Octavio Pérez from Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute
Whom to believe? Why would someone intentionally leak parts of a report? Technically, can someone be sentenced to between 3 and 30 years in prison for doing so? Why has this become more common now than it was 40 years ago?Although this could be a topic for debate in a white paper, and how generations interpret the search for truth, freedom, and national security, it is now more present in our government than it was 40 years ago.
Under the pretext of seeking truth and headlines, sensationalist press and liberal media rush to detect security leaks and publish headlines based on small evidence to regain control of the discourse. If they are wrong, they will give it a political twist and turn it around.
How many times have you heard or seen an apology, a retraction, or a correction about a critical headline that went wrong? Here are the data and sources for you to assess the situation.
They start with the Jerusalem Post, as it claims that the regime is considering restoring its nuclear program. In doing so, JP cites Mehr News as a source (which makes it a secondary source).
Mehr News Agency is a semi-official news agency sponsored by the Iranian government. It is based in Tehran and owned by the Iranian Organization for Development.
They continue to state that what is still questionable is "whether the Fordow nuclear site was destroyed entirely or partially...". JP continues documenting the list of minor nuclear sites also destroyed, as well as a dozen nuclear scientists killed during the operation. It also claims that more than two-thirds of the TEL (Transporter Erector Launchers) have also been destroyed, and includes that much of the missile production factories have also disappeared.
So, let's list all this with bullet points as we add:
- Fordow (Partially or totally destroyed)
- Other nuclear plants, sites, and associated equipment were destroyed
- 2/3 of all MTEL (mobile transport launchers)
- Much of the missile production plants
- Approximately a dozen nuclear scientists died
They continue to list the death of 9 of the 13 top military and intelligence chiefs during the operation and how they did it to destabilize the internal power structure and command of the IRGC and the Basij militia.
Let's add more bullet points:
- Death of 9 of the 13 key generals and intelligence chiefs
- The destabilization of internal command and control (leadership) is intentional
- Over 30 generals and commanders, both from the IRGC and the intelligence services
Let's move to another source, the New York Times, which reiterates that the nuclear program comprises more than 30 facilities and that the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) of the UN clearly stated that Israel had attacked two centrifuge production facilities:
Its initial report only indicated that they had attacked and damaged only the surface part of the enrichment plant.
But it subsequently revised its assessment to confirm "direct impacts" in the underground enrichment halls.
Satellite images two days after the attack show heavy machinery covering craters where the enrichment halls are believed to be.
In addition to the nuclear program, military installations and other key energy infrastructures were also attacked:
- Main gas depot near Tehran.
- Central Oil Refinery (visible fires at the Shahran oil depot).
- A central gas field, one of the largest in the country.
- Headquarters of Iranian state television.
- A missile base in Kermanshah (damaged missile storage).
After consulting other news sources such as Axios and AP, we obtain the following information:
A glance at Iran's remaining capabilities:
Iran was said to have approximately 2500 ballistic missiles and thousands of drones at the beginning of the 12 Day War.
About two-thirds of the launchers were destroyed (a second confirmation of this event), and more than 1000 missiles were fired or destroyed.
Therefore, the Islamic Republic only possesses between 1000 and 1500 missiles and 100 launchers. According to estimates from the IDF,
More than 80 Iranian air defense batteries were also destroyed.
Iran could not down any IDF planes, but did down two drones, and did have air superiority.
Israel carried out more than 1000 missions (sorties).
It conducted over 600 air refueling missions.
According to the IDF’s bomb damage assessment,
The airstrikes caused significant damage to the Natanz and Isfahan nuclear enrichment plants.
The attack on Fordow was a U.S. mission and was not assessed by the IDF.
Attacks on other facilities, such as the heavy water reactor in Arak, the SPND headquarters (where nuclear files were kept), and several centrifuge production plants, have delayed the nuclear program by a year.
Missiles and drones
According to the IDF, Iran launched between 550 ballistic missiles and around 1000 drones against Israel during the war.
The vast majority of the 1000 drones, which are slower but harder to track, did not even reach the borders of Israel.
Even more statistics on losses
Hundreds more IRGC soldiers, including numerous members of the Basij internal security corps, were killed in Israeli attacks, according to IDF assessments.
Let's hear what Axios says:
Israeli officials see "significant" damage to Iran's nuclear facilities.
Many are perplexed by the leaked U.S. intelligence report suggesting otherwise.
Israel has yet to provide a final report.
Without an official final report from Israel and the United States, it is clear that the leaked report has a political background. The DIA report, claiming that it might have only delayed them by a few months, does not reach a more concrete final report.
