In recent years, liberal-conservative, libertarian, and national-populist political currents have experienced an international expansion that seemed to anticipate a prolonged shift of the political pendulum to the right. The triumph of Javier Milei in Argentina, in December 2023, was one of the most representative events of this process. Subsequently, leaders and movements of a similar orientation consolidated positions of power in various countries, encouraged by the wear and tear of traditional parties, the questioning of state structures, and the rejection of broad social sectors to the economic and cultural policies of progressive governments.
Donald Trump, Giorgia Meloni, Viktor Orbán, and other leaders of this current formed a political constellation that found its main elements of identification in the defense of national sovereignty, the reduction of the State, economic deregulation, the tightening of immigration policies, and criticism of traditional elites. In Latin America, the phenomenon acquired its own characteristics and was expressed in different national experiences, including those of Argentina, El Salvador, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Colombia, where the triumph of Abelardo de la Espriella seemed to confirm the electoral vitality of these proposals.
However, when the conservative expansion appeared difficult to stop, signs of exhaustion began to multiply. The first major event was the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán in Hungary in April 2026, after sixteen uninterrupted years in power. His fall, at the hands of Péter Magyar and the Tisza movement, constituted a symbolic blow for those who considered the Hungarian leader a model of nationalist and conservative political construction. Economic dissatisfaction, corruption allegations, institutional deterioration, and international isolation contributed to eroding his support.
Other setbacks added to that defeat. Geert Wilders lost influence in the Dutch government scene, and Giorgia Meloni suffered a significant defeat in the referendum on her judicial reform, held in March. The Italian consultation showed that even leaders who retain considerable mobilization capacity can encounter limits when their institutional projects are perceived by part of the electorate as attempts to concentrate power.
The storm acquired larger dimensions in America and Europe in recent days. In Brazil, Flávio Bolsonaro, who had managed to impose himself by a narrow margin in the first round, ended up defeated by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the runoff on October 25. The veteran leader of the Workers' Party obtained 51.8% of the votes and achieved a fourth presidential term. The result showed that the electoral strength of bolsonarism did not guarantee its continuity in power and that a significant part of Brazilian society preferred to avoid another governmental experience of that orientation.
In the United States, Donald Trump received another significant political blow. Democrats conquered control of both houses of Congress in the legislative elections on November 3, in addition to obtaining important victories in various states. Inflation, the rising cost of living, rejection of the war with Iran, and discontent with presidential management contributed to a defeat that considerably limits the president's ability to promote his program. The result also represents a questioning of the international influence of Trumpism and its capacity to project itself as a reference for the new right.
Paraguay offers another significant example. The resignation of President Santiago Peña on November 5, amid the crisis caused by the Ueno Bank financial scandal, constitutes a severe setback for the ruling Colorado party. The intervention of the institution left millions of customers without access to their deposits and triggered a political crisis that ended up compromising presidential continuity. Although its causes have a specific institutional and financial dimension, the episode once again highlights the vulnerability of governments when public trust deteriorates.
Europe also does not remain aloof from this process. The youth mobilizations recorded in France, Spain, Portugal, and other countries express a discontent that transcends ideological differences. The rising cost of living, job precariousness, difficulties accessing housing, deterioration of educational and health services, and the loss of expectations for social mobility fuel a growing generational frustration.
The underlying problem is that millions of young people perceive that the opportunities for progress that their parents had have become practically inaccessible. The technological revolution, automation, artificial intelligence, and the expansion of e-commerce are transforming labor markets, displacing traditional activities and reducing the prospects for stable employment. Additionally, there are increasing energy costs, rising military spending, and the difficulties of states to sustain social benefits.
In the face of this scenario, liberal-conservative proposals begin to exhibit a political inadequacy: the reduction of public spending, deregulation, the so-called chainsaw, and the tightening of security policies do not constitute, by themselves, satisfactory responses to the demands of societies that seek employment, decent wages, housing, education, and social protection. Fiscal balance and monetary stability are necessary conditions for development, but they are unlikely to become sufficient political objectives when their benefits do not reach a substantial part of the population.
In this context, populist proposals and leftist forces find an opportunity to regain positions, especially among the sectors harmed by economic adjustments. Not necessarily because they have more effective programs, but because they manage to channel discontent and offer immediate responses to needs that conservative governments have failed to satisfy.
The phenomenon should awaken particular concern in the Casa Rosada. Javier Milei and his collaborators have reasons to closely observe what has happened in Brazil, the United States, and Paraguay. Argentina will hold presidential elections in 2027, and the ruling party will have to demonstrate that its economic program can overcome the stabilization stage and result in a perceptible recovery of income, employment, and living conditions.
The chainsaw has acted profoundly on public administration. The elimination of unnecessary structures and unproductive jobs can constitute a legitimate policy of state rationalization. However, there is a substantial difference between ending the so-called "ñoquis" employees and dismantling professional teams whose experience is indispensable for the functioning of institutions. Efficient bureaucracy, as Max Weber explained, is not an obstacle to national development, but one of its fundamental instruments.
The reduction of inflation and fiscal balance constitute achievements that the Government can showcase, but they do not automatically guarantee its electoral continuity. The contraction of consumption, industrial difficulties, business closures, job losses, and restrictions affecting family incomes may end up neutralizing the benefits of stabilization. It will not be enough to maintain international alignment with the United States, support for Ukraine, or shared positions with Israel in the Middle East to retain the electoral enthusiasm that accompanied La Libertad Avanza in 2023.
Milei needs to understand that the electorate is not a variable subordinate to macroeconomic indicators. Workers, retirees, young people without job prospects, small business owners, merchants, and self-employed workers also vote. The impoverished and excluded sectors, who may endure the sacrifices demanded by an economic transformation for a time, are not willing to do so indefinitely if they do not perceive a concrete prospect of improvement.
The year 2027 could thus become a decisive test for the Argentine libertarian experiment. International experience shows that political cycles are not permanent and that electoral majorities can change rapidly when social expectations clash with everyday results. The liberal-conservative right still holds significant positions of power, and there is not enough evidence to announce its disappearance or a widespread restoration of the left. But there are signs of a changing trend that would be unwise to ignore.
Politics is not sustained exclusively by ideological convictions, fiscal discipline, or cultural confrontations. It also needs concrete results and a shared expectation of the future. If Javier Milei intends to retain popular support, he must demonstrate that his project can offer more than present sacrifices and promises of future prosperity. Perhaps the time has come to reduce the intensity of the chainsaw and pay greater attention to the well-being of society. Because when governments stop listening to the discontent of their citizens, the ballot boxes often take care of reminding them that the poor, the unemployed, and young people without a future also have the right to decide the fate of a nation.
Adalberto Agozino holds a PhD in Political Science, is an International Analyst, and a Professor at the University of Buenos Aires.
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