José Jesús Sanmartín Pardo from Alicante, Spain, for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
In March 2022, a preliminary agreement was reached betweendelegates of Vladimir Putin and Western representatives (with prior
knowledge and full acquiescence of the Ukrainian leadership) to
transform the already failed Russian "blitzkrieg" against the Government of Kiev into an exit strategy for both parties. Moscow would receive confidential guarantees regarding the untenability of a Ukrainian candidacy to join NATO within an estimable time frame. Ukraine would have guarantees regarding the security of its borders and other issues. Other advantages and privileges were granted, not excluding extensive collaboration aimed at a future free of conflicts. Another forecast was a scenario of generous foreign investment to incentivize the development of disputed regions and other equally sensitive territories. This forecast unfortunately remained unconfirmed due to the abrupt cutoff of this parallel and discreet negotiation pathway. Because, until then, the will of the Slavs and Westerners was that the conclusion of hostilities would occur within weeks. Meanwhile, political conversations were supposed to appear as the only visible source of agreement before the international community. Secret negotiations progressed slowly but steadily. The most challenging aspects seemed to have been overcome when, suddenly, an external force beyond the negotiators cast its looming shadow. In record time, what had been achieved first blurred and then evaporated. Everything disappeared as if by magic. Both contesting parties—especially one—felt that what was committed was insufficient. Today we know what was already intuited then: someone applied misinformation techniques against Moscow, deceiving several Russian leaders. The goal was to ensure that the invasion turned into a debilitating and indefinite war for Russia. That toxic source was not Western, and its intention continues to be to occupy economic and geopolitical space that Russia cannot sustain. Such crucial facts are often overlooked or sometimes ignored. The Kremlin fell victim to misinformation that, based on it, authorized the invasion of Ukraine. The information received by the Russian President and his team was neither complete nor accurate.
The decision was based on a deliberate, conscious, and malevolent operation to involve the Russian Federation in a protracted war that would exhaust its economy, bog down its army, deplete its society, and discredit its regime. The same toxic sources continue to act to prolong the war; at any cost. Each day of armed conflict ruins and harms Russia. The weakening of the Euro-Asian power is of interest to various actors, always attentive to economic colonization. A weakened and besieged Russia does not benefit the West, from outside or from within. Instability in Russia would be a tragedy for all of us; worse still is the scenario of a fragmented Russia in a state of chaos with warlords acting independently for years. The territorial unity of Russia is a geopolitical asset that the West must support decisively. The Kremlin must understand that the Western bloc is not its enemy, and we all must act accordingly.
In the case of Ukraine, the same holds true. There is no possibility of lasting peace if the Ukrainian people endure another humiliation of historic dimensions like the one that occurred in 2014. The conquest and occupation of Crimea by Russia continue to be a national trauma in Ukraine. A society can endure such a catastrophe once per generation, but not twice in a decade. Ukraine must also receive guarantees regarding its borders that obviously correspond, at least, to the existing status quo in January 2022. The international community cannot assume or accept the breach of International Law; yielding to this would sign a blank check for the reproduction of "special operations" at virtually any border in conflict... or not. The civil war among Slavs that has existed since then on an exaggerated scale has been one of the greatest European and international tragedies since the end of World War II. Europe and all of the West need the Slavic peoples for their extraordinary—indeed, sublime—contribution to culture, morality, religion, family, and History. Russians and Ukrainians, but also White Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, and other Slavic communities, compose one of the most exalted civilizations of Humanity, with unparalleled achievements in areas of excellence.