Trump stated during a press conference at the NATO summit that the report was inconclusive and that the Israeli report would shed more light.
If it is not understood that Israel and Mossad might have better sources (Humint) in Iran to verify and corroborate the extent of the damage, a report based solely on satellite photographs could be inconclusive.
On the other hand, if Israel, which has more to lose and faces a direct threat from Iran, is mostly satisfied with the initial reports, why should a report from a single agency, based practically on a single source (Photint), Photographic Intelligence, be more credible? Even when the Iranians have not published their own internal report?
The emergence of the leaked report and the abrupt postponement of congressional briefings on Tuesday also contributed to complaints from the opposition party.
Steve Witkoff, on the other hand, rightly claimed that the leak is a betrayal and that whoever leaked it should be prosecuted.
Moreover, in their article they state that Israeli officials, through intercepted communications, suggest that Iranian military officers have been providing false SITREPs (situation reports) to political leaders, minimizing the actual damage... So, to simplify, the Iranians themselves still do not have an overview of what has happened.
AP News, Times of Israel, and Economic Times of India come to practically the same conclusions. While all utilize the same source, they admit the following:
The three facilities (Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan) suffered significant damage.
The superficial enrichment plant in Natanz was completely destroyed, with signs of collapse of its underground infrastructure.
In Fordow, the GBU-57 bomb caused significant damage to the plant, although it is unclear if the underground plant suffered total structural collapse.
In Isfahan, the uranium reprocessing plant was also destroyed, and the underground tunnels were damaged.
It is doubtful that these facilities will be operational immediately or in the near future.
Israeli authorities claim that the reserves of 60%/20% enriched uranium are now buried under rubble in Isfahan and Fordow.
In addition to the direct damage to Iran's nuclear facilities, the decapitation of the military and scientific leadership will have devastating long-term effects on the nuclear program. The removal of top and second-tier nuclear scientists erases institutional memory and actual expertise in the program. Iran has used six types of indigenous centrifuges, designed by several of the deceased scientists.
The fact that of the 19,000 centrifuges in Natanz and Fordow, many may be damaged is a crucial factor. 16,426 of the IR 1 and IR 2m in Natanz are basically the initial low-level centrifuges that will later provide the new IR 4 and IR 6 units to achieve higher levels at Fordow.
Therefore, replacing them is not an easy task nor something done in months. This must also be added to the collateral laboratories and testing facilities that housed crucial scientific equipment for weapon research. Therefore, if you expect a photo to be your only source and do not consider all other factors, you are not providing an analysis of all sources.
On the other hand, some reports coming from Tehran stated that Iran had relocated almost all of its enriched uranium before the U.S. attack. There are satellite images that support this claim. Now, according to Israeli sources, Iran does claim it managed to move 400 kg (1016 lb) of 60% enriched uranium from Fordow and Isfahan to an undisclosed location.
If they transported the material secretly, they did so in construction vehicles, which do not offer the necessary protection to carry such materials. To transport adequately enriched uranium, trucks with reinforced steel containers and protective casing are required.
Satellite imagery could track their routes and possible new location. So, again, the question is: Can Iran continue building a nuclear weapon?
Can it reconstruct its facilities in undisclosed locations? And the answer is yes, but it will take years.
So, after analyzing all this, let's see what the BBC, AP, NYT, and those who published the news about the DIA leak said...
The intentional leak states:
U.S. attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities did not destroy the country's nuclear program and likely only delayed it by months.
The Islamic Republic's reserves of enriched uranium were not eliminated in Saturday's bombings.
However, sources familiar with the Pentagon's intelligence assessment claim that Iranian centrifuges are virtually "intact" and that the impact was limited to superficial structures.
The entrances to two nuclear facilities were sealed and part of the infrastructure was destroyed or damaged, but much of the facilities, which are located deep underground, escaped the explosions.
The resumption of its nuclear program may depend on how long it takes the country to dig and make repairs.
The United States has 18 intelligence agencies, which sometimes produce contradictory reports depending on their mission and area of expertise.
The only unbiased truth in their analysis was that "... future intelligence reports may include more information that shows a different level of damage to the facilities".
They clarified that the Pentagon stated the damage assessment would take time. The Pentagon reiterated that the sites suffered extremely severe damage.
The article, on the other hand, quotes Hassam Abedini from Iranian state broadcasting, who claims that materials were safe and were removed before the attack, but does not mention the state of the facilities. The article adds: "... He added that the administration has not said whether the attacks destroyed Iran's ability to make weapons with its uranium, its uranium enrichment centrifuges, or whether they depleted its arsenal, which, he claimed, would be sufficient to create nine nuclear weapons..."
