The social events taking place in various countries of Western Europe represent the epitome of a concerning decline whose origins must be traced back to the last decade of the 20th century.
Then, after the disappearance of the threat that provided Western Europe with the American military assurance since the end of World War II, Europe did not embark on any path that would lead it to rethink itself, even when it had leaders with memory and strategic reflective capacity, such as Jacques Chirac.
This fact is relevant, as three decades later that refusal to emerge from strategic comfort has led to an (avoidable) war on its territory with consequences that, in part, explain the mobilizations and excesses that are spreading today across various countries.
The self-satisfaction that implied becoming an "institutional power" (experience does not record this type of power) perhaps convinced the makers of the largest post-state venture in the world that they had achieved everything or almost everything. Even more so, it is possible that in the future the regions of the "rest" of the world would replicate their model, thus eliminating the tragedy of politics between nations: international anarchy.
The other fact weighing today, also stemming from the past, is the policies concerning social spending and pensions. Nowhere in the world did social spending reach that of Europe. Hence, there was frequent talk of the welfare state. However, to a large extent, that widespread benefit was made possible by that strategic-military comfort which today, due to the American decoupling strategy, will no longer be maintained.
On the other hand, Europe has significantly regressed in terms of its global economic position. If two decades ago the European economy represented almost 28 percent of the world's GDP, today it stands at 17 percent. Considering the emergence of new economies and the great transformation that (in a context of fiscal adjustments and declining productivity) Europe must undertake to regain competitiveness, it is possible that by 2040 no European country, not even the (ex?) German locomotive, will be among the world's top ten economies.
So if World War II marked the end of the power of the great countries of Europe, in the 21st century a united Europe, meaning, with a greater critical mass, although not fully becoming a power, is once again experiencing a loss of power.
In short, the fusion model did not save Europe from what the expert Fareed Zakaria has called the international "trilemma", that is, a global situation achieved in which trade grows, connectivity increases, and insecurity rises.
The insecurity in Europe is both internal and external. Internally, the socio-political dimension of (in)security is not insurmountable but is indeed concerning.
Indeed, governments, particularly that of France, practically have no leeway to respond satisfactorily to the legitimate demands of a society whose young segment faces difficulties regarding employment, access to housing, rising living costs, declining university standards, and future prospects, to name the main ones.
One of the dangerous scenarios in this picture is that the inability of government institutions is compounded by their relative lack of control over violence.
Thus, there exists a real situation, the breakdown of the social contract, and a potential situation, a possible breakdown of social peace.
There are authors who highlight economic issues in this complex context, for instance, the American economist John Mills, who places the center of Europe's problems in the abandonment of the industrial sector and the fall in productivity. But there are others, such as the French sociologist Emmanuel Todd, a scholar of soft factors (like demographic weakness) when considering the decline of a country; thus, Todd believes that the crisis in Western Europe must be viewed from a broader angle, that is, although there is industrial decay, something more compromising is happening: the accelerated loss or disintegration of collective meaning as a consequence of the erosion of religious values.
As for the outside, the threat lies in Europe, from its position as an institutional power and aspirational leadership, disregarding geopolitics (as it did when it uncritically supported the American democratic initiative to expand NATO), that is, asserting antipragmatic approaches that increase insecurity.
It was precisely that type of approach that has led Europe to become a "non-winner" in the war that has been taking place for five years on its territory, Ukraine.
We are not saying here that the grand principles of international law are unimportant or should not be observed, but that the "principles" of geopolitics, from which this conflict began (well before 2022), must be considered by Europe if it truly wishes to end the war.
In other words, and saving differences, today the leaders of Western Europe endorse and promote what we might call the "Leyen model," that is, a policy of reluctance and surveillance towards Russia, over the "Bismarck model," this is, the pursuit of a strategic diagonal with the Eurasian actor in order to achieve an indivisible continental principle of security, precisely that which has been altered with NATO's eastward expansion and the attempt to bring it to the immediate west of Russia.
In conclusion, in Europe, a cycle is coming to an end and there are no apparent vectors, both internally and externally, to achieve a transition to another that would propel it to become a world-class strategic actor.
In this context, the elections in France, Italy, Spain, and Poland in 2027 will be crucial concerning reevaluating policies that distance Europe from the strategic twilight zone it has been approaching since the end of the Cold War.
Alberto Hutschenreuter holds a Doctorate in International Relations. Postgraduate studies in Control and Management of Public Policies. Former tenured professor of Geopolitics (ESGA). Former professor at UBA and ISEN. Contributor to national and international specialized magazines and websites. Author of the book "Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Humiliation and Repair."
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