The atrocities mostly committed by dictators at certain historical stages were also applied against those same Slavic peoples, whose spirit of sacrifice and resilience enabled them to persevere in the face of a series of adversities they had to endure. From a geopolitical perspective, since spring 2022, the dynamics operated to mitigate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have not fully achieved their formal objective. The ambivalent application of incentives for moderation of a Kissingerian nature was partially sterile, partially useful. Besides allowing for a calculated mercantile traffic in protected areas against sanctions, it is evident that the human factor crackled; the absence of first-rate statesmen is a paradigmatic fact. There is a lack of an intellectual politician capable of implementing in reality the idea of balance as designed by Kissinger; but, above all, the international community perceives the orphanage of resolute leaders with long-term vision. Circumstances make and unmake leaders. What José Ortega y Gasset understood and reasoned a century ago persists and endures.
The formidable Spanish thinker was among the few Westerners to capture the Slavic soul in all its depth. But that was another time. Today's Europe needs statesmen like Charles de Gaulle or Winston Churchill; intelligence and cunning, firmness and elegance. All of this presided over by a hierarchy of instituted values seen as superior, accepted by some, assumed by others. The omission of that legacy has weighed perniciously against proposals and individuals focused on a peaceful resolution to the war aimed at sinking Russia into a new Middle Ages. The immense, colossal error of Moscow was to be seduced by siren calls and invade Ukraine in 2022. The fear of a westernized brother country acting as an attractor for a Russian social majority that might feel linked to the "decadent" opulence of the European Union did not justify a "special operation" cloaked in a lightning war that degenerated into a general war. Poland and other Slavic nations are a loyal part of the European community heritage. What threat did Ukraine pose for Russian leadership to activate the military invasion in 2022? Kiev represents, along with Belarus, the closest brother state to Moscow. Its complete and increasing westernization is seen as an existential risk for the survival of the current Russian regime. What happens in Warsaw or Zagreb generates interest in Russia, but what happens in Kiev also provokes emulation.
Following in the Russian Federation a speeded-up modernization inspired by the Ukrainian "model" could undermine the social bases of the Russian status quo. A "bad example" that someone in the West—here yes—launched by urgently ringing the alarm bells against the Kremlin's leadership. What should have been done discreetly, almost silently and without any boasting, confining the gradual change strictly to Ukraine, became a spectacle of scorn against the Russian Government. This act of arrogance was done knowingly of the humiliation that the Russian leaders would suffer. The stridency of the Westernizing campaign on Ukraine was perceived in Moscow as the beginning of a process of delegitimization against the Putinist regime… induced from the outside. It was necessary to cut to the quick to save priorities, interests, and statuses. That was the reading made from and for power. Ukraine was invaded. When confidential guarantees were offered by the West, the ruling circle in the Kremlin came closer together. However, as noted at the beginning, they could not resist the manipulative suggestions from a counter-power regarding the fact that the Russian people would not be satisfied with their government if they did not receive more, much more. Here the circle was closed again through a reiteration of mistakes that no one seems to have been able to rectify.
Both Russia and Ukraine need an honorable exit from this civil war. The solution cannot reside in the humiliation of the other side, nor in the sacrifice of one faction at the expense of another. So far, all resolution proposals base their design on buying time; and not too much at times. Just a few years before the crisis flares up again if the temptation of a false closure ends up being accepted. That short-sightedness lacks common sense and an overview, which appear as higher attributes of a statesman. The past and present embrace in an inextricable fusion of conflicts. The overlap of one crisis after another, of one grievance upon another, produces the current rigidity. Leaders have little maneuvering capacity to negotiate; they have promised their own that after the sacrifice, salvation will come. Now those leaders find themselves defenseless before the scenario of a cessation of war without having yet consolidated the necessary part to justify it before their people. A truce will remain incomplete if a renewal of a significant part of the leading elites in Moscow and Kiev does not occur from within each country. Those who take charge of managing the new stage must be capable individuals who can continue the negotiations without nationalist mortgages. The current context of negotiations emphatically rhetorical or publicly media-driven, expresses the failure of classic diplomacy. Agreements stemmed from a commitment more than from the problem to be overcome, remain and flourish.