Another topic they did address was a report from Saudi media Al Hadath, which cited an anonymous Israeli source and claimed that Israel believes that most of Iran's enriched uranium is buried under the rubble.
A counterpoint to the leaked article is the quote from David Albright (president of the Institute for Science and International Security and expert on the secret development of nuclear weapons), who stated that the damage sustained by Iran from the U.S. attacks will mean that it will take a long time, investment, and energy to restore its nuclear program.
And the smartest decision was for the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to refuse to comment on the DIA's assessment.
When we receive a report with all sources, including intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT) from Israel, the United States, and other foreign services, we will be able to corroborate one or the other. But there are too many loose ends to conclude that the damage would only delay the Iranian program by several months.
The destruction of certain centrifuges in Natanz, type IR-1 and IR-2, which practically initiate enrichment up to 20%, would delay the program immediately.
It is important to consider that there are cascade centrifuges and many other components necessary for transitioning from one level to another.
Therefore, if the link is broken at any level, reaching the next one is impeded. If they have 60% enriched uranium, but do not have the capability to enrich it to 90% and, furthermore, do not have the ability to convert it into a nuclear weapon, that is a success of the mission...
And that is the destruction of their nuclear program, which is why the president, I believe, rightly uses that term, said Vance...
Finally, if Iran were to launch a covert nuclear program, it would do so at a disadvantage, having lost, due to Israeli and U.S. attacks, vital equipment and personnel crucial to turning enriched uranium into a functional nuclear weapon.
Intentional leaks often cause more harm than help clarify the truth; the complThe complexity of what happened requires time. To reclaim the narrative is a tactic to undermine a person or government and their achievements.
Read what you want, consider the source, but never let yourself be convinced by an analysis based on a single source.
Footnotes
After uranium enrichment, it is usually converted back into a solid state, specifically uranium dioxide (UO₂), which is then used to create nuclear fuel pellets. The hexafluoride gas of enriched uranium (UF₂) is heated and chemically processed to form UO₂ powder.
According to the UN nuclear watchdog, theoretically, 42 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% is enough to produce a nuclear bomb if further enriched to 90%.
References
Associated Press (n.d.). A preliminary report from US intelligence suggests that US strikes only delayed Iran's nuclear program by months. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-program-military-strikes-trump-f0fc085a2605e7da3e2f47ff9ac0e01d
Axios (n.d.). Israeli officials observe "significant" damage to Iran's nuclear facilities. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.axios.com/2025/06/25/iran-nuclear-program-israel-damage-intelligence
BBC News (n.d.). Trump counters after a report leaks suggesting that attacks on Iran had a limited impact. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce9x809vgrro
BBC News. (n.d.). U.S. strikes did not destroy Iran's nuclear program, according to intelligence analysis. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckglxwp5x03o
The Economic Times. (n.d.). Where are 400 kg of enriched uranium? Iran claims to have secretly moved nuclear material to an undisclosed location before U.S. airstrikes hit nuclear facilities. Here's how uranium may have been transported secretly. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/where-is-400-kg-enriched-uranium-iran-claims-to-secretly-move-nuclear-material-to-undisclosed-location-before-us-airstrikes-hit-nuclear-sites-heres-how-uranium-may-have-been-transported-secretly/articleshow/122028401.cms?from=mdr
The Jerusalem Post. (n.d.). Iran seeks to restore its nuclear industry, claims Iranian nuclear chief. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-858888
The New York Times (n.d.). See the strategic infrastructure that Israel has damaged in Iran. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/18/world/middleeast/israel-iran-strikes-facilities-map.html
Times of Israel (n.d.). The war between Israel and Iran in numbers, after 12 days of fighting. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-israel-iran-war-by-the-numbers-after-12-days-of-fighting/
Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Pérez is a United States Army intelligence officer with extensive experience, having more than two decades of active service and other assignments in the reserves. He specialized in intelligence and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, commanding operations at Fort Leonard Wood and serving in the Republic of Korea. At the Defense Intelligence Agency, he focused on North Korean military analysis and responded to crises related to the Achille Lauro and TWA 847 incidents. Pérez volunteered in the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Shield/Desert Storm and later served as Chief Intelligence Instructor at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, where he trained Latin American officers in low-intensity conflicts. His reserve career culminated at U.S. Southern Command as a strategic intelligence officer (J2 Ops).
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