Jesús Daniel Romero and William Acosta from the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute for Poder & Dinero and FinGurú
On March 21, 2025, the United States banned the entry into the country of former Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, citing her involvement in corruption cases during her term (Reuters, 2025). The measure, announced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, also affects her immediate family and former officials such as Julio Miguel De Vido, linked to bribery in public works contracts. Although Washington presents it as part of its anti-corruption fight (U.S. Department of State, 2024), the timing raises suspicions, especially following the scandal surrounding the cryptocurrency Libra, which has cast doubt on the intentions behind actions like this (El País Argentina, 2025). Is it a genuine gesture or a strategic maneuver to strengthen President Javier Milei and reconfigure Argentine politics?
Milei Against Kirchnerism: A Context of Rupture
Milei, an anarcho-capitalist and relentless critic of Kirchnerism, has centered his government on combating corruption and liberalizing the economy since he took office in December 2023 (Rodríguez, 2024). His commitment to breaking with leftist policies has led him to strengthen ties with the West, as evidenced by his recent visit to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington, where he met with Donald Trump and key figures of the Republican Party (Reuters, 2025). In this context, the sanction against Fernández de Kirchner seems to align with his interests. Although there is no direct evidence that he instigated it, the effect is clear: it weakens his greatest adversary and reinforces his narrative that Kirchnerism is the root of the country's economic and moral crisis.
A Political Blow to Kirchnerism
The ban transcends symbolism: it complicates Kirchnerism's ability to reorganize as a solid opposition. For Milei, who accuses it of decades of corruption, this international measure strengthens his discourse (Rodríguez, 2024). However, the impact could backfire. Fernández de Kirchner, despite her conviction in the Vialidad case (upheld in 2024 but still appealable), maintains a loyal base and has accused Milei of orchestrating the sanction, an argument that could revive Peronism and stoke criticism over foreign interference, especially after the doubts raised by the Libra scandal (El País Argentina, 2025).
Geopolitics and Suspicions: The Ghost of Libra
The geopolitical background is crucial. In light of China's advances in Latin America, Washington seeks allies aligned with the West, and Milei, a critic of Beijing and socialism, fits that role (U.S. Department of State, 2024). The sanction against Kirchner not only targets corruption: it signals that the political future of Argentina must distance itself from Kirchnerism, solidifying an alliance that could bring economic benefits, such as a favorable deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to which the country owes $44 billion (Reuters, 2025). However, the recent controversy over Libra, the cryptocurrency promoted by U.S. companies and questioned for its potential to launder money and destabilize economies, adds a layer of suspicion (El País Argentina, 2025). For some, the action against Kirchner might be less an act of justice and more a ploy to consolidate influence in the region, using corruption as a pretext.
Stronger Sanctions on the Horizon?
Although the measure is currently limited to a ban on entry, asset freezing is not improbable. This would require Fernández de Kirchner to have funds in U.S. banks or banks linked to the U.S., illicit origin evidence, and an order from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Cases like Nicolás Maduro, Russian oligarchs, or former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández show that Washington acts when there is evidence (U.S. Treasury, 2023). New evidence, political pressure in the U.S., or collaboration from Milei could accelerate it, but a lack of assets or the risk of diplomatic tensions could hinder it, leaving the case to the Argentine judiciary.
A Boost for Milei's Reelection?
Could these sanctions pave the way for Milei's second term in 2027? For his base, the measure validates his anti-corruption crusade and could mobilize voters fed up with Kirchnerism, especially ahead of the legislative elections in October 2025, a crucial test for his administration (Rodríguez, 2024). However, his reelection will depend more on the economy than on this symbolic triumph. Although he has managed to reduce inflation (from 210% in 2023 to lower levels in 2024) with measures such as devaluation and subsidy cuts, poverty exceeds 50%, and purchasing power continues to decline (Reuters, 2025). Without concrete improvements, neither U.S. support nor suspicions about Libra will compensate for social discontent.
The opposition will also play its role. Kirchnerism could regroup if Fernández de Kirchner turns the sanction into an external attack, while forces like Juntos por el Cambio could capitalize on a polarization that leaves room for moderates. Furthermore, the alliance with Trump and the U.S., while useful, could alienate nationalist sectors if seen as submission, a fear that the Libra scandal could amplify (El País Argentina, 2025).
Conclusion: A Game Under Scrutiny
Whether an anti-corruption gesture or a calculated maneuver, the sanction against Fernández de Kirchner shakes up the Argentine political landscape. Weakening Kirchnerism, it strengthens Milei and tightens his bond with the U.S., opening a new chapter in bilateral relations. However, the echoes of the Libra scandal invite questioning of Washington's intentions (El País Argentina, 2025), while the impact on Milei's reelection will depend on translating this support into tangible results. For now, it gives him a campaign argument and a political breather, but his future and that of the country remains tied to the economy and the patience of a society exhausted after decades of crisis.
References:
● El País Argentina. (2025, February 18). The cryptocurrency Libra scandal places Milei before his worst crisis in more than a year of governance.https://elpais.com/argentina/2025-02-18/libra-escandalo-milei.html
● Reuters. (2025, March 21). U.S. bans Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner over corruption allegations.https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-bans-cfk-2025-03-21/
● Rodríguez, M. (2024). Javier Milei and the break with Kirchnerism: An analysis of his political project. Argentine Journal of Political Sciences, 15(2), 89-112.
● U.S. Department of State. (2024). Foreign policy priorities in Latin America: Countering corruption and influence. U.S. Government Printing Office.
● U.S. Treasury. (2023). OFAC sanctions: A history of enforcement actions.https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/reports/2023-enforcement
About the Authors
William L. Acosta: Magna Cum Laude graduate of PWU and Universidad de Alianza. Retired police officer from New York and founder of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc. Since 1999, he has directed investigations into narcotics, homicides, and missing persons, participating in state and federal criminal defense. An expert in international cases, he has coordinated operations in North America, Europe, and Latin America.
Jesús D. Romero: Magna Cum Laude graduate from Norfolk State University. Retired officer from the U.S. Navy intelligence service and Army Intelligence Operations with 37 years of service. Worked in the defense industry with British Aerospace Systems and Booz Allen Hamilton. Commanded a unit of the Defense Intelligence Agency in Panama and oversaw operations in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. Member and co-founder of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute. Bestselling author on Amazon and commentator on radio, television, and print media. Member and co-founder of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute think tank.
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