through the intergovernmental mechanism COSBAN.

Brazil's role and China's within the BRICS grants Brazil additional importance to China as a key country in its relations with major developing nations, including U.S. adversaries like Russia and Iran.

In September 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Brazilian Chancellor Mauro Vieira participated in the BRICS summit held in New Delhi, India.

BRICS has turned Brazil into a strategically relevant country for China on various issues: from actively questioning and resisting the policies of the Trump administration to promoting alternatives to U.S. initiatives in the Persian Gulf and Ukraine, and collaborating on alternatives to the U.S. dollar and dollar-based compensation mechanisms within the international monetary system.

Beyond high-level international diplomacy, Brazil also cooperates with China through various “people-to-people exchange” forums.

Brazilian politicians and party leaders regularly travel to China. In August 2025, for example, six members of the São Paulo Deliberative Council traveled.

In the educational sphere, Brazil currently hosts 14 Confucius Institutes dedicated to teaching the Chinese language and culture by the PRC government, the largest program of its kind in the region.

Military Cooperation

Brazil, whose army is larger than those of all other South American countries combined, has become China's most important military partner in the region.

Cooperation includes high-level delegations, such as the visit of 17 generals from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China to Brazil in 2023, at the beginning of Lula's current administration.

It also includes the participation of 33 PLA soldiers in the Brazilian exercise Formosa in 2024, as well as the attendance of a high-level Brazilian delegation at the 6th China-Latin America Defense Forum, held in September 2025.

In January 2026, Lula's government welcomed the Chinese military hospital ship Silk Road Arc at the port of Rio de Janeiro, which participated on January 15 in a joint maritime exercise with Brazilian forces.

As a demonstration of the importance that Lula's government attributes to military cooperation with China, Brazil appointed three military attaches with general officer rank to its embassy in the PRC, a level of representation superior to that of any other Latin American state.

Conclusion

Whoever wins the Brazilian presidential elections in October 2026, it is likely that the country will maintain its significant trade and other relationships with the PRC, as occurred during the administration of Flavio Bolsonaro's father, Jair Bolsonaro, characterized by its pro-American and anti-communist orientation.

However, Flavio Bolsonaro would likely make very different decisions than Lula regarding how to manage the opportunities and risks of the relationship with China, in the context of concerns from Washington.

A potential new Lula government could deepen Brazil’s dependence on China as a market and investor and use that expanded relationship as a basis to more deeply challenge the agenda of the Trump administration in the region and globally.

This government could turn Brazil into a major supplier of strategic minerals to China and an alternative to the United States for Chinese agricultural needs.

It could also use Brazilian territory to provide China with greater military and space access to the hemisphere while turning Brazil into China's main platform for its efforts to dominate global markets in strategic technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and robotics.

On the contrary, a Flavio Bolsonaro government would be more likely to respond to U.S. concerns about China in ways that would limit its access to regional strategic minerals or to military and space cooperation.

A Flavio Bolsonaro government would also likely restrict China’s ability to turn to Brazil for agricultural products if the country re-reduced its purchases from the United States.

In international forums, such a government would likely offer China fewer possibilities...

Ways to use the BRICS as a political and financial instrument against the United States.

He would also be more willing than Lula to limit Brazilian purchases of Chinese artificial intelligence and robotics, or to cooperate with China in those areas in ways that could harm Western companies in global competition.

In summary, what happens in Brazil's elections in October will have profound consequences not only for the country's direction but also for Washington, China, and the entire region.

R. Evan Ellis is a non-resident senior associate of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).