Wars, one of the main "regularities" in the history of humanity, always concentrate people's attention and concern, much more so today due to the tremendous phenomenon of globalization and connectivity.
The impact that confrontations provoke in a time of so many advancements creates a situation of normalcy regarding the uncertainty of the outcomes or courses of a social phenomenon that the French general André Beaufre (1902-1975) defined with clarity: "the art of the dialectic of wills that employ force to resolve their conflict," meaning that war is not just the application of force, but an intellectual clash between opposing wills.
This old definition by the author of “Introduction to Strategy,” “Deterrence and Strategy,” among others, applies to the wars of the 21st century or "new wars," and also to future wars, as we must remember that the last war will always be the next war, emphasizing the regular nature of it, even in times of abundant commercial and technological activity that theoretically should inhibit war.
Here, the reflections of another Frenchman, the polemicist Gaston Bouthoul (1896-1980), are relevant, who argued that the proposal of politicians and specialists to end wars through renunciation of them, as attempted in the 1920s with the Briand-Kellogg Pact, signed in Paris in August 1927, was akin to the attempts by doctors to end diseases by renouncing them.
To complete these lines, we cannot fail to mention Raymond Aron (1905-1983), who provides in “Peace and War among the Nations” a magnificent synthesis on the phenomenon of war, particularly concerning its future: “War is of all historical times and all civilizations. With axes or cannons, with arrows or bullets, with chemical explosives or chain atomic reactions; from afar or up close, in isolation or in mass, randomly or according to a rigorous method, men have killed each other, using the instruments that custom and the knowledge of collectives offer them.”
Well, considering the current war in the large geostrategic and geoeconomic plate of the Middle East/Persian Gulf, we could more specifically reflect on the situation by briefly observing some old strategies.
For instance, the Swiss general Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869), highly followed by Napoleon in his military campaigns, maintained the practically decisive advantage it implied in war to strike what he termed the "center of gravity" of the opponent, in this case, Iran.
This center in the case of the medium power of the Persian Gulf consists of the nuclear program and conventional capabilities, that is, not only conventional weapons but also the production centers for armament and equipment, as well as the infrastructure for manufacturing missiles and drones.
According to selective American reports, the United States and Israel have not destroyed all of Iran's nuclear and conventional capabilities, but they have "degraded" them considerably, and they have even been able to approach the total, for example, both countries would have destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran's air defense systems, a fact that would explain the missions of B-52 bombers in Iranian airspace. Likewise, over 150 ships belonging to the Army and the Revolutionary Guard Corps would have been destroyed.
Regarding the feared Iranian nuclear program, the destruction of a good part of it was achieved in the punitive mission of June 2025; for example, the Natanz and Fordow plants have been rendered practically inoperative. However, Iran retains significant reserves of uranium, as recently acknowledged by the Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi.
Jomini would say that an operation on the opponent's center of gravity would be completed with the capture of the capital. But perhaps this goal responded more to the type of war and operations of his time than to the current reality.
At this point, the recommendations of the Prussian military Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) are highly pertinent.
For this thinker, author of key military texts such as “On War” and “The Campaign of 1812 in Russia,” it is extremely important not to exceed the limits of victory or decision in war. Although the temptation to continue until the total destruction of the opponent may be strong, it involves a risk that could jeopardize the decision.
This guideline was very well applied in the 1991 war with Iraq. At that time, the American political power determined that the objective was solely to expel Iraq from Kuwaiti territory.
In the subsequent war with Iraq in 2003, the objective was to end the regime, relying on two completely false premises. The regional consequences of the dismantling of the Iraqi state were tremendous and extend to today.
In Iran, a ground campaign by the United States could open a Pandora's box, as it is not only a difficult territory but would activate those Iranian bodies prepared for sustained ground combat and territorial defense, namely, the conventional armed forces known as Artesh; also the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), although this force is more oriented towards strategic attack and escalation.
According to specialist Andrew Davidson, the Artesh has approximately 350,000 troops, compared to the nearly 200,000 of the IRGC, “but the IRGC dominates how the conflict is shaped through the control of missile forces, escalation paths, and strategic decision-making. This role is reinforced by its formal position within Iran's political and economic structure, where it exerts influence in key sectors such as telecommunications, energy, and the defense industry, as well as in the nuclear program.
A scenario of a ground invasion of Iran brings us back once more to General André Beaufre when this expert refers to the problems faced by an expeditionary force in a highly hostile environment. It should be noted here that the United States does not have very favorable results regarding ground interventions, and this can be explained by the problems faced by the invading country if it does not promptly achieve the capitulation of the invaded actor.
Furthermore, a ground invasion could be based on a premise that may ultimately not be such: that the population will largely support it, leaving only the struggle between invading forces and regime forces.
In countries with a strong ideological or confessional background, the automatic support of the native population for the expeditionary force tends not to occur as expected, a situation that, as the French general warns, begins to create problems for the increasingly massive invading body.
In conclusion, the “old strategies” remain highly relevant in "modern wars." In the current confrontation taking place in the Middle East-Persian Gulf, those can be appreciated, although to date, there has not been a categorical victory by the United States and Israel.
Victory there implies the “degradation” of Iranian military capabilities, and from this standpoint, the results are considerable. But it is also important not to lose sight of Iran's strategic resilience: despite the decapitation strategy carried out by the United States and Israel, the regime has not been annihilated nor is there a popular revolution occurring, which does not mean that serious governance problems cannot arise.
Therefore, it is possible that in the state Iran is in, there will be barely any room for the regime to decide to make nuclear and conventional concessions in exchange for assistance to repair economic infrastructure. This is what is expected from a government led by pragmatists.
However, this "optimistic" scenario does not eliminate the possibility that Iran abandons its asymmetrical war strategy of regional and global reach, “just” one of the alternatives Tehran has to continue the war without space or time.
The author holds a PhD in International Relations (summa cum laude, USAL). Graduate in Control and Management of Public Policies. Full Professor of Geopolitics at the Air War Superior School. Former professor at UBA. He was the Director of the Eurasia Cycle at the Universidad Abierta Interamericana. Director of the media Equilibrium Global. Columnist and collaborator in national and international specialized journals. Author of the books “Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War,” “The Great Disturbance,” and “Geopolitics Never Left.”
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