The streets have once again become the place where a generation tries to make visible what the political institutions seem incapable of resolving. In October 2026, student protests and social mobilizations have spread across France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Albania, while Argentina and Chile once again place the defense of public education at the center of the political confrontation. The immediate reasons vary, from classroom conditions to rents, wages, and university budgets. But a single question runs through the demonstrations: what real chances does the youth have to build a life better than that of their parents?
The temporal coincidence does not mean that there is a unified global movement, led by a common organization or inspired by a homogeneous ideology. What we observe is something more complex: a synchronization of national conflicts that share structural problems and find a mechanism for dissemination, coordination, and mutual recognition in social networks. Research on international youth mobilizations has repeatedly pointed to the convergence of three factors: economic difficulties, distrust towards institutions, and the perception that public decisions are made without listening to those who will suffer their consequences.
The gathered material on the protests of 2026 precisely shows this combination. French students demand teachers, adequate facilities, and better educational prospects; Belgians denounce budget restrictions; Portuguese and Spaniards bring housing to the forefront; Italians link wages and the cost of living to the increase in military spending. In Argentina, the controversy revolves around the funding of public universities, while in Chile, the mobilizations respond to the planned cuts in certain educational budgets. The diversity of demands does not prevent recognizing a common denominator: the growing distance between the expectations that accompanied educational expansion and the opportunities offered by the contemporary economy.
The daily economy behind the protest
The simplest explanation attributes these demonstrations to inflation, budget cuts, or discontent against certain governments. These are important causes but insufficient. To understand the extent of the phenomenon, one must distinguish between the circumstances that deteriorate living conditions, the events that trigger mobilizations, and the crisis of trust that allows a sectorial demand to transform into a general political protest.
Inflation constitutes one of the first pieces of this chain. The increase in fuel prices affects transportation, food distribution, industrial costs, and numerous services. On October 20, oil reached a five-month high, with the Brent barrel around 111 dollars, driven by tensions in the Middle East, attacks on energy infrastructure, and threats to commercial navigation. Geopolitical uncertainty adds a risk premium to the markets and raises the costs of consumption and production decisions.
The problem does not end when prices stop rising. Once energy and food become more expensive, households need more income to maintain their standard of living, while companies face higher costs and may pass them on to consumers, reduce hiring, or contain wages. Even if inflation moderates later, the price level may remain high. The accumulated loss of purchasing power thus becomes a lasting experience, especially for those starting their working life with modest earnings and facing rents, transportation, and educational expenses.
The pressure is particularly intense in large European cities. Housing has become one of the main obstacles to youth emancipation. The rise in rents, the scarcity of affordable supply, and the competition for the most accessible properties make it difficult for even those with stable jobs to become independent. Higher education no longer guarantees an economically strong enough position to access housing. Social ascension, which for decades legitimized academic effort, loses credibility when a university degree does not ensure basic material conditions.
The tenth edition of the Junges Europa study, published in June 2026 by the TUI Foundation based on 8,024 interviews with young people between 16 and 26 years old from seven European countries, offers a measure of that transformation. Only 25% of respondents believe that their generation will live better than that of their parents, while 52% expect to find themselves in a worse situation. Optimism about the future has fallen from 70% in 2017 to 57% in 2026. This is not a generation completely devoid of initiative — 55% consider the possibility of starting their own business — but rather young people who combine personal aspirations with growing uncertainty about the collective conditions necessary to realize them.
The deterioration of expectations is also reflected in employment. The International Labour Organization, in its Global Employment Trends for Youth 2026 report, estimated that global youth unemployment among those aged 15 to 24 reached 12.4% in 2025, equivalent to about 67 million people. The organization links this evolution to insufficient economic growth, weak job creation, geopolitical tensions, and technological changes. The difficulty is not only in obtaining a job but also in accessing formal, productive, and sufficiently paid employment to sustain a life project.
When studying no longer seems to guarantee work, and working also does not allow for independence, discontent ceases to be exclusively economic. It becomes a crisis of expectations and, ultimately, a challenge to the legitimacy of the institutions that promised social mobility.
Defense, Ukraine, and the budget dilemma
To these tensions is added a transformation of the strategic priorities of the West. The United States has been calling for years for a more equitable distribution of defensive responsibilities among NATO members. At the 2025 Hague summit, allies agreed to move towards an annual investment equivalent to 5% of GDP by 2035, of which at least 3.5% would be allocated to essential defense needs and the rest to security and resilience-related items. NATO reported that the spending of European allies and Canada had increased nearly 20% in real terms during 2025 compared to the previous year.
This commitment modifies the budgetary horizon of European States. Russia's war against Ukraine has demonstrated that continental security cannot be taken for granted and that armies need ammunition, air defense systems, industrial capabilities, and deterrent means that require sustained investments. Support for Kiev also responds to a strategic consideration: to prevent military aggression from forcibly altering European borders.
However, military decisions have distributive consequences. Each government must determine how to finance its commitments: through higher taxes, borrowing, reallocating funds, or a combination of those alternatives. When it is simultaneously required to contain the deficit, increase defense, and sustain pension and healthcare systems under demographic pressure, education and youth policies can end up competing for scarce resources.
Followpolitics
The assertion that every euro devoted to defense is automatically subtracted from social spending would, nevertheless, be an oversimplification. Budgets do not function as watertight compartments: fiscal revenues, borrowing, and investment priorities can also be modified. But the competition for fiscal space is real and becomes politically explosive when citizens perceive that they are being asked to accept sacrifices without a convincing explanation of their benefits or an equitable distribution of burdens.
The maintenance of Ukraine adds another dimension. Military, financial, and humanitarian aid involves considerable commitments, while the reconstruction of Europe’s defensive capabilities demands additional investments. The decision to support Kiev may be justified for collective security reasons, but that does not eliminate the obligation to explain how it will be financed without unnecessarily degrading public services. Democratic discussion should not automatically pit defense against education but should require governments to make their costs, objectives, and alternatives explicit.
The increase in energy prices exacerbates the problem. If households must allocate a greater proportion of their income to fuel, heating, and transportation, their capacity to meet other expenses decreases. If, additionally, States allocate increasing resources to defense and must pay higher interest on their debt, the margin to expand scholarships, hire teachers, or finance affordable housing narrows.
In France, where educational protests have coincided with a deep political crisis and budgetary difficulties, this accumulation is particularly visible. In Italy and Belgium, social demands have also been linked to the cost of living and the direction of public spending. The decisive question is not whether national security matters but who bears the cost of ensuring it and what mechanisms prevent the younger generation from disproportionately bearing the bill.
Adalberto Agozino has a PhD in Political Science, is an International Analyst, and a Professor at the University of Buenos Aires.
Comments