The world—not just the West—has too much at stake. Those who misinformed to activate a war between neighbors and brothers now need that conflict to remain in a dormant state to ensure its restart in the medium or long term. If the war between Russia and Ukraine were to remain as a latent conflict indefinitely, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East would be the first areas to suffer an acute lack of stability. The reverberation would also reach the United States, Canada, and Latin America; these countries' material prosperity (and thus their national security) is inextricably linked to that of their European allies. Economic Intelligence incisively highlights that isolationism in foreign policy is a repudiation of rationality and intelligence; in all senses.
In a system crisis such as the current one, the solution cannot be a package of innocuous measures. Homogeneity will not resolve the fundamental, indeed unfathomable problems either. In a process of progress, the first thing is for the parties to avoid wounding the honor of the others. Whether belligerents, allies, or sympathetic, the rhetoric must reflect a state of mind based on the constructive, not the destructive. In this regard, a decisive factor is the need not to humiliate or be humiliated, neither in public nor in private. Moral wounds are among the genuinely difficult ones to heal. Healing will only come from a genuine exchange of roles; because so far, Ukrainian and Russian leaders have hardly transmitted a welcome message to their Slavic brothers on the "other side." If Lincoln made his speeches grandiose it was, in part, due to his demonstrated ability to transcend borders (territorial, mental, cultural, among others). The Gettysburg address is a prime example in this matter. The American President designed it so that each of his words would resonate in the conscience, touch the spirit, and reach the soul of the families, soldiers, and fellow townsfolk of both sides facing such a dramatic conflagration.
If progress is made towards a renaissance of the other, the de-escalation process would indeed be enabled. Confusing a leader with "his" people is a common mistake. Citizens may infer that there is an intention to annihilate their country or, at the very least, diminish its space and consequently its prestige. Any offense to honor is also an offense to rationality. For immediate and inevitable reactions are emotional in nature. A call for the current leaders to withdraw is not a prudent suggestion. Their continuity or not will depend on internal factors of public visibility (or external factors of public invisibility). But urging from outside (from the exterior) the withdrawal of those who have been leaders of the war in the warring countries can be perceived as a humiliation by local society. What is modified in the governmental structures of both brother countries must appear as a result of a strictly internal decision-making process.
The disputed areas can be left with a co-management system among Russia, Ukraine, and the United Nations, with the active participation of the European Union. These territories must become a preferred investment object, creating there a hinterland of unparalleled prosperity in Eastern Europe. Co-management formulas between Russians and Ukrainians, creating mixed commissions with Western participation, would be an acceptable formula for the parties. What cannot be assumed is the commission of topically Wilsonian errors like the creation of new states; it would also not be prudent to create co-sovereignty spaces. For both Russia and Ukraine, this would entail serious medium-term problems. Especially, the Russian Federation would face greater negative pressure in this regard, generating increasingly larger and worse internal tensions. In the medium term, implosion. That option must be discarded outright because it will cause terrible and irreparable damage, especially to Russia. Even more serious would be the promotion of segmentation of territories, corraling Russian populations in some and Ukrainian populations in others. A process of Balkanization among communities
Such a course will be open as long as the common interests and benefits outweigh the disagreements. The applied methodology will be the biggest challenge; if done incorrectly, the results will emerge as a meager shadow of a hypostatic dream. Hence the relevance of linking the legitimate existence of both Slavic States to each other; what is positive for one will also be for the other. Ukraine can be the bridge between Russia and the West. Likewise, Russia would play a predominant role in stabilizing its spheres of influence. We need each other and must collaborate; all of us. Without exclusions. For security, for intelligence, beyond the economic, political, or social factors, which are equally relevant. Because Russia must also benefit from Western investment, not just Ukraine. The deal must be dignified and respectful for both countries. Marginalizing one is the loss of the whole. The wise Aristotle set the solution as a constant search for that middle ground leading to balance between opposites. Respect and dignity; here lies the way, here lies the destination.
Prof. José J. Sanmartín, University of Alicante.
Advisory Council, Harvard Business Review. President, Radix Intelligentia.
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